

Liberation Movements and the Political Opposition in Democracies:

The case of the ANC in South Africa's democracy

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Declaration

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Abstract

The topic of democratic consolidation has become an important field of study, particularly in developing states with national liberation movements (NLM) turned government. These liberation movements originally fought against authoritarian regimes in the hopes of implementing a democratic regime. Once the conversion to a democratic regime has occurred and during the subsequent electoral process, the NLM usually becomes the ruling party. The way in which these NLM governments view political opposition has a crucial impact on the prospects for democratic consolidation, as political opposition (and therefore electoral contestation and choice), is one of the key recognised foundations of a democratic regime.

This thesis intended to answer: How does the African National Congress (ANC), as a core contributor of South Africa's NLM and the incumbent ruling party, view political opposition in a democratic regime, and why? This was achieved with a case study design and qualitative research approach. Using ATLAS.ti key terms were coded and the party's language, within their Strategy and Tactics (S&T) documents from 1997 to 2017, was analysed. Key terms were drawn out from the understanding of political opposition as an important institutional foundation for democratic consolidation (to answer the first part of the question) and the three main ideological strands found within the party, which were expected to influence the ANC's view, namely, liberalism, communism, and Africanism (to answer the second part of the question).

The findings revealed that the ANC is subject to a mixture of ideological influences that inform its view of political opposition and inadvertently of itself in a democratic setting. Of note was the term 'vanguard', which was most prevalent in all S&T documents throughout the period analysed. The term, associated with Leninism, infers that the ANC sees only itself as qualified to lead South Africa and implies that opposition parties are hostile to the ANC's transformation project in the South African context. This communist ideology came to influence the ANC in the 1960s during its liberation history. And, as is evident from the analysis, remains influential. However, the investigation showed that this was not the only ideology to influence the ANC's view of political parties, as the endorsement of liberal values and thus the need for pluralism and multi-parties was also strongly evident. These different ideological influences thus continue to contend for the ANC's view of opposition and itself in a democratic setting. Even so, the vanguard-view as an antagonistic approach towards political opposition in a democratic regime remains an obstacle to South Africa's democratic consolidation.

Opsomming

Demokratiese konsolidasie het oor die laaste paar jare 'n belangrike onderwerp en studieveld geword, veral waar ontwikkelende lande met nasionale liberale bewegings (NLBs) ter sprake is. Dié liberale bewegings het oorspronklik teen outoritêre regimes baklei, met die hoop om 'n demokratiese regering aan bewind te bring. Wanneer 'n demokratiese regime daar gestel is, en gedurende die daaropvolgende verkiesingsprosedure, het die NLBs gewoonlik ook die rol van die regerende party ingeneem. Hoe hierdie NLBs dan ander politiese partye benader, wat in opposisie teenoor hulle staan, speel 'n kritieke rol in die vooruitsigte van demokratiese konsolidasie, omdat 'n opposisie party, en dus ook die kompetisie binne 'n verkiesing en stemkeuse, een van die belangrikste grondslae is vir 'n demokratiese regime.

Hierdie tesis beoog om die vraag te beantwoord: Hoe ag die regerende African National Congress (ANC), een van die kern NLBs in Suid-Afrika, die opposisie in die land se demokrasie? En hoekom? Die gevolgtrekkings is gemaak deur gevallestudies te bestudeer en kwalitatiewe navorsingsbenaderings te volg. Deur gebruik te maak van ATLAS.ti, is sleutelwoorde en die party se stemming binne die raamwerk van die ANC se Strategie en Taktiek (S&T) dokumente, wat tussen 1997 en 2017 geskryf is, te ontleed. Sleutelwoorde is onttrek deur die rol wat politiese opposisie as 'n belangrike institusionele grondslag vir demokratiese konsolidasie te verstaan, wat dan die eerste deel van die vraag beantwoord. Die drie hoof ideologieë wat die party volg, wat dan ook die party se benaderings stipuleer, bestaan uit liberalisme, kommunisme en Afrikanisme. Dit antwoord dus die tweede deel van die vraag.

Dit bewys dus dat die ANC onderhewig is aan 'n mengsel van ideologiese invloede wat die sienings van die politiese opposisie, en tot 'n mate ook sy eie sienings, in 'n demokratiese omgewing voorskryf. Een belangrike sleutelwoord – voorhoede – het die meeste voorgekom het in die S&T dokumente in die tydperk wat geanaliseer is. Die woord, in Engels *vanguard*, word oor die algemeen verbind met Lenninisme en kan mens aflei dat die ANC slegs homself as gekwalifiseerd sien om die regerende party in Suid-Afrika te wees. Dit impliseer dat opposisie partye dikwels vyandig is teenoor die ANC se transformasie projekte binne 'n plaaslike konteks. Die kommunistiese ideologieë het sy plek in die ANC ingeneem gedurende die 1960s, wat deel van sy bevrydingstydperk gevorm het. Soos wat die analise verder uitgewys het, bly dit 'n groot faktor in die party se hedendaagse ideologieë. Die analise het egter gewys dat die nie die enigste ideologieë is wat die ANC se siening van ander politieke partye beïnvloed nie, omdat die goedkeuring van liberale waardes en dus ook die behoefte aan

pluralisme en multi-partye ook belangrik is. Hierdie ideologiese invloed veg dus steeds vir die ANC se siening van opposisie partye en hoe dit in 'n demokratiese omgewing pas. Hoe dit ookal sy, die verhoede siening, wat as 'n antoginistiese benadering teenoor opposisie partye in die demokrasie optree, is steeds 'n struikelblok in die demokratiese konsolidasie proses van Suid-Afrika.

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List of Acronyms

AA	Affirmative Action
ANC	African National Congress
ANCYL	African National Congress Youth League
AU	African Union
BBBEE	Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
COPE	Congress of the People
COSATU	The Congress of South African Trade Unions
CPSA	Communist Party of South Africa
DA	Democratic Alliance
FRELIMO	The Mozambique Liberation Front
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MK	Umkhonto we Sizwe
MP	Member of Parliament
NA	National Assembly
NCOP	National Council of Provinces
NDR	National Democratic Revolution
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NLM	National Liberation Movement
NP	National Party

S&T	Strategy and Tactics
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SACP	South African Communist Party
SANNC	South African Native National Congress
SWAPO	The South West People's Organisation
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UDF	United Democratic Front
WSSD	World Summit on Sustainable Development
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front

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Chapter 1

Research Plan

1.1 Introduction

Post-colonial liberation struggles have occurred throughout Africa during the 20th century with the successful movements assuming power as national governments in ostensibly democratic regimes (Clapham, 2012: 4). These liberation credentials provided the national liberation movement (NLM) governments with legitimacy (one that was not necessarily contingent on delivery, however), as well as a sense of entitlement to rule in the long term that potentially threatened the importance and the capability of political opposition. This becomes a challenge when the chosen regime for the new state is democracy, as is the case in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC) has been a key role player in South Africa, having governed since the country's first post-apartheid democratic elections in 1994. It is important to look at how political opposition is viewed by the ruling party, as a vibrant and viable opposition is a crucial part of the competitive element in electoral processes, and so resistance to having an opposition can undermine the regime. Political opposition provides legitimacy to a democratic regime as it holds the ruling party accountable for their actions safeguarding the system from corruption and offers the citizenry a peaceful alternative to their current leaders. Generally, the rallying for votes increases the quality of government as each party aims to impress the public, altogether improving the nation. Without support for opposition, the entire regime would collapse as the ability to choose your ruling party is what makes a democracy democratic. Resistance to the idea of political opposition would have an undesirable effect on the system, thus emphasising the importance of determining whether the ANC supports the concept of political opposition in order to consolidate South Africa's democratic regime.

1.2 Background

A liberation movement is defined as being engaged in a struggle for national liberation through political strategy and sometimes violence (Clapham, 2012). National liberation refers to "political independence in a sovereign state under a government representing the majority of the previously colonised people, who had been excluded from full participation in society through the imposition of an oppressive system" (Melber, 2011: 82). Therefore, a NLM government is one that has succeeded in its struggle and risen to power; many NLMs choose democracy as the regime for the new state. Coming from a military-like structure during the

struggle, however, these parties often battle to transition into a political party in a democratic setting. This transition tends to result in the development of certain characteristics of NLM governments, such as: unfamiliarity with government and the practices and responsibilities of governing; poor governance; the fact that legitimacy is not based on delivery of efficacy, but rather based on historical moments; a sense of entitlement based on the history of the struggle and winning the battle for national liberation; and dominance of the party.

Much of the literature on liberation movements as governments states that it is a common occurrence for these parties to become dominant parties in the subsequent democratic dispensation (De Jager, 2009; De Jager & Steenekamp 2016; Dorman, 2006; Gumede, 2017; Johnson, 2003; Melber, 2008; Ottoway, 1991; Salih, 2007; Wallerstein, 1996). However, democratic regimes require free and fair competitive elections, preferably between parties of similar strength so that there is better balance (Schedler, 2001: 71). Dominant political parties defeat the objective of a democratic regime and affect the chances of consolidation.

Democratic consolidation, which is defined as “the assessment of the degree to which a democracy is consolidated, meaning whether it is strong enough to endure and the unlikelihood that it would revert back to authoritarianism” (Schedler, 2001: 66), has three key foundations, namely, behavioural, attitudinal and institutional, as set out by a prominent scholar on the topic – Andreas Schedler (2001). These foundations form the criterion that determines whether a democracy will last, as each covers an important feature of a consolidated democracy. For the purpose of this study, emphasis will be placed upon the institutional foundation, since vibrant political parties are an institutional requirement of democratic consolidation. However, if a political party “refuses to participate in elections, tries to take control of electoral outcomes through fraud and intimidation, or does not accept the outcomes and rather chooses to boycott elected assemblies, mobilise extra-institutional protest or take up arms to overthrow the elected parties, then democracy will be undermined” (Schedler, 2001: 60-66).

In South Africa, the ANC won the national elections in 1994 and has subsequently been elected in six consecutive national elections, thus consolidating its position as the dominant party (De Jager & Parkin, 2017: 1). Besides the legitimacy that comes with being a liberation party, dominance can occur when opposition parties are under-funded, under-capacitated and harassed by the ruling party (Southall, 2013: 266). For example, Zimbabwe’s liberation party, the Zimbabwe African National Unit – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), uses coercive tactics and authoritarian populist policies and strategies to maintain its support base, and to portray the

opposition as the enemy (Muzondidya, 2011: 9). This gives rise to the question: Does the formation of a dominant party state undermine the importance of political opposition in a democratic regime?

This study will investigate how a key role player in the South African NLM, namely the ANC, views political opposition in an apparently democratic setting. The ANC is recognised to be a broad political organisation with different ideological influences that contend with each other, thus producing different responses to political opposition. The ANC, since its formation, has had three ideological strands: liberalism, communism, and Africanism. These ideologies form the intellectual framework which leaders within the ANC use to guide their political decisions and strategies, each with vastly different agendas. It was initially founded by missionary educated African Christian liberals in January 1912; thereafter communist and Africanist ideologies further influenced the party (De Jager, 2009: 275-276). It could be of interest to see if and how these different ideologies have influenced the ANC's view of political opposition and of itself within a democratic setting.

1.3 Preliminary Literature Review

This preliminary study of the literature was done in order to determine what has been said in the greater body of literature by scholars in the field of liberation movements, and the importance of institutions like political opposition parties in the process of democratic consolidation.

1.3.1 Institutional Foundation of Democratic Consolidation

Democratic consolidation is a concept that is widely used to assess whether a certain democracy will last, rather than reverting to an alternative regime such as that of the authoritarian nature. Having a democracy that is strong enough to last is what consolidates it. Democracy is a political system where political parties compete against each other to gain the votes of the citizenry during elections – the party with the majority or plurality of votes becomes the ruling party. This thesis adopts a minimal understanding of democracy in the Schumpeterian (1950) tradition, who defines democracy as “an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will” (Schumpeter, 2005:250). At the core of this definition is therefore choice through competitive elections.

Democracy concerns access to government power, according to Rothstein and Teorell (2008: 166), who argue that this is a necessary yet ‘insufficient criterion’ of the quality of governance. Merely having access to government does not ensure a party will act democratically, the party needs to promote the two liberal values of consent and constitutionalism, according to Heywood (2017). Schedler (2001: 67) defines democratic consolidation as “a democracy that is unlikely to ‘break down’ but rather likely to endure”.

Schedler (2001) outlines three key foundations for assessing democratic consolidation. The first is the behavioural foundation, which determines indications of democratic trouble through actor (political party or member) behaviour, such as “violence, transgression of authority, or the rejection of elections” (Schedler, 2001: 71). The second foundation is attitudinal, which assesses the political attitudes of actors and whether they ensure the stability of democracy (Schedler, 2001: 71-72). While, these foundations are recognised, emphasis will be placed on the third foundation. This being the structural foundation, which consists of the socioeconomic context and the institutional foundation. These are imperative for the survival of any democracy. The socioeconomic foundation states that wealthy nations are more likely to have a consolidated democracy than poorer nations (Schedler, 2001: 80). Many scholars agree, stating that poor democracies are extremely fragile, as social inequalities and poverty tend to threaten the stability of a democracy (Lipset, 1981; Przeworski et al., 1996). The institutional foundation shows that formal institutions with incentive structures will determine whether there is any anti-democratic behaviour. Democracy is based on “political equality, which requires impartial government institutions to regulate access to political power”, according to Rothstein and Teorell (2008: 180). Schedler (2001: 84) argues that democratic stability is attained when attitudinal and structural evidence agrees with behavioural evidence. The attitudes of actors towards the system and the structure of the system may influence actors to act in an anti-democratic manner, thus preventing consolidation.

A democratic regime has several institutional requirements. Dahl (2005: 188) listed the most important: (1) “Elected officials”, (2) “Free, fair and frequent elections”, (3) “Freedom of expression”, (4) “Alternative sources of information”, (5) “Associational autonomy, to achieve their various rights, citizens have the right to form independent associations or organisations”, and (6) “Inclusive citizenship, meaning no person residing in the country and is subject to the country’s laws, can be denied the rights that are available to others”. Moreover, “democracy

requires a supportive culture and acceptance by both the citizenry and the political elites of the principles underlying freedom of speech, media, assembly, religion, of the rights of opposition parties, of the rule of law, of human rights and the like” (Lipset, 1994: 3). Without political opposition, democracy would fail to meet these requirements. In this view, Schumpeter (1950: 250) defines “democracy as the institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”.

Political parties and elections are an integral part of any functioning democracy. They “compete with one another, using the electoral system to gain power in their state” (De Jager, 2010: 107). Although they are a crucial part of determining the strength of any democratic regime, they are not considered a sufficient measure as such, but rather “a necessary indication” of whether a democracy will endure or not (De Jager, 2010: 107). Lipset (1993: 43-53) suggests that “political parties should be viewed as the most important mediating institution between the citizenry and the state”; as representation in government for the people. In his later work, he states that “a crucial condition for a stable democracy is that major parties can only exist when they have an almost permanent significant support base” (Lipset, 1994: 14). If such commitment does not exist, then it is likely that such parties will be eliminated thus removing an effective opposition (Lipset, 1994: 14). Lipset (1994) emphasises the importance of having a strong or effective political opposition and how support for this is vital for democracy to work. Freedom of choice is a defining concept of democracy, and thus elections, where voters do not have access to alternative political parties, are – by definition – not effectively democratic. New democracies must be institutionalised, consolidated and become legitimate, as they face a fair amount of issues that accompany the transition from liberation movement to democracy. These, amongst others, include: creating a growing and inclusive economy; reducing the tensions with and replacing the old civil and military elites; and formulating workable democratic electoral and administrative systems that rest on stable political parties (see Di Palma, 1990; Huntington, 1991; Linz & Stepan, 1989; Whitehead, 1989). Thus, the importance of political opposition reveals itself as the basis of a stable democratic society. This literature is expanded upon in Chapter 2.

1.3.2 Liberation Movements as Governments

A liberation movement is a struggle for national liberation by a mass organisation through violence and political strategy usually against an oppressive force. Southall (2003: 257) stated

that there were two waves of liberation movements: the first sought to rid the country of the original colonisers, while the second, usually occurring much later than the first, sought to liberate the people from the colonisers who settled after the first wave and were reluctant to leave. The ANC NLM falls within the second wave, as it liberated the people from apartheid.

Once the liberation struggle is over, these movements typically transition into political parties within a democratic society. However, due to their history as military-like organisations, they tend to struggle to abide by the rules of democracy (Clapham, 2012; Dorman, 2006; Gumede, 2017; Melber, 2008; Southall, 2013; Suttner, 2008). Many scholars have negative sentiments towards this transition, stating that such movements ascend to power and take control of state machinery with no prior knowledge on how to do so, and that their legitimacy stems from their role in the struggle (Clapham, 2012; Melber, 2008). Liberation movements as governments in Southern Africa, such as ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe, FRELIMO in Mozambique, and SWAPO in Namibia, have developed similar characteristics: lack of familiarity with democratic government; dominant party systems; poor governance; and reliance on legitimacy gained from the struggle history. These characteristics all affect the ways in which a NLM views political opposition.

In African culture, “the concept of opposition and enemy came to mean the same thing”, as the “only known opposing force was the enemy from outside” (Osabu-Kle, 2001: 19). Many liberation movements see themselves “as the ‘embodiment’ of the nation or the ‘people’” (Osabu-Kle, 2001: 19). In such a worldview, “opposition is seen as going against the voice of the ‘people’” (Logan, 2008: 11). Many NLMs “divide the world between those who are on their side and those who belong to the old order”, meaning the colonial power or oppressor. Gumede (2010: 31) explains that legitimate opposition to the sitting NLM is often portrayed as such opposition being in league with the former colonial power, with “foreign ‘enemy’ governments or with defending white minority or ‘settler’ interests”. Such a viewpoint is harmful to the democratic ethos, as political opposition needs to be accepted and supported in order for a democracy to work effectively, according to Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1990: 16-18). The literature on liberation movements as governments is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2.

1.4 Problem Statement

It has been seen that NLMs in Southern Africa tend to become dominant once they are elected into government, effectively becoming a one-party state. Engagement in anti-democratic

behaviour tends to follow in such cases as the ruling party aims to maintain their electoral position by undermining the opposition. Dominant systems occur and anti-democratic behaviour involving the opposition arises. In Zimbabwe, for example, politically motivated violence occurred during the 2000 and 2002 presidential elections over “land expropriation towards supporters of the opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)” (Hove, 2013: 79). In Namibia, the transition to democracy was less violent but the political opposition was incapacitated. Namibia’s opposition parties receive no private funding from the government, unlike SWAPO, and are entirely dependent on public subsidies, which are “paid exclusively to groups represented by the National Assembly” (Cooper, 2014: 112). This reveals that Namibia is an unconsolidated democracy, as opposition parties are an intrinsic part of any democracy and effectively legitimise the regime. In South Africa, the question thus arises whether the ANC is following this trend as a NLM that legitimises its power by engaging in the anti-democratic behaviour of undermining political opposition and attracting support by relying on its liberation struggle history? The ANC have had consecutive electoral victories since the implementation of a democratic system in South Africa in 1994, despite growing levels of poor governance over the years (Britz, 2011: 113-117). There is also a wide margin between the ANC and the official opposition in terms of support. It is imperative for a democracy to have a viable opposition, making it important to understand how South Africa’s key NLM party, the ANC, views political opposition.

1.5 Research Questions

Democracy relies on the support and acceptance of its underlying principles, such as contestation and choice, which allow voters the right to individual opinions when choosing for whom to cast their vote. A crucial institution that is based on these principles is that of a healthy / strong political opposition, which is imperative for the survival of a democracy. Disagreement with the principle of having political opposition and its importance can result in a gradual breakdown of the entire regime, as the very ethos of democracy relies on it. NLMs endured a struggle that has provided the nation with the opportunity to introduce a political regime such as democracy. Although it was the NLM that originally introduced the regime, correct implementation is necessary for democratic consolidation and the survival of democracy. In countries where NLMs have come to power and ostensibly instituted a democratic regime, they have also suppressed, weakened, disempowered, or aggressively attacked the political opposition. However, democracy, by definition, requires both a governing party and a healthy opposition.

South Africa, having gone through a significant liberation struggle, successfully transitioned into a democracy in 1994, with a core NLM party (the ANC) winning the first election. The ANC has remained in power since then. In order to determine whether South Africa's incumbent has adhered to the principles of democracy, several inter-related questions are being posed in this thesis: How does the ANC, as a liberation movement in government, view the political opposition in South Africa's democracy? And, why? And what informs their views?

It is envisaged that this research will reveal how the ANC political party views the opposition, and that it may determine the extent to which South Africa's democracy is consolidated, based on its acceptance and tolerance of political opposition. It is also envisaged that this research will add to the body of literature on the topic of liberation movements who have subsequently formed governments. To do so, the research will be divided into two sections:

- I. How does the ANC, as a liberation movement in government, view political opposition in South Africa's democracy?
- II. Why does the ANC have this particular view?
 - a. What are the three main ideological influences within the ANC?
 - b. What is each ideology's stance on opposition parties?
 - c. How have these ideologies informed the ANC's view of political opposition?

1.6 Research Design and Methodology

This study takes the form of a qualitative desktop analysis. This case study of the ANC as a NLM will use a conceptual framework built on the institutional conditions for democratic consolidation and the three ideological strands within the ANC, namely, the liberalist, communist and Africanist strands. It has been postulated that political ideology provides the intellectual framework for political parties, which in turn "helps them to make sense of the world in which they live" (Heywood, 2013: 29). Hence, the utilisation of the ANC's ideological influences in the study is expected to uncover their view of political opposition. The research design is based on a case study of the ANC as South Africa's NLM and provides an intensive description of this group, which is a characteristic feature of case study research (Mouton, 2010: 56). The research design will also utilise historical analysis of the ANC as a liberation movement as well as the history and gradual influence of each ideology on the movement turned political party. Understanding the evolutionary influence of the various ideologies within the ANC and understanding the history of the ANC as a liberation movement will aid in determining the various views of political opposition.

The research method will be a systematic desktop content analysis of the relevant documentation from the ANC's five national policy conference documents, specifically the Strategy and Tactics (S&T) documents. These documents were chosen as they clearly state the political party's goals, aspirations and plans for the upcoming years until they reassess and repeat every five years. The concepts of strategy and tactics are defined in the 2002 ANC S&T document as:

Strategy represents the broad definition of the ultimate objectives of struggle: in brief, what kind of society we seek to create, the forces that are objectively the drivers of the struggle, and the forces arraigned against them. Tactics are the variety of methods used to attain those objectives, including the instruments used to wage the struggle and how to mobilise and organise the motive forces.

(ANC, 2002: 1).

This study will only look at the S&T documents from the national conferences, which occurred every 5 years under ANC rule, from 1997 until the most recent conference in 2017. There are limitations to using the S&T documents as they are written by the ANC and therefore describe what the ANC intends to portray to the public. This means that what is stated within the documents may not pertain to the actions of the ANC, they are more aspirational documents. The methodology is qualitative as it gathers non-numerical data from the ANC national conference S&T documents. The investigation will entail a systematic documentation search, which will look at the ideas and sentiment documented in these national policy conference documents. The way in which these documents reveal the ANC's sentiments towards political opposition is through the use of certain terminology and language that is linked to the understanding of the concept of political opposition and the party's ideological background and influences. For example, repetitive support for democracy and individual liberty shows the liberal ideological strand is present.

The conceptual framework outlines the different ideological strands within the ANC. Each ideology, as will be explained (see Section 3.3), has a specific way of perceiving and referring to political opposition with reference to their main ideological principles. The investigation will systematically search each of the five national policy conference documents for key terms from each ideology. Recurring terms will be collected and arranged from the understanding of the concept of political opposition (Table 1) and the descriptions of each ideological strand in a tabular format (Table 2). This will allow for categorisation of the ANC's viewpoints on political opposition, according to the number of terms found in the documents and to which

ideology they refer. This process will then highlight, according to the various ideologies, how the ANC responds to and views political opposition, and inadvertently itself, in a democratic setting.

1.6.1 Coding Process

The process of coding is vital to this study as it is the means to data collection. This is a qualitative desktop study and requires the use of a qualitative data programme. The chosen programme is ATLAS.ti as it allows for all five of the ANC S&T documents, since the ANC was democratically elected in 1994, to be uploaded and coded with the political opposition and ideological key terms.

ATLAS.ti creates a platform for research analysis allowing for the arrangement, resemblance (such as, looking for similarities), and management of the material in a ‘creative’ yet systematic way (ATLAS.ti, 2018). A search for predetermined key terms is done using the programme. The documents are read in detail in order to gain a broader understanding of each document as well as aid with the contextual understanding. The search is done by locating the key terms throughout the documents as either a direct utilisation of the term or on a contextual basis. The data is then organised through grouping and coding, thus sorting the keywords into relevant categories. From this, an examination of the data will occur to highlight links and trends within the five S&T documents allowing for conclusions to be drawn on how and why the ANC views political opposition in a particular way.

According to Saldaña (2013: 3) “a code in qualitative inquiry is most often a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data”. Therefore, when the key terms or codes are applied and reapplied to the S&T documents, this is defined as ‘coding’. Coding entails arranging things in “a systematic order, to make something part of a system or classification [such as the ideological strands of the ANC], to categorize” (Saldaña, 2013: 8). The political opposition and ideology key terms are operationalised further along in the research in Chapters 2 and 3.

1.7 Conceptual Framework

The conceptual theory and understanding of the role, function and importance of political opposition is presented under the structural foundation of democratic consolidation (see Section 2.2.2.3.1). Analysis of the ANC’s view of opposition in terms of the three main

different ideological strands mentioned, namely, the liberalist, the communist and the Africanist ideologies will be briefly presented here. The conceptual framework that is used in this study looks at institutional conditions for democratic consolidation, as this is a way of assessing the state of a democracy and determining whether it will last. Throughout the ANC's long existence, the party has been influenced by diverse ideologies, which have varied views on the institutional conditions for democratic consolidation. Alongside elections, "the presence of a vibrant and viable political society in the form of political parties has become the yardstick of the health of a democracy" (De Jager, 2010: 107). Herein lies the crux of the institutional requirements for democratic consolidation. South Africa's diverse ideological roots create unique institutional beliefs for the ANC. The three ideological strands that have heavily influenced the ANC, and in turn have influenced their views on political opposition, are briefly discussed below.

1.7.1 Liberal Ideological Strand

This strand specifically refers to Christian liberalism that can be "traced back to the founding members of the ANC as well as to later members, such as Albert Luthuli and Oliver Tambo" (De Jager, 2009: 276). This ideology dates back to January 1912, when the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) was formed by leaders from the African middle class. They were "largely drawn from Kholwa, a Zulu word meaning Christian converts that promoted Victorian values of moral progress, material advancement and personal respectability" (De Jager & Steenekamp, 2015: 919). The founders of the ANC were the product of early Christian missionaries, "as the government did not provide education to black Africans in the official education system" (De Jager & Steenekamp, 2015: 919). Hence their education was according to the "relatively liberal Western tradition" (Thompson, 2001: 156). These roots influenced the ANC for years to come as founding principles. The "leadership was committed to a method of opposition that emphasised responsible citizenship, whilst rejecting acts of protest or demonstration" (De Jager, 2009: 277). Their beliefs were made up of a commitment to constitutionalism that was based on Christian values (De Jager, 2009: 277).

1.7.2 Communist Ideological Strand

The Cold War had a significant influence on the "African continent and its liberation movements due to the financial, military and ideological support provided by the Soviet Union and communist China" (De Jager & Steenekamp, 2016: 921). This ideological strand is

influenced by communists and their “non-racialist and socialist economic ideals” (De Jager, 2009: 276). These ideals were introduced to the ANC by the South African Communist Party (SACP) in 1928, when they introduced the call for “an independent native republic” (Dubow, 2000: 14). The SACP believed that “working class unity transcended racial divisions” thus included members from all racial groups (Lodge, 1983: 7). The SACP cemented its influence within the ANC’s military wing ‘Umkhonto we Sizwe’ (MK), gradually reaching the ANC (Dubow, 2000: 77). The ANC was banned in 1960; due to its large size, underground activity proved difficult, making it reliant on the SACP (De Jager, 2009: 277). This is when the communist ideology seeped into the ANC as a major ideological influence. Many scholars discuss this transition into dependence on SACP, referring to it as a move from non-violence into armed struggle, and the declaration of war on the government, thus increasing the importance of the SACP alliance (Ellis & Sechaba, 1992: 35; Gevisser, 2007: 149). The ANC received much of its military resources and equipment from communist nations in the North, such as the Soviet Union and China, due to the SACP’s connections.

1.7.3 Africanist Ideological Strand

This strand refers to the Africanists’ “promotion of a black African-biased African nationalism” (De Jager, 2009: 276). This ideology was first introduced to the ANC in the 1920s when the ideals of Pan-Africanism’s main idea of ‘an Africa for Africans’ started to influence the party (De Jager, 2009: 276). Emphasis was placed on “African self-sufficiency and the pre-eminence of the racial struggle” (Dubow, 2000: 15). These ideals gained traction in the 1940s, as evident from the ANC 1943 seminal document ‘African Claims’, which contrasted with previous ANC discourse, as “polite requests turned into demands, calling for a future that promoted more interventionist state” (De Jager, 2009: 277). This revealed a change in ideology from the softer approach of Christian liberalism. Further evidence of this shift emerged when the ANC Youth League was “formed in 1943, with leader Anton Lembede’s philosophies” indicating a move towards “revolutionary militancy and racial exclusivism” (Gevisser, 2007: 37). Hereafter, the ANC adopted the Youth League’s ‘Programme of Action’, which committed the ANC to achieving national liberation through boycotts, strikes and civil disobedience – exactly what the Christian liberals wanted to avoid (De Jager, 2009: 277).

1.8 Limitations and Delimitations

This study and the chosen methodology do have some limitations. One of these is the research design: desktop analysis relies on the use of secondary sources, which may reflect the potential

biases of the authors (Britz, 2011: 9). In addition, primary data in the form of the ANC's S&T documents is analysed. In this case study, the author of the ANC national policy conference S&T documents is the ruling party itself, hence it is assumed that it would be in the best interests of the ANC to release documentation that reflects themselves in a good light and as being supportive of democracy. Another limitation is that the researcher is the only one collecting data and therefore can also be seen as biased. One way of reducing this would be for the researcher to keep all ideological strands in mind, while carefully and systematically searching for each key term. An additional limitation is that this research is specific to the case study, in other words, on the specific history and ideological influences that are unique to the ANC as South Africa's ruling party, which means that the findings cannot be generalised to other countries.

This thesis was delimited in order to make it achievable and manageable within the allocated amount of time. The first delimitation was that the research was done over a two-year period; as the selected submission date is in November 2019, the study period was reduced to 23 months. The research was furthermore narrowed down to South Africa's NLM, rather than NLMs in general, in order to make it more manageable. The ANC has been influenced by many political ideologies since its founding, yet only the three main ideologies of liberalism, communism, and Africanism were used to collect the key terms and relevant data. The fourth delimitation is that the documents used for data collection were limited to the five post-apartheid ANC national policy conference documents, as the national policy S&T documents before 1994 fell under the previous apartheid regime. Additionally, it is recognised that there are other ways in which to analyse the ANC, for example its behaviour. However, this study is focusing on the content in the ANC's S&T documents as a means of understanding the party's view on political opposition. As the national conferences only occurred every five years after apartheid ended starting with the 1997 document, there are only five S&T documents to be studied. However, these cover a large spectrum of policies, which thus provided sufficient data relating to the research question.

1.9 Chapter Outline

This thesis consists of five chapters. *Chapter 2* is broken down into two parts. The first outlines the literature available on the theory of democratic consolidation with a focus on the concept and role of political parties in democracies. The first key terms table from the conceptualisation of political opposition is provided for application in ATLAS.ti. The second part looks at the

body of literature around NLMs as governments with a specific focus on the ANC NLM. *Chapter 3* contextualises the ANC's liberation history and explains the evolution of the party's ideological influences. It also provides the second key terms table from the conceptualisation of the three main ideologies to be applied to the ATLAS.ti programme. *Chapter 4* analyses and presents the data from the political opposition and ideology key term coding process. *Chapter 5* contains the concluding remarks and makes several recommendations for future research in this field.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

The aim of this study is to determine how the ANC, as a NLM turned government, views political opposition in South Africa's democracy and what informs its views. In order to do so, it is necessary to clarify the concepts of democratic consolidation and liberation movements. In particular, an understanding of the institutional conditions of democratic consolidation – specifically as it relates to the requirement of political opposition in a democracy – is essential to this study. Moreover, the ANC's transition to power has influenced the political party in many ways, revealing characteristics that are commonly found in Southern African NLM parties. This chapter's purpose is to provide an overview of the literature on these two concepts, namely, democratic consolidation and liberation movements as governments, thus allowing for a more informed approach to the study. In the sections below, the concept of democratic consolidation and how it relates to political parties (Section 2.2) will be discussed, followed by what a liberation movement is and which characteristics manifest once they become the official government of a country (Section 2.3). Thereafter, a more specific look at the South African situation will occur, with the ANC as a liberation movement government and other literature already written on its view of political opposition (Section 2.4).

2.2 Democratic Consolidation and Political Parties

This section will start by defining the concepts of democratic consolidation and deconsolidation, and describing the three key foundations of democratic consolidation, as set out by Schedler (2001), which includes the importance of the political opposition. The conceptualisation of political opposition will form the basis for the key terms that will be operationalised (see Section 2.2.2.3.1.1) in order to answer the first part of the research question (i.e., What the ANC's view of political opposition is). Thereafter, focus on democratic consolidation in the South African context will be discussed.

2.2.1 Defining Democratic consolidation

In order to better understand the literature on democratic consolidation, it is important first to understand the concept of democracy itself. Democracy is a political system in which citizens have the right to give their input toward political decisions and to vote for representatives of

their choice, who will make political decisions on their behalf. Democracy is underpinned by the value of political equality, which means that every citizen's vote has equal value.

“Free and fair elections, being a procedural aspect of democracy, are considered as necessary but not a sufficiently strong pillar of democratic consolidation”, according to De Jager (2010: 105). Additional important pillars include: “(1) the creation of a protected space for opposition parties to act freely; (2) recognition of the potential cooperative relations between government and citizenry; (3) recognition and protection of civil liberties, such as freedom of the press; (4) separation of powers to ensure accountability and guard against excessive power accumulation; (5) agreement of all parties to participate fairly under the established regulations; (6) the recognition of the rule of law, which no party is above” (De Jager, 2010: 105). These pillars are crucial to the “maintenance and establishment of the spirit of a democratic society” (Schrire, 2001: 136).

The concept of democratic consolidation is used to assess the degree to which a democratic regime is consolidated, meaning whether it is strong enough to endure. Schedler (2001) addresses the more commonly understood definition before describing his own understanding in terms of three key foundations. The commonly understood definition states that “a consolidated democracy is one that is unlikely to break down” (Schedler, 2001: 66). Schedler agrees, but describes this definition as “thin and simplistic”, and adds “that a democratic regime [is regarded] as consolidated when it is likely to endure, meaning that it can withstand any problems that arise and last a long time” (Schedler, 2001: 67). According to Schedler, three key foundations should form the framework for this definition, namely, the behavioural, attitudinal and structural foundations. These will be discussed further, following a review of the literature on democratic consolidation.

Similar to Schedler (2001), Foa and Mounk (2017: 8) understand democratic consolidation as having been achieved when liberal democracy has become properly entrenched in a particular country. Democratic consolidation thus exists when a democracy is stable (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 14-33). Foa and Mounk (2017: 9) include the further criterion of the citizenry’s belief in the democratic system and in the fact “that democratic forms of government possess a unique legitimacy and that authoritarian alternatives are unacceptable”. However, they also raise the question of what will happen when the citizenry no longer believes that the democratic system of government is legitimate (Foa & Mounk, 2017: 9). They note that democracy may in fact

“deconsolidate when a group loses belief in democratic values, beliefs and practices” (Foa & Mounk, 2017: 9).

An alternative way of determining how consolidation occurs could be to look at why democracies fail instead of how they succeed. Kapstein and Converse (2008) cover this topic, with a particular focus on institutional faults that might cause the collapse of democracies. They argue that many experts focus on the economic performance of a state to determine its strength and its likeliness to succeed as a democratic regime (Kapstein & Converse, 2008: 57). They further argue that “young democracies are likely to suffer from institutional weakness” (Kapstein & Converse, 2008: 57). This occurs for numerous reasons: “institutions take time to build and develop credibility”; “central banks need to maintain stable monetary policies in order to fight inflation”; “judicial authorities need sufficient time to establish their independence from political intrusion”; parliaments and executives must shape their roles and responsibilities to “forge power-sharing arrangements that are productive and effective; and political parties need to establish and coalesce around particular themes that aggregate the interests of their core constituents” (Kapstein & Converse, 2008: 58). They further state that political scientists have found that, the longer a democratic regime endures and the better such democratic institutions have become institutionalised, the less likely the regime is to revert to authoritarian rule (Kapstein & Converse, 2008: 58). Moreover, they argue that an important determinant of democratic failure is when there are not enough restraints on executive power.

Huntington (1991) and Keefer (2005) have stressed that “the leaders of young democracies often have difficulty establishing legitimacy with the electorate and thus tend to make promises that are considered credible by their constitution”. According to Huntington (1991), young democracies are often unable to gain legitimacy and this makes it difficult for them to be effective, which in turn hampers their legitimacy. Young democracies also often have institutional weaknesses, as institutions take time to build up and to develop legitimacy (Kapstein & Converse, 2008: 58). Central banks “need time to [establish] stable monetary policies”, and “judicial authorities need time to establish that they are independent from political intrusion” (Kapstein & Converse, 2008: 58). The above restraints suggest that the duration of existence of a democracy is positively related to its chances for survival.

The closely related notion of democratic deconsolidation has also emerged in the field of political science. Foa and Mounk (2017: 9) describe this concept in depth, arguing that democracy becomes consolidated when an “overwhelming majority” of the country’s citizenry

embraces democratic values, rejects authoritarian alternatives, and supports representatives who are willing to uphold the core norms and institutions of democracy. Although Foa and Mounk focus mainly on democratic deconsolidation through the lens of democratic values, they do rely on the existence of political institutions in their argument. The existence of political institutions, such as free and fair elections, creates a space in which the assessment of political values can be researched. Foa and Mounk, however, do not focus on the importance of political institutions throughout but rather political values around such institutions.

For the purpose of this study, democratic consolidation is understood to refer to a democracy that is unlikely to break down due to the following: widespread support from the country's citizenry for a democratic regime; the support of core democratic values by representatives and the rejection of authoritarian alternatives; and sufficient institutional restraint on executive power. The next section will outline Schedler's (2001) three key foundations, with emphasis on the institutional foundation of political opposition.

2.2.2 The Three Key Foundations of Democratic Consolidation

Schedler (2001) identifies three key foundations of democratic consolidation, namely, behavioural, attitudinal and structural. Although it is important to understand the first two foundations, focus will be placed on the structural foundation, as this includes the importance of the role of institutions, such as political parties, within democratic regimes. This follows on from Kapstein and Converse's (2008) argument on institutional stability and the need for restraining political representatives through effective and viable institutions like political parties.

2.2.2.1 Behavioural foundation

The behavioural foundation of democratic stability assists one to identify indications of potential trouble by looking at instances of anti-democratic behaviour. Schedler (2001: 70) states that looking for these indications requires a strong intuitive appeal as it is not always clear, which is why he provides indicational categories. He claims that there are "three indicators of anti-democratic behaviour: the use of violence, rejections of elections, and transgression of authority" (Schedler, 2001: 71).

2.2.2.2 Attitudinal foundation

In terms of the attitudinal foundation of democracy, Schedler (2001: 75) argues that “one must look deeply into the political attitudes of actors to see whether their strategic, normative, or cognitive rationality (their preferences and perceptions) conform to the stability requirements of democratic governance”. The strategic component refers to strategic interactions between opposing actors, such as democrats against antidemocrats; the normative component is “the recognition that actors’ regime [preferences] matter for regime survival” (Schedler, 2001: 76). Lastly, he explains the cognitive attitudinal foundation, which is that “the actors’ subjective expectations for the regime are important, as they may have an impact on the consolidation of the regime” (Schedler, 2001: 78). This statement echoes Foa and Mounk’s (2017) understanding of democratic consolidation and the need for intrinsic support for democracy.

2.2.2.3 Structural foundation

Schedler’s (2001: 80) structural foundation has the most relevance to this research project, as political opposition is a democratic institution that determines a state’s democratic consolidation. A democracy is only a democracy if there is an opposition. Schedler (2001) divides this foundation into two sub-foundations: socioeconomic and institutional. Socioeconomic being a crucial factor due to the fact that “levels of economic development do translate into important constraints and opportunities for the consolidation of democracy” (Schedler, 2001: 80). Formal institutions are primarily defined as “incentive structures (that either encourage or discourage anti-democratic behaviour), and secondarily as structural constraints (that either allow or prohibit anti-democratic behaviour)” (Schedler, 2001: 81). Lipset (1981: 31) states that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy”. Other scholars in the field have also argued that “a state’s level of development has a strong effect on the probability that its democracy will survive” (Przeworski et al., 1996: 40-41).

According to Schedler, the global revival of democracy has also led to “the revival of institutional analysis in contemporary political science, and studies of democratic consolidation have benefitted from and contributed to neo-institutional insights” (Schedler, 2001: 81). The general trend in this literature shows that formal institutions are used as incentive structures that positively or negatively influence “anti-democratic behaviour and act as structural constraints that allow for or prohibit this anti-democratic behaviour” (Schedler, 2001: 81). Schedler uses electoral systems as an example, stating that they differ widely in “the incentives

they set for the institutionalisation of political parties, party-systemic fragmentation, and internal party discipline” (Schedler, 2001: 81). In many transitional democracies, “the key for institutionalizing competitive elections lies in the field of electoral governance” (Mozaffar & Schedler, 2002; Özbudun & Weiner, 1987).

Scholars tend to agree that institutional stability is a key component of democratic stability (see Dahl, 2005; Kapstein & Converse, 2008; Lipset, 1994; Schumpeter, 1950). Schumpeter (1950: 250) defines democracy as an “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of competitive struggle for the people’s vote”. This coincides with Dahl’s (2005: 188) list/pillars of the various institutional requirements of a democratic regime, namely: elected officials; the fact that “control over government decisions about policy is vested in officials” who have been elected by the citizenry, therefore making “democratic governments representative”; “free, fair and frequent elections”; “freedom of expression [which means that citizens] have the right to express their political opinions without danger”; “alternative and independent sources of information”, which are protected by law and not controlled by government; associational autonomy, which allows citizens to exercise their “various rights and to form independent organisations, such as [independent] political parties and interest groups”; and “inclusive citizenship”, which means that no adult citizen can be denied the right to the above political institutions. Most of Dahl’s institutional requirements fall under the aforementioned pillars for maintaining and establishing the democratic spirit noted by De Jager (2010: 105).

2.2.2.3.1 Political Opposition

A crucial component of a democratic regime is that of choice, as pertains to the requirement of having various political parties in which the citizenry may vote for. Without such opposition, a crucial democratic requirement would not be met. In this section, two questions will be answered: Firstly, why are political parties important in a democracy? Secondly, why is political opposition as a concept important? This conceptualisation will allow for key terms to be drawn and operationalised in order to answer the first part of the research question: What is the ANC’s view of political opposition?

In order to answer the first question, one must first understand what a political party is. A political party is a group of people with common views who come together to campaign in the hope of attracting enough support during the elections to attain political power in government, with the ultimate goal of becoming the ruling party. Political parties compete against “one

another, using the electoral mechanism to gain power” in a democracy (De Jager, 2010: 107). Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge (1994: 1) state that representatives are elected on behalf of the people to achieve success in relation to political agendas, thus turning the demands of their voters into political issues.

Sindjoun (2010: 3) argues that it can be said that democracy makes parties, considering true democracy is impossible without parties, adding that it is usually “under the emblematic reference to democracy as the prevailing institutional formula for political organization that political parties emerge”. Conversely, one could habitually associate political parties with democracy. It can also be said that political parties make democracy, as it is impossible to grasp the nature of democracy without reference to political parties (Sindjoun, 2010: 4). The very definition of democracy alludes to the importance of giving the citizenry choice by exposing them to political opposition. In agreement with this argument, De Jager (2010: 107) states that, “next to elections, the presence of a vibrant and viable political society in the form of political parties has become the yardstick of the health of democracy”. Thus “the relationship between political parties and democracy is not unidimensional; nor is it unidirectional” (De Jager, 2010: 107). Similarly, without political parties, democratic consolidation would not be possible.

The nature and content of democracy and the political liberalisation process are also influenced by political parties (Sindjoun, 2010: 6). Political parties are important in that they can fulfil democracy-supporting functions, including: aggregating and channelling interests; representing interests of citizenry; mobilising the public; utilising sources of government; and maintaining government accountability (Ball & Peters, 2005; De Jager, 2010; Randall & Svåsand, 2002).

Lipset (1994: 14) suggests that political parties can act as mediators between the “citizenry and the state; a crucial condition for a stable democracy is that major parties exist with a permanent significant base of support”. However, some political parties come to power waving the banner of democracy but “are not necessarily bound – or able – to obey its precepts once in power” (Lawson, 2010: xii). This tends to occur in liberation parties, as their support base is already established before the party comes to power, which means that they do not need to canvas for voters during elections, as they already have loyal supporters so in this sense, they tend to be different to opposition parties. Lipset (1994: 14) argues that parties in new democracies need to command allegiance to avoid being side-lined or eliminated. He states that a party’s support base must be consistent in their loyalty, despite failures of the party and/or the elected

representatives, or else the effective opposition will be eliminated. Essentially, the dominant party in power, if it lacks sufficient support, even if it is corrupt or does not behave democratically or ethically, and if it thus fears to lose its voter base, will actively try to undermine or eliminate the opposition. Liberation movements such as the ANC have an established such a large support base prior to elections, thus aiding in the avoidance of such elimination as votes are expected regardless of behaviour from the party or opposing parties.

Lawson (2010: xii) answers the first question of this section (i.e., why are political parties in general important in a democracy?) by stating that:

Parties are important because they are expected to provide the key building blocks of democracy by forming a strong link between citizens and the state. It is a challenge [that] fledgling parties commonly accept, because promising to establish a government in keeping with the will of the people is the best way to achieve adequate support and wrest power away from non-democratic leadership.

The second question of this section is: why is political opposition in particular, important? There are many reasons, but the most important is that political opposition holds the ruling party accountable, vertically and horizontally. According to De Jager (2010: 107), “vertical accountability emanates through the electorate, as they know which party is responsible for controlling the government” – this links to why political parties in general are important. Additionally, “horizontal accountability is channelled through opposition, which is responsible for monitoring the government and voicing dissent” (De Jager, 2010: 107).

Even so, “the existence of political parties does not automatically imply a democratic society as parties can also be found in non-democratic societies, such as the Communist Party in China”, which is a one-party state (De Jager, 2010: 107). Political parties may in fact become “tools of tyranny and repression, especially where the party system moves to a one-party state”, a strong opposition is necessary to counter such a progression (De Jager, 2010: 107). Habib and Taylor (2001: 208) similarly state that “parliamentary opposition parties are necessary institutions if political initiatives towards consolidation of democracy are to succeed”.

Jung and Shapiro (1995) also explain why political opposition is necessary for democracy. Firstly, opposition parties offer peaceful alternatives in government. Without opposition parties being able to compete for power, any crises in government are “correspondingly more likely to become crises for democracy” (Jung & Shapiro, 1995: 209). Furthermore, “a parliamentary opposition ensures that the citizenry’s unhappiness with the government is not automatically

translated into delegitimation of the democratic order” (Jung & Shapiro, 1995: 209). Viable opposition parties are thus crucially important critics of government that fuels the notion that they could potentially be in power at a future date (Jung & Shapiro, 1995: 209). This keeps the competitive nature of a democratic regime alive. Finally, Jung and Shapiro (1995) claim that a viable parliamentary opposition facilitates institutional arrangements that enable the performance of a variety of public interest functions. Public policy can only be “coherent if the political environment allows for debate and competition over ideas” (Jung & Shapiro, 1995: 209). Opposition parties enjoy such debates as it reveals to the electorate their potential as a viable alternative to the ruling party. Additionally, they can use these debates to discredit the ruling party, which prompts them to “monitor government performance and expose corruption” (Jung & Shapiro, 1995: 209). Overall, political opposition is necessary for the stability of the regime. Leading to the concept of a loyal opposition, which is when the opposition compete yet cooperate and protect the system (Anastaplo, 2004: 1010).

Interestingly, the African view of political opposition differs from that of these standard definitions within the literature. Osabu-Kle (2001) speaks of how African’s interrupt the word opposition and how this influences their understanding of the concept of political opposition. He states that “the concept of opposition and enemy came to mean the same thing, as the only known opposing force was the enemy from outside” (Osabu-Kle, 2001: 19). Many liberation movements see themselves as “the ‘embodiment’ of the nation or the ‘people’”, and thus speak for everyone (Osabu-Kle, 2001: 19). In such a worldview, “opposition is seen as going against the voice of the ‘people’” (Logan, 2008: 11). They divide the world between those “who are on their side and those who belong to the ‘old order’”, meaning the colonial power or oppressor (Logan, 2008: 11). Gumede (2010: 31) explains that legitimate opposition to the sitting NLM is “often portrayed as such opposition being in league with the former colonial power, with foreign ‘enemy’ governments or with defending white minority or ‘settler’ interests”. Such a viewpoint is harmful to the democratic ethos, however, as political opposition needs to be accepted and supported in order for a democracy to work effectively (Diamond et al., 1990: 16-18).

In South Africa, the situation is that the ANC has been in power for the entire democratic period, since the end of apartheid in 1994, although its political power has not been uncontested. The Democratic Alliance (DA) is the official opposition party, and has won ruling party positions in both provincial and local governments, thus ensuring a competitive system.

Southern (2011: 289) notes that, “irrespective of the ANC’s substantially monolithic support base, the DA “unswervingly argues that the South African democracy is dependent upon one crucial factor – a strong political opposition”.

Habib and Taylor (2001: 210) note “that democratic consolidation in South Africa, as well as in democracies throughout the developing world, is dependent on the government’s ability to address widespread poverty and economic inequalities within society”. They state that political opposition is a crucial component to ensure that the citizenry’s concerns are heard. If a government has “no incentive to take citizens’ interests into account” because their support is guaranteed, there is little chance that they will improve delivery (Habib & Taylor, 2001: 210). This is where an opposition party becomes crucial in holding the ruling party accountable by highlighting important issues and presenting alternative voting options to the electorate. This is vital to the success of a democratic regime. Therefore, to answer the second question posed, a healthy political opposition ensures that the core principles of freedom of speech and choice are maintained. The opposition party not only benefits itself when highlighting the faults of the dominant governing party, but also reveals its own character, thus allowing the citizenry to envision this party in power. Accountability prevents the system from failing and keeps the public informed, thus making it an important feature of any democratic regime.

In conclusion, one can see that political parties are important in a democratic regime, as they represent democracy’s very ethos of freedom to choose, by providing citizenry with leadership options. They mobilise the citizenry and at best can be considered a loyal opposition by promoting accountability, which ensures that the system remains effective. Political parties hold other parties accountable for their actions, which not only serves to promote their own party but also to highlight flaws within the opposition (or in this case the governing party), thus keeping the citizenry well-informed and enabling them to make informed decisions during elections. This is an effective accountability circle, which highlights the faults and benefits of each party within the system.

2.2.2.3.1.1 Operationalisation of the concept of Political Opposition

The concept of political opposition is operationalised by drawing key terms from the above section’s conceptualisation. These terms are used to codify the five S&T documents in order to uncover the first part of the research question being: What is the ANC’s view of political opposition. The key terms are presented below (Table 1) and are divided into three categories: fundamental, functionality in a democratic setting, and non-pluralist view. The fundamental

group refers to the code groups that are fundamental to the research question and the concept of political opposition; the functionality group contains the key functions of opposition in a democratic setting; lastly, the non-pluralist view group reveals two codes that show a non-pluralist view of opposition. These key terms will highlight the ANC's views of political opposition. The data analysis of the key political opposition terms will occur in Chapter 4.

Table 1: Key Political Opposition Terms Table

Political Opposition Key Terms	
Fundamental	Political Opposition
	Political Parties
	Elections
Functionality in a Democratic Setting	Accountability
	Loyal Opposition
	Mobilisation of Citizenry
	Representation
Non-pluralist View	Enemy
	Vanguard Party

2.2.3 Democratic Consolidation in South Africa

The ANC played a major role in the negotiated transition in South Africa. The party aided in restructuring the public space by promoting democratic values, initiating the reconciliation of the nation, and creating a constitution with a primary focus on human rights. Moreover, South Africa's post-apartheid parliamentary system was "engineered to keep political parties at its core" to ensure accountability and prevent party dominance from occurring (Thuynsma, 2017: xxii). Despite this, South Africa has developed into a dominant party system because the majority of the votes have been going to the ANC since the start of democracy in 1994. This has raised concerns for many scholars, particularly in view of recent developments, such as "populist attacks on the constitution and growing disregard for decisions made by the constitutional institutions" (De Jager & Parkin, 2017: 3). These institutions hold the ruling parties accountable, thus a disregard for them is potentially damaging to democracy.

Other scholars have also pointed out that the development of a dominant party system has created negative prospects for the state's democratic consolidation. De Jager (2006: 81), for instance, argues that "an increasing intolerance of dissent and alternative views is apparent in

South Africa's 'fledgling' democracy". Additionally, she states that the enactment processes (such as structural adjustments) "to centralise government structures and social discourse [are being used to close existing] avenues for autonomous and independent thought" (De Jager, 2006: 81). She concludes that the ANC government is using its "soft power (through the pervasion of ideological hegemony)", as provided by the dominant party system, to preserve its ideological hegemony (De Jager, 2006: 81). Habib and Taylor (1999: 266) agree that the dominant party system in South Africa is affecting the state's prospects of achieving democratic consolidation; the rise of this "dominant party system has meant that the people's preferences have become secondary to the interests of capital, of foreign investors, and domestic business community". Additionally, they suggest that "the prospects for strong political opposition and thereby democratic consolidation rests on either: existing parliamentary opposition parties' ability to break their racial mould, and/or the fracturing of the Tripartite Alliance (between the ANC, the Congress of South African Trade Unions [COSATU], and the Communist Party of South Africa [CPSA])" (Habib & Taylor, 1999: 267). They argue that "the development of strong opposition is a much-needed long-term project" (Habib & Taylor, 1999: 267).

From the above discussion, one can see that institutional requirements influence the democratic quality and level of consolidation of a regime. In order to determine whether South Africa's democracy is indeed consolidated, it is necessary to understand what happens to liberation movements who take power in government and what their characteristics are. It is also crucial to understand the impact of liberation movements as governments in the South African context, as scholars have argued this is hindering prospects for democratic consolidation; an in-depth look into the literature concerning this topic thus follows in the next section. This will provide some insight into the reasoning behind the ANC's stance towards political opposition.

2.3 Liberation Movements as Governments

In this section, definitions of liberation movements will be presented, before looking at what happens to them when they become part of the government, or the dominant party in government. Some of the typical characteristics of liberation movement governments will be discussed, such as their lack of familiarity with democracy, their legitimacy as a political party in power, their tendency to become the dominant political party while repressing or undermining any political opposition, and their tendency to engage in poor governance.

2.3.1 Defining a Liberation Movement

In this section, liberation movements will be discussed in terms of their origins, important defining concepts, methods used to gain power, and aims. A ‘thin’ definition is that “a liberation movement is the struggle for national liberation through strategy” (Wardle, 2017: 1). This, however, is not complex enough therefore the literature around defining NLM will be discussed here. Liberation movements, as we know them today, originated in the post-war society of the twentieth century. Many scholars have discussed the reasons for their emergence, primarily on the African continent, and liken this to imperialism, rejection of racism and anti-colonialism (Dorman, 2006; Johnson, 2003; Melber, 2008 & 2011; Southall, 2003). Liberation movements are “born out of colonial states, mainly in Africa and Asia, where they fought the war-drained First World colonising states for independence” (Southall, 2003: 256). Melber (2011: 163) explains it simply “as the rising up and overthrowing of the existing powers of imperialism and oppression”. The objective of any liberation struggle is “national liberation defined as political independence in a sovereign state under a government representing the majority of the previously colonised [or oppressed] people, who were excluded from full participation in society” (Melber, 2002: 163).

The very concept of liberation movements has been a focal point when reviewing the literature around Southern African regimes. In some of the literature it states that there are different types of liberation movements (Salih, 2007; Southall, 2013; Wallerstein, 1996). For instance, Britz (2011: 21) argues that “a liberation movement is a type of social movement that is committed to radical social change, such as revolutionary tactics”. Similarly, Melber (2010: 79) describes these movements as “an agency of transformation”, explaining that they usually “claim to be inclusive and to represent the interests of all the people in a country”. Liberation movements utilise “revolutionary tactics and rhetoric in order to achieve their goals” (Britz, 2011: 21). Lodge (2014: 23) states “that liberation movements take shape when oppressed groups form a mass organisation, based on broad social solidarities, and mobilise a popular following”.

The above show the diversity of definitions, thus for some clarity on the topic Southall’s (2003) distinction between the two ‘waves’ or types of liberation struggles is used. The first type is made up of “nationalist movements who fought against colonialism and gained relatively easy successes” (Southall, 2003: 256). He claims that this occurs “in the non-settler states, of limited economic value, where the metropolitan power was confident of being able to reap continued benefits through strategic investments, largely in mining and agriculture” (Southall, 2003:

256). The second type is categorised as a struggle against “colonisers who were reluctant to leave [such as South Africa and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe)], or in settler-dominated economies, which claimed political independence” (Southall, 2003: 256). Due to the nature of the second type of liberation struggle, Southall states that they required “greater determination and strategy [which often led to them to] resorting to an armed struggle, making them more violent” (Southall, 2003: 257).

The second type of liberation struggle is more often linked to literature focusing on African politics. Salih (2007: 671) writes predominately about the second wave of liberation movements, explaining that the “democratic failures of Africa’s decolonisation movements, such as South Africa’s destabilisation, and Cold War conflict (Angola and Mozambique), led to the second type of liberation movements”. Salih (2007) speaks more generally about the entire African continent whilst Southall (2003) focuses on Southern Africa. These democratic failures were described by Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1995) as follows: “regime insecurity; ethnic division; weak political structures; lack of legitimacy; undermined and hence distorted local institutions; state monopoly over economic development and a weak private sector; and external pressures, emanating from Cold War rivalry (influence of the Soviet Union)”. These factors led to the second type of “liberation movements, which waged their struggle to rid their countries of the authoritarianism associated with decolonization governments” (Salih, 2007: 671). Salih (2007: 669) thus distinguishes between the first wave of liberation movements that engaged in and precipitated decolonisation, and the second wave of liberation movements that sought to “free a country from the control of authoritarian parties that emerged in post-liberation societies after decolonisation”.

All liberation movements aim for liberation and nation, making them key concepts in the literature according to Wallerstein (1996: 2695). Hence, Southall’s (2013: 2) term National Liberation Movements (NLMs); occurring “when liberation movements are combined with nationalist movements”. NLMs have the distinctive goal to “overthrow an authoritarian government on behalf of the majority population in a nation state” (Southall, 2013: 2). When discussing the interests of the majority, Melber (2010 & 2011) similarly uses the term ‘overthrow’. These NLM pride themselves in that fact that they are familiar with the needs of the people fuelling the need to liberate them (Wallerstein, 1997: 3). Southall (2013: 2) argues that NLMs are a “product of the reaction to colonialism and are anti-colonial national movements who participated in an armed struggle to liberate their nations from colonial rulers”.

The means to gain liberty through a liberation struggle is a popular topic amongst scholars, as this was typically sustained by violence. The violence was successful due to “a combination of armed resistance, international pressure, the ending of the Cold War, and an agreement with political rivals, including large armed forces of other nations and guerrilla warfare” (Wardle, 2017: 3). Clapham (2012: 6) reveals that these movements endured many obstacles: “leaders being banned or forced into exile and being denied access to the coercive resources of the state by the police or military”. The movements successfully “built a support base, mainly among the oppressed people whom they were fighting for” (Clapham, 2012: 6). Southall (2003: 258) calls this a battle “conducted by the weak against the strong”, and the military was “a substantive element to accelerate the process towards self-determination”. The second wave, as identified by Southall, was mainly characterised by violent liberation struggles.

The majority of liberation struggles aim to “free people and territories from oppressive regimes, whether these regimes are colonialist, domestic dictatorships or oligarchies” (Clapham, 2012: 4). Unlike other scholars, Clapham (2012) includes South Africa despite the fact that the oppressive regime was not implemented by a colonial power but rather the descendants of one. The oppressive government in South Africa cannot be considered colonialist but “rather a racist authoritarian government”, despite having colonialist Dutch and British heritage (October, 2015: 16).

Liberation movements were an “expression of people’s disillusionment with what the leaders of the decolonisation movement were able or unable to deliver” (Salih, 2007: 672). When it comes to South Africa, Salih (2007) is also unwilling to include them in the second type of liberation movements, as it was more a battle for social equality rather than liberation from a coloniser. He labels “South Africa as an exception to most liberation movements”, describing it as a “second liberation movement with a vibrant multiparty democracy” (Salih, 2007: 677). Similarly, Welsh (2009: 569) highlights the uniqueness of South Africa’s situation as the transition to democracy ran “smoothly”. South Africa’s liberation was achieved through negotiation rather than violence. Moreover, he adds this smooth transition “was certainly not in the nature of liberation movements to acknowledge that others, especially their hated opponents, might actually have played a part in dismantling oppression, which happened to be the case in South Africa” (Welsh, 2009: 569).

For the purpose of this study, the definition of liberation movements that will be used is taken from Clapham (2012: 4), defining it as: “a liberation struggle that aims to free people and

territories from oppressive regimes, whether these regimes are colonialist, domestic dictatorships or oligarchies, by using various violent or non-violent strategies in order to gain liberation”. The section to follow will specifically look at liberation movements in Southern Africa that have successfully achieved liberation and how they respond to their transition from liberation movements to government.

2.3.2 Liberation Movements as Governments in Southern Africa

A liberation movement can consider itself a success when it has removed the oppressive regime and is able to take over the state. These NLMs can now establish a democracy and undo the wrongs of the past. As stated previously by Southall (2003), “liberation movements are born out of colonial states” all over the world, although this study would like to pay particular focus to liberation movements in Southern Africa. The ANC are included in this grouping thus making answering of the research question more approachable. However, one could argue that not all liberation movements are born out of colonial states; most are just a response to authoritarianism and express a need to be liberated from political oppression (See Salih, 2007; Southall, 2013).

When a NLM transitions from political movement/activist to a position in a democratic government, pre-liberation factors influence this process. Dorman (2006) highlights these influences, which include the extent of the NLM’s own hierarchical structure “during the struggle, the nature of the transition, the character of the [previously replaced] state, the reaction of the former incumbents, and the array of international influences” (Dorman, 2006: 1086).

According to Salih, certain NLMs are “notorious for using extra-constitutional methods to contain the political ambitions of aspiring leaders” (2007: 679). Due to passion for the struggle and overwhelming sense of entitlement, Clapham (2012: 11) states that “it is rare for leaders to step down voluntarily after one or two terms in office, even though this is a necessary check for democratic stability”. The African example used by Clapham (2012: 11), is that of Nelson Mandela, who had not been directly involved in the last stages of the struggle due to his imprisonment and was elderly when he came to power. Salih (2007: 679) argues that many “decolonisation and second-wave liberation governments, with the exception of South Africa and Namibia [whom he holds in high regard] have found it difficult to play by the rules of the democratic game”.

Subsequently, broken rules include the “freedom of information and the existence of alternative media” (Salih, 2007: 678). Very few of these states have freedom of the press, and Salih (2007: 678) explains: “the longer a president serves, the more brutal and determined the regime is in oppressing the media such as in Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Zimbabwe”. There appears to be a link between the length of time a ruler is in power and the level of media exposure. Salih (2007: 679) notes that “South Africa [is] one of the most open of all the decolonisation movement governments”. His reasoning for this is that “freedom of expression and information [is] respected by the government”, even if they are “unhappy with some of the public criticism” they have been receiving (Salih, 2007: 679).

Liberation movements transition into power by transforming themselves into supposed political parties that “take control of state machinery” (Melber, 2011: 81). Moreover, “their legitimacy to rule stems from their emergence from the liberation process as representatives acting on behalf of the majority of the people” (Melber, 2011: 81). In Southern Africa, multiparty democratic regimes were established where “considerable gains were made: new constitutions, new commitments to human rights, and new acknowledgements of the liberal democratic values of diversity, individual liberties, checks and balances, and the necessity of the accountability of rulers to their voters” (Southall, 2003: 266). In many cases, “the liberation leader assumes the position of head of state and all of his former colleagues tend to take on subordinate roles” [as was the case with Nelson Mandela] (Clapham, 2012: 9). He adds that NLMs turned governments have “political tasks to be tackled, notably in creating a sense of national reconciliation in the aftermath of the conflict” (Clapham, 2012: 7). Due to the similar nature of these NLM turned government in Southern Africa, certain characteristics are found to be common amongst them. These characteristics will be described in the section to follow.

2.3.3 Characteristics of Liberation Movements as Governments

It has been found in the literature that liberation movements that come to power as official governments tend to share some common characteristics. The first of these is a lack of familiarity with democratic government and what this entails. The second relates to their sense of legitimacy that is gained from the success of the liberation movement. The third is the emergence of party dominance, which is often a result of the legitimacy that occurs and can lead to a one-party state. And lastly, many of such liberation movements tend to display poor governance and authoritarian tendencies, as a result of their liberation movement credentials. Each of these characteristics will be discussed further below.

2.3.3.1 Lack of Familiarity with Democratic Government

When a NLM removes an oppressive government, “they find themselves in a position where they must take over the pre-existing state machinery” (Wardle, 2017: 6). With limited knowledge or experience towards transitioning to a democratic regime, “they struggle to cope with their new position and responsibilities” (Wardle, 2017: 6). Clapham (2012: 8) states that “running a liberation struggle is a very different kind of exercise from running a government”. Thus, this transformation process is difficult for the NLM as their goal was to resist and overthrow (Southall, 2003: 257). Yet, their main challenge now is to create national unity and transform into a political party in a democratic setting.

NLMs had a key purpose and that was “the right to self-determination of the population on the basis of free and fair elections” (Salih, 2007: 669). Salih argues, “soon after independence, many African states had either obliterated the previous system of government they inherited from colonial rule, resisted the path of democratic consolidation or elected new authoritarian regimes” (Salih, 2007: 669). Similarly, “any political alternative that does not emerge from within the liberation movement government itself will not be acceptable to the members of that movement as well as to their supporters” (Melber, 2008: 87). The members of the movement may be ignorant of how to run a country, or may not fully grasp the complexities of being in power and ruling for the benefit of all the people – or, to the contrary, they may just want to be in power for the sake of being in power and holding the wealth, and are not interested in governing responsibly and ethically at all; making it a difficult situation. Moreover, liberation movements tend to maintain their military mind-set to control the government due to the nature of the preceding struggle, which is likely to have been violent (Clapham, 2012; Dorman, 2006; Melber, 2008; Southall, 2013).

Typically, “when liberation movements assume control of the state, they are governed by an underdeveloped class, lacking economic power and more interested in redistribution of existing wealth and power than in production of resources, development and maintenance of infrastructure, or the generation of new economic opportunities” (Clapham, 2012: 10). He adds “Positions in government are appointed based on loyalty to the struggle rather than to the ability to rule or knowledge of that particular sector or role” (Clapham, 2012: 10). In South Africa, there are numerous examples of this, with the appointment of ministers to portfolios they know nothing about, and the intermittent re-shuffling of cabinet ministers to different portfolios, without it being based on skill, knowledge or experience. Having the ability to defeat an

oppressor in an armed conflict or violent struggle “does not necessarily qualify an individual to control state affairs and manage socio-economic issues effectively” (October, 2015: 30).

2.3.3.2 Legitimacy

Legitimacy commonly occurs after a struggle “against an illegitimate and oppressive sovereign, the movement will be buoyed by a sense of legitimacy that was lacking in its predecessor” (Clapham, 2012: 7). Due to its prominence this concept, which is linked to the liberation history, has been researched and is supported by many scholars (see Clapham, 2012; De Jager, 2009; Dorman, 2007; Johnson, 2002; Melber, 2002, 2009 & 2011; Southall, 2003 & 2013).

In the case of second wave of liberation movements, “their leaders’ persistently [politick] under the banner of liberation” (Salih, 2007: 673). They depict their movement party as the “bearers of all that is good”, while portraying the opposition as “relics of the past actively engaged in trying to unseat them” (Salih, 2007: 673). Clapham (2012: 6) argues that “the ruling incumbents utilise their status as liberators in order to maintain their legitimacy, even with younger generations who have little connection to the original liberation struggle”. With such historically based legitimacy, they tend to retain their support bases in spite of poor delivery, and opposition parties struggle to compete against such loyalty-based legitimacy. This use of legitimacy subsequently tends to create “dominant-party systems, which increase centralisation and presidentialism” (Dorman, 2007: 1092). Thus, providing the leaders of the liberation movement with an abundance of power and few features that ensure accountability. These developments will be discussed below.

2.3.3.3 Dominant Party

Party dominance from liberation movements turned government is a common feature in these in post-liberation societies. Southall (2014: 332) describes “dominant parties as those leading electorally for an extended period”. Ottaway (1991: 62) states that “majority rule in post-liberation societies can lead to the creation of authoritarian, single-party regimes that proved as unwilling as their white predecessors to allow the population to have a meaningful say in political decisions”. Additionally, “party dominance provides a platform for the exercise of soft power in a democratic system and soft power provides the necessary means to maintain dominance” (De Jager, 2006: 64). Salih (2007: 676) similarly argues, “that even though they have adopted multiparty democracy, the decolonisation liberation governments of Angola,

Eritrea, Mozambique and Zimbabwe are controlled by a dominant state party, formed as a liberation movement during the liberation struggle”. All of the above scholars have shown that party dominance is an evident trend under liberation movements.

A common occurrence in Southern African, particularly in Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa’s post-liberation states, is the adoption of supposedly multiparty systems where “substantial gains were made, such as the drafting of new constitutions, the implementation of equality and the creation of checks and balances” (Southall, 2003: 266). Nonetheless, all of these are often empty promises to appease supporters rather than consistently being adhered to. Hence, the trend is that “even states with multiparty systems and plural civil societies move towards dominant party systems in their first decade after liberation” (Wardle, 2017: 10). This was exemplified by ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe for instance. Dorman (2006: 1092) suggests that this occurred due to “inclusionary tactics that brought allies and old enemies into the new governing coalitions”, which seems counter-intuitive. De Jager and Du Toit (2013: 196) argue that “one of the most prominent and recurring reasons for creating dominant party states is the occurrence of a particular historic event of major national significance”.

A crucial note must be made that the Soviet Union was imperialist too, like the European colonial powers (Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, etc.) however, it did not gain as much momentum as other imperialist nations such as Britain. Some liberation movements relied on support from the Soviet Union, and were thus structured along Marxist-Leninist lines focusing on the concept of equality of outcome rather than overall equality. They carried forward these characteristics when they came to power in government. This then led to “the centralisation of decision and policy-making, which is closely linked to party dominance, where only a small group is making all the decisions; in such a situation, corrupt, partisan and clientistic [the exchange of goods or services for political support] groups can easily take control, to the detriment of democracy” (Gumede, 2017: 4).

Salih (2007: 62) highlights the following:

liberation movements cultivate the goodwill and affinity with their people to establish dominant party regimes, such as in Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe. It is under these circumstances that the ‘tyranny of the majority’ has created an arrogance of power that has pervaded the liberation movement’s triumph in controlling the state, allowing minimal freedoms while actively excluding their opponents

He states that the so-called “president-for-life syndrome is the monopoly of decolonisation movement leaders like Afwerki, Dos Santos, and Mugabe” (Salih, 2007: 681). And, second-wave “liberation movement leaders have similar tendencies to either entrenching themselves in office indefinitely or [to amend] the constitutions to extend their term of office” (Salih, 2007: 681).

Good (2002: 71-76) provides an comprehensive list of the damaging effects of party dominance: “parliamentary checks upon executives that are contained in the constitution are overpowered by the predominance of the ruling party; the ruling party operates in a hierarchical and disciplined fashion; public relation systems implemented by closed party-list systems manage to rid representatives of accountability; centralisation of power in the hands of the presidency inspires autocracy; weak oppositions and their incapacity to become a viable alternative pose a contradiction to democracy; the lack of accountability allows for elite corruption and state profligacy; demands for accountability are deflected; media are often brought under control; and independent institutions are undermined and therefore cannot impose restraints”.

2.3.3.4 Poor Governance

A common argument amongst scholars (see Dorman, 2006, Melber, 2008 & 2011; Southall, 2003) is summarised by Britz (2011: 4), which is that “the armed struggles many liberation movements were engaged in, produced a certain and distinctly authoritarian political culture within these movements”. Particularly, “such movements had to organise themselves hierarchically and along authoritarian lines in order to be successful” according to Melber (2009: 451). Therefore, “when elites assumed power, there was thus an immediate need to build alliances between the liberation movement and the established interests” (Melber, 2009: 451). Clapham (2012: 11) clarifies that “the precise forms through which governing elites extract resources from the economy differ from case to case”. It is found that these elites work to uplift their comrades where strong relations were formed during the struggle, but such militaristic relationships should not be utilised in governance (see Clapham, 2012; Melber, 2009 & 2011; Southall, 2003). Interestingly, previous NLM activists in government, tend to use (and abuse) “their status and position to indulge in personal gain” as well as participate in “cronyism and nepotism through access to the state apparatus and power relations” (Wardle, 2017: 12).

A crucial argument to the study is that of Rothstein and Teorell's (2008) concept of quality of governance. Rothstein and Teorell (2008: 168) state that "this relates to its citizens according to two dimensions, namely, access to public authority, and exercise of such authority". Having a democratic regime "is not a sufficient condition for quality of government, as it serves to set certain limits on the types of policies that may be pursued in the name of impartiality" (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008: 180). Furthermore, Gumede (2017: 1) explains that majority of NLMs turned governments in Africa have not been successful in establishing "quality democracies, [building] inclusive societies and [bringing] economic prosperity". Despite being "expressly committed to transforming their societies for the better" (Gumede, 2017: 1). All of the above characteristics have inhibited these NLM parties from creating a quality democracy that can be consolidated. The section to follow will apply these characteristics to the South African NLM party, the ANC, to see whether these negative characteristics are present in the literature.

2.4 The ANC as a Liberation Movement Government

South Africa's transition to democracy can be considered unique. Despite many of its leaders being in exile, the liberation movement successfully fought against and overcame the segregated regime, largely through strategy, tactics and international pressure, and the willingness to transform by the National Party (NP). Notably, the ANC was not the only force that resisted the apartheid regime, the struggle was much broader than one organisation.

The ANC NLM labels itself as a political party in post-liberation South Africa, yet in many ways it has not changed. To continue on as a NLM in a democratic society, ultimately undermines it. Continually defining itself as "a liberation movement within society as opposed to a political party within a specified government structure, thus freeing it from the limitations of being a political party" (De Jager & Steenekamp, 2016: 928). The ANC has shown it carries many of the common NLM turned government characteristics that were mentioned above (Section 2.3.3). Some scholars (see Salih, 2007; Welsh, 2009) categorise the ANC as being a second wave liberation movement. Whereas, other scholars make no distinction, and place the ANC in the anti-colonial liberation movements category (see Dorman, 2006; Melber, 2008; Ottaway, 1991).

Notably, the ANC founders did not envisage or intend that the ANC NLM would one day have such an undesirable reputation in the post-liberation society, although state capture and its poor performance have led to such. Their original intentions, according to Dubow (2000: 1), were

to “defend and advance African civil and political rights at a time when these were under unprecedented threat”. Dubow (2000: 3) states that “the organisation’s original objectives were in line with their nationalist beliefs; they were dedicated to overcoming inter-African ethnic divisions and to extending citizenship and franchise rights to all South Africans on a non-racial basis”. This reveals a desire for “unity and integration” within a pluralist society, which is a “far cry from the present-day exclusionary and corrupt state” (Wardle, 2017: 13). The sections below will discuss the various common characteristics according to the ANC and whether they fit the stereotypes.

2.4.1 Lack of Familiarity with Democratic Government

The shift from liberation movement to political party is challenging, as each has very different roles. In South Africa, the ANC “struggled to shift its thinking from liberation movement fighting a struggle to ruling party running a government” (Wardle, 2017: 13). Understandably, there “were many disparate segments of the movement (such as the exiled political cadre, the military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe, and others that aided in the struggle, such as SACP), which leaders aimed to bring together into a single structure” (Ottaway, 1991: 71). This caused an internal problem when it came to leadership positions with there being “too many contenders” for too few positions (Ottaway, 1991: 70–71). Additionally, the “presence of Umkhonto we Sizwe was a contentious issue because political parties do not have armies” (Ottaway, 1991: 71). This militaristic mind-set has revealed itself as a common problem amongst NLMs turned governments; as Melber (2009: 454) points out, “democracy – unlike military conflicts – is not about ‘winners and losers’”. Instead, democracy requires “compromise, and even search for consensus, in pursuit of the public good. To achieve this, one does not need military mind-sets, but rather a broad political debate” (Melber, 2009: 454). However, the military mind-set is often the only way leaders and members of liberation movements have been exposed to. October (2015: 52) similarly indicates that “the numerous legacies within the ANC, such as mass mobilisation, communism, as well as elitism of the exiled ANC leaders meant that it would be difficult to transition from a liberation movement to a political party”.

2.4.2 Dominant Party System with Authoritarian Rule

South Africa undeniably suffers from party dominance party, with the ANC’s consecutive electoral victories since the 1994 transition to democracy. The various characteristics associated with this type dominant system are present. Southall (2003: 74-75) defines this

“dominant party system as a kind of low intensity democracy, which is when the formal requirements of democracy are met but under conditions of decreasing competition and declining popular participation”. Two years later, he claims that “there is evidence of a dominant party system, yet it is limited by constitutional counterweights, by its inability to impose itself on society and by evidence of vigorous internal debate” (Southall, 2005: 64). Moreover, the ANC “maintains and reasserts its dominance by continually referring to the significant historical event that helped them to come to power” (De Jager, 2009: 281). Welsh (2009: 569–577) alludes to the fact that “the ANC, during the transition to democracy, was unable to share the moral high ground with rival organisations”, especially not with opposition parties “when it came to dismantling oppression”. Welsh (2009) is suggesting that the ANC is not fond of political opposition. Ottaway (1991) calls this dominant disapproval of opposition “an illusion that the entire country could have a single purpose and accept a single representative to speak as the mouthpiece of an oppressed nation” (Ottaway, 1991: 66).

De Jager (2006: 63) explains that the ANC NLM is “engaged in a deliberate process of centralising power”. She states that this centralisation is deliberately done through the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) programme by “utilising ‘tools’ of soft power through the pervasion of ideological hegemony” (De Jager, 2006: 81). Southall (2003) states that the current South African electoral system lacks a party that would be able to threaten the ANC’s position, and that this is allowing the ANC to “embark upon a strategy of centralisation of power, which is blurring the lines between party and state” (Southall, 2003: 262). In 2014, Southall states:

Elections take on the broad character of a ‘racial census’ with the black majority of the electorate pledging their support for the party; it has followed the example of the National Party in numerous ways such as subverting the independence of the state machinery through the placement of party loyalists in public positions and thus blurring the line between party and state [and] undermining the liberal idea of separation of powers and [creating a] marginalized parliament.

(Southall, 2014: 332)

De Jager (2009) and Ottaway (1991) are both of the view that the ANC has blurred the line between state and political party. Southall (2003: 262), for instance, highlights the key elements of the party’s centralisation strategy:

The strengthening of the institution and machinery of the presidency relative to other senior branches of the civil service; the assignment of most ANC appointees to senior positions and high offices of state, and the routine ‘redeployment’ of ANC personnel

between parliamentary and public positions; the erosion of parliament's independence relative to the government; the assertion of central control over the provinces, particularly by the ANC central hierarchy and its selection of its party's provincial premiers; the undermining of the parliamentary opposition through the channel of floor-crossing legislation. And lastly, the imposition of party discipline to "silence internal party debate and criticisms.

This list further underscores De Jager's (2006) argument; which provides the four possible reasons for ANC's centralisation and the move towards a unitary system: "the apartheid system was based on a federal and decentralised form of government; leaders tend to perceive decentralisation as undermining their capacity to administer development and to control its processes and resources"; "there is an international tendency towards centralisation"; and lastly, many ANC leaders (such as Thabo Mbeki) have been "trained in the radical Leninist school of thought" (Johnson, 2002: 222). Critically, this "gives pre-eminence to the role of the vanguard party" (De Jager, 2006: 67).

2.4.3 Political Opposition in South Africa

The ANC's view of political opposition is unclear throughout the literature, but the section below reveals a trend that suggests that the ANC does not view the opposition in a positive way even though they see it is a fundamental part of a democracy. In 2009, DA member of parliament (MP) and then Chairman of the Federal Executive, James Selfe (2009) stated in an interview that, in his opinion, the ANC was split: some members support the Constitution and multiparty democracy, "whilst others believe that the DA is counter-revolutionary" (Selfe, 2009). De Jager (2009: 279) similarly argued that "members of the ANC are largely suspicious of [the] opposition". Regardless of the opposition's strength in South Africa, Schrire (2001) suggests that the ANC is not accepting of these parties thus creating issues towards democratic consolidation. The ANC, and parties on the left, find the democratic "status quo illegitimate" as it reflects the legacy of the authoritarian apartheid government (Schrire, 2001: 139). He adds that the ANC "has never perceived itself as a mere political party" (Schrire, 2001: 139).

Although the ANC has been maintaining its position in power based on the legitimacy of their struggle, Southern (2011: 296) states that this will lessen with the new generation. This could be for many reasons, possibly due to lack of service delivery or anti-democratic behaviour. An example of anti-democratic behaviour dating back to 2007 is when "the ANC tried to prevent COPE, a splinter party, from using the name 'Congress of the People', claiming that this was an exclusive part of the ANC's history" (De Jager & Du Toit, 2013: 196).

For a democratic regime to be properly consolidated, an effective opposition needs to be in place. However, Schrire (2001: 140) argues that the ANC is “ambivalent to the concept of legitimate opposition” despite being aware of the philosophical justifications for opposition. Habib and Taylor (2001: 211) argue that it is difficult in this context noting that, according to mainstream opinion, it is “impossible to establish a viable parliamentary opposition because of the racialised structure of South African political politics”. They argue further “that a viable political system does not yet exist in South Africa, and that there is no prospect of one emerging from the collection of parties currently represented in the national parliament” (Habib & Taylor, 2001: 211). This is a fundamental problem with South Africa’s democracy as it is preventing consolidation.

2.4.4 Poor Governance

Lodge (2014) provides a strong argument towards ANC poor governance suggesting that neo-patrimonial politics is prevalent within the party. He sets out indicators of this behaviour, these include: “acquisition of business interests by leading politicians and their families and notes the proliferation of the presidential family’s business concerns since Jacob Zuma’s accession to presidency; and the damage by local office holders through municipal and provincial tendering procedures”. Arguing that the “ANC’s behaviour is starting to mimic that of the conventions associated with clientelistic organisations” (Lodge, 2014: 3). He provides a definition of such organisations: where “specific public services and resources are offered to particular groups in exchange for political support” (Lodge, 2014: 3)”. Additionally, these tendencies towards neo-patrimonialism are “historically entrenched habits, norms, and expectations as colonial residue”, or from “the clientelistic undertakings during apartheid” (Lodge, 2014: 6–7). He also focuses on the nepotism that has developed throughout the ANC’s history, referring to these “networks constituted through family, kinship, and childhood friendships, which played a role in the formation of the ANC’s founding elite” (Lodge, 2014: 6).

Lodge suggests that “these neo-patrimonial operations [could be based] on insecurities” in the face of “change and how this is viewed as a consequence of modernisation” (Lodge, 2014: 9). Under these conditions, corruption becomes “a way in which political actors use disorder as a political tool” (Lodge, 2014: 9). The ANC, according to Lodge (2014 10), “embraced militant activism, which produced an environment that pulled together political and criminal networks, thus creating the foundation for the organisation; there is substantial evidence that the legacy

of these relationships continues to shape ANC politics”. An example of corruption would be the 1997/8 Arms Deal, mentioned by De Jager (2009) and Lodge (2014). Notably, revealing the acceptance of such relations. Consequently, “it is not uncommon for the ANC to receive funding through its patronage networks, and they have become increasingly reliant on such” (Wardle, 2017: 20). Accordingly, the party “nurtures its relationship with the corporate world through [various] initiatives” (Lodge, 2014: 10-11). Such as, for example, “the Progressive Business Forum, an organisation that sells ‘access’ to important government ministers, thus resulting in mutual benefit” (Wardle, 2017: 20). Despite emphasising the ANC’s neo-patrimonial operations, Lodge (2014: 16) explains that “the ANC’s politicking is still driven largely by national programmatic actions rather than clientelist promises of favours, thus making South African politics distinctive on the continent”. Lodge’s argument suggests that the South African democratic regime differs from the other NLM governments. The ANC’s tendencies to behave as they previously did during the struggle rather than a party that is running a government is negatively affecting South Africa’s democracy.

From the above review of the literature, one might assume that the ANC had made no positive progress, which is not the case. Without the liberation movement, there would be no democratic system in the first place. The erosion of good governance, evident in the Zondo commission on state capture, that the country has been witnessing has developed out of the party’s lack of familiarity with the principles of good governance and its possibly negative view of the opposition. The party is able to maintain its hegemony through the legitimisation provided by the liberation struggle, which has provided it with its majority support and dominant party status. These common characteristics of a NLM turned government were highlighted in order to aid us in determining South Africa’s prospects for democratic consolidation, as seen through the literature.

The ANC party has been heavily influenced by its liberation movement history. The struggle was influenced by various ideological strands that affect the way in which members approach the reality of governing the country. South Africa’s Constitution promotes the liberal regime of democracy and the ruling party, by actively participating in such a regime, appears to display support for this ideology. However, it is safe to assume that the ANC is not fully committed to the political ideology of liberalism. There are three main ideological strands within the ANC that have grown out of the struggle, and these are liberalism, communism, and Africanism. These ideological strands influence the ways in which members approach government and,

particularly, the way in which they view political opposition. This section exposed the effects of the ANC's history as a liberation movement and how this is influencing democratic consolidation.

2.5 Conclusion

The two core concepts of this study are democratic consolidation, particularly with regard to the institutional factors, and liberation movements. Democratic consolidation refers to the likelihood of a democratic system lasting. The institutional factors and requirements of democratic consolidation are the most important aspects for the purposes of this study. Institutions act as a framework within which a democracy operates. They ensure structure and can positively or negatively influence anti-democratic behaviour, and are thus linked directly to consolidation prospects. Political opposition is a crucial institutional requirement that ensures accountability and provides the electorate with choice within the democratic regime.

The second section of this chapter looked at the concept of liberation movements and the evolution of certain characteristics, when they change roles from liberation movement within an authoritarian regime to political parties in a democratic regime. Liberation movements that fought against authoritarian rule tended to develop similar characteristics once they gained power, and share these with other NLMs. The ANC is no exception, with many authors discussing the party's lack of familiarity with government, as evident in the ANC's approach to governing and dominating the political sphere, its claims of legitimacy based on its NLM history, and most crucially, their poor governance practices (Melber, 2009; Ottaway, 1991; Southall, 2013). The common characteristics of NLMs, as seen within the ANC, are hindering the consolidation of democracy in South Africa, and moreover create obstructions for political opposition – which is a crucial part of consolidating South Africa's democracy and thus a key concept in this study.

This literature review provided an understanding of the literature around democratic consolidation and liberation movements. It created a basis for understanding the complexity of the ANC as a political party and how this has been heavily influenced by its liberation movement history. In Section 2.2.2.3.1, a conceptualisation of political opposition was provided allowing for its operationalisation to occur in Section 2.2.2.3.1.1. During its formation and the struggle, the ANC was influenced by ideological strands (liberalism, communism and Africanism) that are still affecting the ways in which the ANC approaches governing and, particularly, the way in which it views political opposition. The next chapter will add to the

conceptual foundation, using the above identified ideological strands, for the analytical desktop investigation.

Chapter 3

Political Ideologies

3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide context for the study. This will allow for a stronger understanding of the research aim and further establish a basis for the data collection in the chapter to follow. In order to achieve this, one must understand the historical context of the ANC and South Africa. By understanding the historical background of the ANC, one will be able to grasp the party's current stance on political issues and why it views political opposition in a particular way. The ANC's development cannot be explained without referring to the three major ideological influences that shaped the party's present outlook, namely, liberalism, communism, and Africanism. This comes from Heywood's (2013) postulation that political ideology provides political parties with an intellectual framework to view and engage with other political actors. Each of these three political ideologies will be defined in this chapter, and their historical significance to the ANC will be explained. These ideologies will moreover form the basis of the second part of the data collection that will answer what informs the ANC's view of political opposition. The conceptualisation of the ideologies below, will be operationalised in a tabular format to facilitate the coding process and data collection.

3.2 Historical Background of the ANC

The ANC was founded on 8 January 1912, more than 100 years ago, and has maintained political power in South Africa since the country's transition from apartheid to democracy in 1994 – in other words, for 25 years. This section will briefly discuss the party's establishment, growth and development from liberation movement to ruling party. This will, in turn, reveal the development of the three main political ideologies found within the party today. The party's history will be used to highlight the progress, growth and importance of each ideological strand and how this thinking has affected the way in which the ANC views political opposition.

3.2.1 Formation of the ANC

The ANC party, having been formed in 1912, is only two years younger than the Union of South Africa, which was established in 1910 after the end of the Boer War (Butler, 2009: 10). The ANC was formed by a mission-educated elite during colonial rule, thus “representing the first attempt at organised resistance along genuinely national lines to overcome inter-ethnic

divisions, and to secure the support of the chiefly aristocracy” (Southall, 2013: 29). The political climate in South Africa shifted in favour of the British after the Boer War ended. British rule meant a deepening of racial segregation (Butler, 2009: 14), starting with the establishment and passing of the “Native Land Act of 1913, which allocated 87 percent of the country’s land to whites” (Butler, 2009: 14). The rest of the ANC’s background will be discussed below in terms of the development of each ideology within the ANC NLM.

Three main ideological influences stand out in the history of the ANC. These ideological influences, according to De Jager (2009: 275), feed into “the making and complexity of the ANC”. De Jager lists the three ideologies with only brief descriptions; they will be described in more detail in the sections that follow. According to De Jager (2009), “the Christian liberal-democratic ideology was evident in the founding members as well as in later leaders, such as Albert Luthuli and Oliver Tambo”; communists and “their non-racialist and socialist economic ideals”, comprised the second strand; lastly, the Africanists and the “promotion of black-African-biased African nationalism” represented the third strand (De Jager, 2009: 275-276). Furthermore, three distinct elements added to “this ideological complexity” and to the creation of factions within the ANC: (1) “an external mission based in Europe and Africa”; (2) “an internal movement grouped around the United Democratic Front (UDF) and COSATU”; (3) “and the diaspora from the Robben Island prison”, where vital ANC members were kept away (De Jager, 2009: 276).

3.2.2 Liberalism

Liberal ideals have motivated the ANC throughout its evolution and framed the party’s main goal as a liberation movement, seeking liberation from their colonial and apartheid rulers. Liberal ideology has been taught in Africa by Westerners and the very word ‘democracy’ encapsulates the ANC’s main goal: “[deriving] from two Greek words, *demos*, which means the common people, and *kratos*, meaning authority or rule” (Osabu-kle, 2000 :13). Herein lay their ultimate goal, liberation from the oppressive apartheid government and the creation of a democratic regime in which the majority would be ruled by their own people. However, this was not an easy journey. The ANC’s liberal ideals grew out of the party’s formation in 1912, when “a group of prominent African men and women created the South African Native National Congress (SANNC)” (Lodge, 1983: 1). Its leadership consisted of aspiring members of the African middle class, i.e. “[only] those who stood to lose the most from [the] post-union political dispensation” (Lodge, 1983: 1). The founding members of the ANC were educated by

the “early Christian missionaries who ran missionary schools” in South Africa (Thompson, 2001: 156). At the time, the government provided no education to the black citizenry (De Jager, 2009: 276). Thus, the early ideology of the ANC grew out of the Christian liberal teachings. Their aim was to be included in the South African body politic “as citizens of a common, non-racial society, informed by the Christian and liberal concepts of justice and humanity” (Dubow, 2000: 4). The early ANC leadership were committed to constitutionalism and responsible citizenship rather than popular protestation and demonstration (De Jager, 2009: 276), which has emerged in more recent years. Thus, the first ideological strand within the “ANC can be described as that of liberal democracy, based on Christian values” (De Jager, 2009: 276).

3.2.3 Communism

Africa was described by Claude Ake as “the battlegrounds on which the elephants of the East and West fought their ideologically stimulated Cold War as the innocent grass (the African population) suffered” (Osabu-Kle, 2000: 23). Many African leaders turned to communism as an alternative to Western colonialisation and later capitalistic goals. The ANC’s involvement with communism was closely influenced by the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) and continues into the Tripartite Alliance with the transformed South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).

The CPSA was created in 1921, and formed a relationship with the ANC in 1928, when the CPSA adopted the call for “an independent native republic as its key objective” (Dubow, 2000: 22). Initially, it was the “only political organisation in South Africa to recruit members from all racial groups” (Thompson, 2001: 177). Further communist training occurred when many of the elite ANC members were in exile:

With the turn to armed struggle, its reorganisation as an exiled liberation movement aimed at seizing state power, and its links with the South African Communist Party (SACP), the ANC was increasingly influenced by communist-style bureaucratic methods of work and a vanguard Leninist strategy with democratic centralism as its organising principle. Many ANC members received training in the Soviet Union as well as other socialist countries, and were taught Marxism-Leninism.

(Johnson, 2003: 328)

The SACP (previously referred to as the CPSA in its earlier years) was not “a large body, but it was highly organised and centralised, drawing on the Leninist model” (Lodge, 1983: 7). The party closely followed the principle that “working class unity transcended racial divisions”

(Lodge, 1983: 7). The SACP “was instrumental in the ANC’s adoption of a non-racial rather than a purely Africanist outlook”; however, Feinstein adds, “it was one of the last communist parties in the world to reject Stalinism” (Feinstein, 2007: 54). This implies that the SACP could possibly be heavily influenced by Stalinism. Dubow (2000: 15) states that “the communists and the Africanists situated themselves at polar ends of the ANC”; the former emphasized “non-racialism and class solidarity [whilst] the latter, African self-sufficiency and the pre-eminence of the racial struggle”.

3.2.4 Africanism

Western ideals have been forced upon Africa as a continent for many years, and so the development of resentment towards Western ideologies was, in fact, inevitable. African political culture varies drastically from Western culture. The African interpretation of Western political ideas creates room for African leadership. Africanism stems from the definition of democracy: “if democracy is truly a government of the people and by the people, the shape and conditions of African democracy should be determined by Africans and not outsiders” (Osabulake, 2000: 13). The 1940s witnessed “a rise in pre-eminence of pan-Africanist consciousness, an influence that became evident in the ANC’s 1943 seminal document ‘*African Claims*’” (de Jager, 2009: 277). This document demanded change and called for a future that differed from previous ANC discourse (De Jager, 2009: 277). It promoted a more interventionist state, and in that same year, the ANC Youth League was formed. Its key leader was Anton Lembede, whose “philosophies differed from those of his elders, as the league indicated a move towards revolutionary militancy and racial exclusivism” (De Jager, 2009: 277). They declared that “Africa was a black man’s country” (Gevisser, 2007: 37). In this way, the pan-Africanist influence spread throughout the ANC, causing a change in the party’s tactics with revolution now firmly on the agenda.

3.2.5 Summary

The above provides a contextual basis for the next section of this chapter. Each of these ideologies will now be described in more detail to enable us to understand their principles and key concepts, as well as their view of political opposition. Further connections will be provided to the present-day ANC by looking at the relevance of each ideological strand. All the components of this chapter will together aid in the creation of the ideological key terms table

that will be used to code the ANC S&T documents, which, alongside the operationalisation of political opposition from Chapter 2, will form the data to be analysed for this study.

3.3 Political Ideologies

It has been noted by Heywood (2013: 29) that “political ideology will always survive because it provides politicians, parties and other political actors with an intellectual framework which helps them make sense of the world in which they live”. Hence the use of political ideologies as the conceptual tool of analysis. As discussed above, the ANC is influenced by three main political ideologies: liberalism, communism, and Africanism. These political ideologies moreover influence the ANC’s view and understanding of political opposition. Therefore, it is imperative that each ideology is defined and explained within the context of the ANC, drawing on various sources, with particular emphasis on the stance of each of these ideological strands towards political opposition, and its relevance and role. This, with the political opposition concept, will make up the conceptual framework for this study and lay the groundwork for an in-depth analysis of the ANC S&T documents in Chapter 4.

3.3.1 Liberalism

The first political ideology to be explained is indeed the most crucial ideology in a democratic regime. Zakaria (1997: 25-26) explains that “constitutional democracy refers to the tradition, deep in Western history, that seeks to protect an individual’s autonomy and dignity against coercion, whatever the source – state, church, or society”. He adds that it is liberal as it draws on the Greek philosophy of liberty (Zakaria, 1997: 26). Liberalism is where democracy manifested; it holds the core principles that any democracy is built upon. Due to the nature of South Africa’s chosen political regime, constitutional democracy, one would assume predominant ANC influence would come from liberal thought.

3.3.1.1 Description

The key concepts of liberalism are liberty and equality, as it aims to protect and enhance the freedom of the individual. According to Titlestad (2010: 96) liberalism is “readily identified with individual freedom from societal restraint”. According to Manning (1976: 14) liberalism “treats the individual as prior to society”. Liberals believe that people are born equal and require equal opportunities and rights, this is known as equality of value. Manning (1976: 24) expands on the concept of equality stating that:

liberals believe that human nature is universally the same, and that differences of race, nationality, sex, class, and religion do not mask significant differences in intelligence and emotional disposition which would preclude the possibility of the formation of a civil society and representative government.

Hence why, individuals are “entitled to equal legal and political rights” (Heywood, 2017: 24). Due to the fact that humans “can respond rationally and morally to the problems they create by their own deeds” (Butler & Schreuder, 1987: 164). Manning (1976: 17) argues that liberalism’s emphasis on morality is apt as “moral will generates the power which sustains all human relationships”.

More recently, Heywood (2017: 24-26) defined liberal ideology as “the commitment to the individual, and the desire to construct a society in which people can satisfy their interests and achieve fulfilment”. A stable society is a free society and “requires free speech, free press and free association in order that it be obliged to the needs and ideas of its [citizens]” (Manning, 1976: 17). Alongside freedom, liberalism promotes the duty of tolerance on the part of the state, society and the individual, according to Arblaster (1984: 66). This concept accepts that differences in behaviours and beliefs exist, and cannot be eliminated (Arblaster, 1984: 67). Peron (2003: 3) summarises the above with: “liberalism, as the name implies, is the fundamental belief in a political ideal where individuals are free to pursue their own goals in their own ways, provided that they do not infringe on the equal liberty of others”.

Liberal societies are structured politically around the “twin principles of consent and constitutionalism, which are designed to protect citizens from the danger of government tyranny” (Heywood, 2017: 26). In a liberal society, “the power and authority of the state or government is not absolute, but limited” (Arblaster, 1984: 74). Consent must be made the basis of legitimate government, according to Arblaster (1984: 72). The function of a constitution plays a fundamental role in a liberal society as a state and its institutions “must operate within limits which are either laid down in an explicit, written constitution, or take the form of a rather a more vaguely conceived body of ‘fundamental’ laws and customs”(Arblaster, 1984: 72).

According to Titlestad (2010: 99), liberalism and democracy are not synonymous, highlighting the importance of defining a liberal democracy, which is a system where participation, competition and liberty are promoted. Participation can be in the form of voting or elections; competition can be between political parties; and liberty is the freedom to choose which party to vote for as well as the freedom of expression (such as media). A democracy can only be

considered liberal when “individual autonomy is regarded as the cardinal value” (Hague & Harrop, 2010: 8). If this occurs then the constitution of a liberal democracy, according to Hague and Harrop (2010: 9), “provides not only an accepted framework of political competition but also an effective shield for defending individual rights against government excess”. In conclusion, liberalism’s core principles of liberty and equality are achieved through the political freedom of the electorate, which is facilitated through the use of a liberal democratic regime.

3.3.1.2 View of Political Opposition

Similar to liberalism, democracy focuses on the concept of the individual. Political participation in liberal democracy refers to the many ways in which individuals can seek to influence the composition of policies of their government (Hague & Harrop, 2010: 161). Heywood (2017: 24) states that liberalism promotes the concept of political and human rights, therefore presence of opposition provides the electorate with choice to exercise those rights. Political opposition aim to represent and serve the citizenry as well as oppose the ruling party to ensure the individual’s needs are met in a fair way. This process facilitates self-determination by providing a platform for it to occur.

A key function of political opposition is holding the ruling party accountable with the best interests of the regime in mind. Arblaster states that “government must be thought of, not as autonomous, but as answerable and accountable for its actions. Consent is normally sought, and accountability enforced, through the device of elections” (Arblaster, 1984: 72). Therefore, the presence of active or loyal opposition enforces the key principle of consent.

Along with the liberal principle of freedom comes the duty of tolerance of opposing views. Wolff (1969: 136-7) argues that “the liberal case for tolerance has been reinforced by the rise of modern pluralism as it stresses the natural disunity of society”. Society is not homogenous; “it is a mosaic of groups, large and small, all with particular interests to promote”, according to Arblaster (1984: 67). Therefore, political opposition creates a space for tolerance to occur, and in turn, pluralism supports the concept of political opposition.

From the above, one can conclude that liberalism is in favour of political opposition for three main reasons: focus is placed on the individual’s freedom and rights in a democracy; opposition prevents the autonomy of government; lastly, political opposition promotes pluralism, which is favourable to the liberal principles of tolerance, freedom and consent.

3.3.1.3 The ANC

The early years of the ANC were guided by Christian and liberal precepts, and thus protestations against racial segregation were made on moral and constitutional grounds (Southall, 2013: 29). Since the end of apartheid, South Africa has implemented a democratic regime that falls under the political ideology of liberalism. South Africa has “a representative democracy with elections at national, provincial and local levels” (Butler, 2009: 139). Hence why, the “1996 Constitution prescribes that two legislative bodies are to be elected at national level, these being the National Assembly (NA) and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP)” (Butler, 2009: 139). Additionally, it stipulates that “the electoral system must be based on a common national voters’ roll and that it must result in proportional representation” (Butler, 2009: 139). Elections are held every five years. Butler (2009) explains that “the NA elects the President who is the head of the executive branch of government, and responsible for governing in conjunction with the cabinet, which he/she appoints” (Butler, 2009: 140). From the above, one can see that the constitution prescribes a liberal democratic system for the country.

While there is a disagreement within the ANC, there is certainly a measure of promoting liberal values, for example, through the party’s support of the Constitution, which stipulates that democracy is the chosen regime for South Africa after many years of oppression. The ANC eagerly campaigns for votes every election to maintain their position in power, and they utilise their liberation history to preserve their image as liberators and hold onto the majority of the votes. Despite poor service delivery, the ANC receives widespread support from those who were affected heavily by apartheid in the past. Opposition parties, such as the DA, campaign alongside other parties in the hopes of increasing their political power through elections. They hold the ANC accountable by highlighting issues and thus making themselves more appealing to voters. The above falls under the liberal tradition that South Africa’s constitution upholds.

The ANC liberation movement was founded on the grounds of liberty and equality – both of which are main concepts within liberalism. The movement fought for a democratic society, revealing that the liberal tradition was their preferred political ideology. However, one cannot assume that the ANC party were or are fully invested in liberalism, particularly not in the present political environment.

The above discussion explained and defined liberalism as a political ideology, emphasising that the constitutionally chosen regime of democracy in South Africa falls under the liberal tradition. Thus, the ruling party of the ANC promotes liberal beliefs through their active

participation in elections and in the democratic agenda of South Africa. However, one could argue that participation in democracy does not necessarily mean support of this particular ideology; it could just be a means to political power.

3.3.2 Communism

The second ideological strand is communism, a prominent ideology amongst leaders on the African continent as a result of the proxy Cold-War.

3.3.2.1 Description

The second ideological strand is that of communism, which can simply be defined as: a system or theory where all property is owned by the community or government, and everyone contributes towards it and only takes what they need (Heywood, 2017: 114). Socialism and communism are sometimes used interchangeably, as both aim to limit the exploitation of workers and to eliminate economic classes (Heywood, 2017: 114). In communism, the working class holds the power, whereas in socialism, a democratic government controls the means of production. Although, the focus will not be on socialist principles but rather on the political and ideological principles of communism. Heywood simply states that “communism is defined [by] the rejection of private property and [by] a clear preference for common or collective ownership” (Heywood, 2017: 122). Everyone works towards the greater good of the community and financial resources are distributed equally, according to needs (Heywood, 2017: 96).

Marxism forms the base of communism and is the political and economic theory of Karl Marx. The basics of “classical Marxism is a philosophy of history that outlines why capitalism is doomed and why socialism is destined to replace it” (Heywood, 2017: 124). Simplistically, communism, according to Marx, meant the creation of “a classless society based on the common ownership of productive wealth” (Heywood, 2017: 126).

Soviet Union leaders like Lenin and Stalin built upon the work of Marx, creating a large body of work around his theories. An important Leninist concept that is important to this research is that of vanguardism, which is “a strategy for political action, gives primacy to leadership and hierarchical organisation over the decentralised and more spontaneous actions of the masses. It is a central component of Leninism’s model of revolution as highly calculated and precisely executed by professional revolutionaries” (Lenin, 1902: 108). It is regarded as a role for the

elite revolutionaries and they push for faster change according to Johnson (2003: 323). Hague and Harrop (2010: 106) summarise the concept as:

A vanguard party consists of fulltime revolutionaries whose understanding of Marxist thinking enables them to escape ideological indoctrination from the old order and to raise the consciousness of the masses both before and after revolution. Without this lead, workers will only develop trade union consciousness

Johnson (2003: 323) states that vanguardism “constructs its own meritocracy, defined by a combination of educational achievement, proper political training and political lineage (in the case of African liberation movements)”. A vanguard party is thus at the forefront of a political movement and if successful is considered the only legitimate party to rule.

Modern Marxism (also known as neo-Marxism) attempted to “revise the classical ideas of Marx whilst [maintaining] certain Marxist principles” in a more subtle and complex version that developed in Western Europe (Heywood, 2017: 132). In 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall brought an end to the model of orthodox communism (Heywood, 2017: 134). Communism has evolved over the years into various ideologies, yet the basic principles have been maintained and evolved to suit today’s political environment. Communism is a fundamentalist and utopian scientific socialism that aims to abolish capitalism and establish common ownership in a classless society in order to gain absolute equality through central planning, all within a proletarian state (Heywood, 2017: 143).

3.3.2.2 View of Political Opposition

Communism does not find political opposition a necessary feature because political parties promote opposing strategies, views and goals from each other. The point of communism is for everyone to hold the same goal of common ownership. This would moreover entail central control to ensure the even distribution of goods and that no exploitation or oppression occurs. Harrop and Hague (2010: 106) note that older communist regimes (such as that of the Soviet Union) were “strongly authoritarian, brooking no opposition, stage-managing elections, acting above the law, rewriting constitutions, determining all major appointments to government, controlling media and spying on their population”. If controlled correctly by the government, the communist system would not require opposing parties. Rather, a revolutionary dictatorship would occur according to Marx, who states:

Between capitalist and communist society there lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is also a political

transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat

(Marx, 1875)

Despite democracy being the goal for many revolutionaries, according to Johnson (2003: 326), the “very notion of vanguardism introduces an anti-democratic element to radical struggles”. A vanguard party is similar to other political parties by virtue of the nature of the party system, as it aims to represent the people, however it does not necessarily promote participation (Johnson, 2003: 326). The above reasons are all in direct contradiction of the liberal and democratic principles, therefore one can deduce that communism does not have a favourable view of political opposition.

3.3.2.3 The ANC

The SACP and ANC alliance with COSATU plays a key role in the promotion of communist thought, both during and after the liberation struggle. The SACP supported and influenced the ANC throughout the struggle, as it was “informed by a conviction that its socialist revolution ideal could be achieved through the attainment of the national democratic order” (Maloka, 2013: 175). The SACP were convinced that their Marxist ideology was superior to the liberal ideals that were prevalent at the time. Under the leadership of Oliver Tambo (who served as the ANC’s president from 1967 to 1991) the ANC made a conscious effort not to be controlled by the SACP, but rather to remain an independent nationalist movement (Maloka, 2013: 175). Despite this, the two organisations did influence each other in a number of areas, according to Maloka (2013: 175), especially in matters pertaining to “ideology, strategy and tactics, and organisational practice”.

The Tripartite Alliance had two fundamental objectives: (1) “to maximise opposition against the apartheid regime”, and (2) to “ensure that a working-class bias prevailed in the policies and programmes of the [NLM]” (Habib & Taylor, 1999: 265). The Tripartite Alliance and its Marxist-Leninist roots remained important to the ANC after democratisation. Even today, the ANC as an electorally dominant party still “relies on street level organisation in order to mobilise its supporters” (Butler, 2005: 729). Those ANC members who were in exile are “more likely to embrace the communist claim that Marxism/Leninism and the inheritance of an unmatched wealth of revolutionary experience makes the Tripartite Alliance uniquely qualified to lead a social democratic society” (Butler, 2005: 729). Yet, “contradicting interests and

disagreements on important [principles have] led to the split of the alliance, culminating in the watershed succession race in December 2007 during the ANC's 52nd National Conference" (Britz, 2011: 78). However, this does not imply that the communist ideology and its principles have disappeared from the ANC party altogether. De Jager (2006) suggests that the ANC's party dominance and move towards centralisation gives "pre-eminence to the role of the vanguard party" (De Jager, 2006: 67).

Johnson (2003: 331) summarises the communist influence that is present within the ANC by stating:

As a liberation movement largely in exile and faced with enormous military pressures and dangers of infiltration by the apartheid regime, the ANC's commitment to a vanguard Leninist strategy that emphasised democratic centralism and top-down command proved successful in providing strong co-ordination, discipline and direction for the anti-apartheid struggle

The communist influence during the liberation struggle has maintained its influence within the ANC NLM today and the ANC "continues use Marxism-Leninism and the notion of the ANC as a vanguard party acting on behalf of the 'masses' to shape their new relationship between state and society" (Johnson, 2003: 334). Therefore, the ANC's communist history has impacted the way in which it views political opposition, negatively.

3.3.3 Africanism

Africanist political ideology or thought can simply be seen as putting Africans first in Africa. It entails the promotion of African people throughout Africa with regard to culture, policy and economy. It is easy to state that the ANC party falls under Africanist ideology, as the party itself is closely linked to a movement of African liberation and political unity.

3.3.3.1 Description

Africanism falls under the broader ideology of nationalism. Nationalism is the desire to promote the interests of a particular nation, such as maintaining or gaining sovereignty (Heywood, 2017: 163). Falola (2004: 98) argues that African nationalism cannot be defined in "strictly political or intellectual terms" as the end result of improvement of living standards is an integral part. According to Falola (2004: 98), "nationalism gave birth to Pan-Africanism, Pan-Africanism radicalised nationalism, and both combined contributed to the fall of the European empires in Africa". Opeyemi (1979: 67) states that the concept Pan-Africanism is

seen by scholars either as a sort of African nationalism or as a struggle for the emancipation and progress of the black race. However, all understandings of Pan-Africanism emphasise the concepts of liberation and integration as necessary conditions for development (Opeyemi, 1979: 67). Therefore, Pan-Africanism can be defined as a nationalist movement promoting African Nationalist ideals whereas Africanism is the belief in the promotion of African-biased African Nationalism.

The ideology of Africanism is a form of nationalism that promotes African culture, politics, economics and ethnicity. It can be considered a form of ethnic nationalism, which Heywood (2017: 167) defines as “nationalism that is fuelled primarily by a keen sense of ethnic distinctiveness and the desire to preserve it”. According to Thomson (2010: 36) the concept of African nationalism differs from that of Western nationalism in the sense that Africans retain and develop the ideas of community, at a local level (lineage groups, clans, and tribes). This links closely to concept of ethnicity, which can be defined as “the state of being ethnic”, or of “belonging to an ethnic group” (Kellas, 1998: 51). Therefore, “ethnic nationalism is the nationalism of ethnic groups, who define their nation in exclusive terms, mainly based on common descent” (Kellas, 1998: 51). Additionally, it falls under cultural nationalism that primarily emphasises “the regeneration of a nation as a distinctive civilisation rather than on self-government” (Heywood, 2017: 167). However, one could argue that Africanism also fits under political nationalism, which focuses on self-determination, and that a nation is regarded as a natural political community (Heywood, 2017: 167). According to Thomson’s (2010: 37) definition, African nationalism is a classic example of the demand for self-determination.

National unity and independence formed the basis of African nationalism. Tribalism became known as a hindrance whilst economic growth and unity became a dominant component within the ideologies of new African states (see Thomson, 2010; Falola, 2004). Notably, Kwame Nkrumah, a leading African nationalist and promoter of Pan-Africanism, stated that political independence without economic independence would be superficial (Nkrumah, 1963: 50). Pan-Africanists, according to Martin (1982: 236) believed that regional unity would protect them from neo-colonialism and aid in “their search for economic independence and self-reliance”. In its early stages, African nationalism was about anticolonialism but has now shifted to the task of nation-building (Falola, 2004: 110). The process of nation-building on the African continent has proven difficult due to the effects of colonialism and authoritarian regimes that resulted in dependency on the West. Africanism aims to remove the region from this dependent

position and create a continental unity for political and economic upliftment. In conclusion, one can define Africanism as the African form of nationalism that promotes the concepts of independence and shared African unity, in order to achieve economic growth and build independent nations.

3.3.3.2 View of Political Opposition

The focus of Africanism is on the unity, cooperation and promotion of African people, and therefore one would assume that political opposition that does not hold the same views would not be easily accepted. During the colonial period and development of African nationalism, the idea of unity was promoted so heavily that “pluralist competition was sacrificed to the higher goal of nation-building” (Thomson, 2010: 38). Julius Nyerere captures nationalist sentiment after Tanganyika’s independence in 1961:

A patriotic struggle that leaves no room for differences and unites all elements of the country; the nationalists who led them to freedom must inevitably form the first governments of the new States. Once the first free government is formed, its supreme task lies in the building up the economy...This, no less than the struggle against colonialism, calls for the maximum united effort by the whole country if it is to succeed. There can be no room for difference or division.

(Nyerere, 1961: 50-57)

The above quotation reveals the development of economic interest and the overall disregard for the concept pluralism in nation-building. Unity is counter to pluralism, according to Thomson (2010: 260-261), as contestation destroys unity.

Additionally, Thomson (2010: 259) argues that many African political elites, both incumbent and opposition, are only using multi-party democracy “instrumentally”. They support pluralism as a way of retaining or maintaining power, not because they “inherently believe in its moral value” (Thomson, 2010: 260). This suggests that regardless of whether the opposition parties promote Africanist beliefs, they are simply a formality for the ruling party to maintain power. According to Osabu-Kle (2001) opposition and enemy have similar connotations in African culture, revealing a disapproving view of political opposition. This further adds to the above statement from Thomson (2010), implying that opposition is never truly accepted and interaction is a means to an end. Pluralism, according to Thomson (2010: 260), requires a political culture where democrats wear victory or defeat gracefully. Due to the weak democratic environment in Africa, a reality has occurred where fewer parties have accepted

the results of multi-party elections than those willing to participate in them. This is seen in the many cases of contested, ignored or manipulated results (Thomson, 2010: 260). This type of political culture cannot sustain pluralism and thus promotes a negative view of opposition under the Africanist ideology.

3.3.3.3 The ANC

The principles of Pan-Africanism have made a considerable contribution to the evolution of ANC policy. South Africa is still suffering from the legacy of slavery and colonialism, with the result that there are still entrenched class, gender, and race divisions within the country (Motshekga, 2010: 94). The ANC's S&T document of 2007 states that "our aim is build a united, democratic society in which the value of all citizens is measured by our common humanity" (ANC, 2007). This statement does not exclude non-Africans even though Africanism's main goal is to uplift the previously oppressed racial group of African people. This common humanity was not recognised under apartheid, and thus the ANC's original purpose was to join together various ethnic groups to "bring about unity and cooperation between people of colour" (Motshekga, 2010: 95). Revealing that the concept of a united nation with a shared identity may be of interest to the ANC.

Africanist ideology aims to promote the progress of Africans in Africa; it was born out of the need for upliftment of African people during the era of slavery and oppression. South Africa became the leading location for the promotion of this ideology, and thus it became an increasingly popular movement. The ANC holds many Africanist beliefs, as its fundamental purpose was to promote the equality of all African people, regardless of their ethnicity, and to liberate South Africa from oppression. Many members of the ANC promoted the pan-Africanist movement, so much so that one of their chosen leaders, former president Thabo Mbeki, worked closely with the African parliament and was an advocate for agency of Africans. Mbeki's approach to politics was to support and promote an African renaissance, which refers to "a vision and mission for transformative change and development that is premised on the understanding that the future of Africa and the Diaspora lies in the fundamental process of renewal, re-invention and rebirth" (Odora Hoppers, 2006: 35). Mbeki when in the position of party leader, had a clear Africanist stance revealing strong support for this ideology within the ANC party.

3.4 Operationalisation of Ideological Key Terms

The purpose of this section is to take the information provided in this chapter and operationalise these key ideologies in order to answer the second part of the research question. Operationalisation for the first half of the research question occurred in Section 2.2.2.3.1.1. The second part answers why the ANC views opposition in a particular way by tabulating key ideological terms (Table 2) that are taken from each ideological explanation and definition above. In ATLAS.ti, the key terms are loaded, and each S&T document is scanned for relevant statements. The data will be analysed in Chapter 4 where general trends and observations across the five S&T documents will be stated. By revealing the most prominent ideology, one can deduce how the party views of political opposition were informed through the language used. Although one cannot assume that what is written in the documents is true to action and that the ANC may claim to believe in a particular ideology yet act in the contradicting manner.

Table 2: Key Ideological Terms Table

Key Ideological Terms		
<i>Liberalism</i>	<i>Communism</i>	<i>Africanism</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consent • Constitutionalism • Democracy • Equality of Value • General Freedom • Human Development • Individualism • Liberty • Morality • Political and Human Rights • Rationality • Self-determination 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Anti-capitalism • Central Control • Class Struggle • Classless Society • Common Ownership • Equal Distribution • Equality of Outcome • Revolutionary • Social Justice • Social Organisation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • African Unity • Cultural Heritage • Ethnicity • Fraternity • Independence • Nationalism • Patriotism • Shared Identity • Transformative

3.5 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to inform the reader on the three important political ideologies that have influenced the ANC, in order to build a clear basis for understanding the data collection process. In order to answer the second part of the research question, it was necessary to define and identify the principles of each political ideology, i.e., liberalism, communism, and Africanism. Each of these were described with regard to its connection to South Africa and, more specifically, to the evolution of the ANC. Liberalism is theoretically the main political ideology, as South Africa's political structure is based on the liberal system of democracy. Communism is a deeply rooted ideology where control over financial resources in order to distribute equally amongst the citizenry is the goal. Africanism, which is a truly relevant ideology for an African country, recognises the importance of independence and liberation. The ANC incorporates all three political ideologies, although each of them has different values. The ideologies were operationalised in a tabular format where key terms were drawn each. The support of certain ideological principles exposes the different viewpoints of ANC and aims to answer how the ANC views political opposition. Once the ANC's stance on political opposition and the ideological influences that informs such a view is determined, it will be possible to assess the degree of democratic consolidation in South Africa.

Chapter 4

Coding and Data Analysis

4.1 Introduction

This chapter sets out to describe the qualitative analysis of the data, including the practical steps utilised to investigate how the ANC views political opposition in South Africa's democracy. This will be done in two sections, the first looking to answer how the ANC, as a liberation movement in government, views political opposition in South Africa's democracy. The second section will look at why, and which ideology has influenced such a view. This is done by coding the tabulated key terms from the political opposition and ideology code groups in the ATLAS.ti programme. The coding reveals, through the ANC's language and choice of words in their S&T documents from 1997 to 2017, what their view of opposition is and which ideologies are most prominent, allowing conclusions to be drawn.

4.2 Data Analysis of Political Opposition

The aim of this section is to ascertain how the ANC, as a liberation movement in government, views political opposition in South Africa's democracy. This was done by codifying key statements contained throughout the five S&T documents from 1997 to 2017, using the key terms that represent the ANC's views of political oppositions. These key political opposition terms were taken from the literature on the importance of political opposition (Section 2.2.2.3.1). The political opposition key terms are divided up into three main groups; the fundamental key terms group, the functionality group, and lastly the non-pluralist view of political opposition group.

4.2.1 General Trends in the Data

This section will be divided into the three key term categories (fundamental, functionality, and non-pluralist) allowing for a systematic analysis of the quotations under each code group and observations will be made in each subsection to aid in answering the first part of the research question before moving on to examine why this view has developed, in the sections to follow. The data collected is presented in Table 3 and the total number of quotations per political opposition key terms can be seen in [Figure 1](#).

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Table 3: The Total Quotations per Political Opposition Code Groups

Code Group		Total Coded Quotations	Percentage %
Fundamental	Political Opposition	6	7
	Political Parties	14	16
	Elections	8	9
Functionality in a democratic setting	Accountability	4	4
	Loyal Opposition	1	1
	Mobilisation of Citizenry	14	16
	Representation	14	16
Non-pluralist View	Enemy	5	6
	Vanguard Party	24	27
Totals		90	100




Figure 1: Total Number of Quotations per Political Opposition Code Group

4.2.2 Fundamental Political Opposition Code Groups

Firstly, the fundamental key terms group was created to highlight all areas relevant to the overall research topic, these include: ‘political opposition’, ‘political party’, and ‘elections’.

Political opposition in a democracy comes in the form of political parties and the platform in which positioning takes place in the electoral process.

4.2.2.1 Political Opposition

This code was put in place to highlight all the instances when the ANC mentions the concept of the ‘political opposition’, as this is the focal point of the research. However, it made up only 6 out of the total number of 90 quotations. The mention of this key term is crucial to the research, and quotations under this section will aid in answering the first part of the research question.

The ANC does not have a clear stance on the political opposition and this comes across in the S&T documents, accounting for only 7 percent of the coded quotations. In the first S&T document (1997) of the new democratic regime, interestingly, the ANC promotes the idea of political opposition quite strongly:

it is always tempting for revolutionary organisations in political office to characterise all opposition to their programmes as acts of counter-revolution. In general terms, an opposition that pays allegiance to the constitution and the country's laws and seeks to modify the programmes of transformation or even to express a retrogressive school of thought shared by a given constituency, is a legitimate actor in the contradictory process of change. Indeed, such forces should be treated as legitimate expressions of the country's social contradictions.

(ANC, 1997: 10)

The above quotation does acknowledge the negative tendencies a NLM could have towards the opposition, but appears to reassure readers that this is not the case with the ANC. However, the ANC does go on to mention circumstances where they do categorise opposition as counter-revolutionary, despite opposition being allowed to hold different views:

The defining character of the public platform of most opposition parties is to entrench the social relations of black poverty and white opulence however modified - that were engendered by the system of apartheid. To achieve this, they seek to imprison the erstwhile beneficiaries of apartheid in that time warp when white and might were right. They strive to maintain cohesion within a former ruling group now facing disintegration. In this sense, these forces are, broadly-speaking, counter-revolutionary.

(ANC, 1997: 11)

The above quotation is a possibly deliberate mis-representation of what the opposition parties are doing; in other words, it seems to say that, anyone who disagrees with the political position of the ANC is automatically ‘entrenching the social relations of black poverty and white opulence’, which is not the case. It is erroneous to claim that they are ‘seeking to imprison...when white and might were right’. This is a kind of political spin that seeks to demonise and denigrate anyone who disagrees with ANC’s position in power. In other words, as long as the opposition parties support the revolution then they can be considered legitimate, otherwise they are regarded as being counter-revolutionary and are unlikely to be acknowledged by the ruling party when it comes to debate. This is a communist point of view as it is concerned with the equality of outcome between the racial groups.

When it comes to international relations, “the ANC seeks to take active part in shaping this [new world] order, both in the context of its relations with other parties and movements, and as the leading organisation in government” (ANC, 1997: 18). In other words, the ANC is open to working with external (not South African) parties as this does not directly affect their position as ruling party in South Africa’s democracy.

The ANC states in both the 2007 and 2012 S&T documents that democracy has “opened up critical space for organisations of civil society to flourish” (ANC, 2007: 10). However, contradictory features under democracy have manifested under this regime and “this is partly due to the haemorrhaging of experienced cadreship, and tendencies towards mechanical oppositionism in relation to government or towards an exclusive focus on narrow self-interest” (ANC, 2007: 10; ANC, 2012, 33). Such statements are intended to criticise the way in which the opposition operates within the regime. The reference to mechanical oppositionism is a way in which the ANC undermines the routine functionality of political opposition, as well as implying the opposition only operates in self-interest rather than for the betterment of the regime as whole. This view is ironic as the ANC itself acts predominantly out of self-interest hence why it seemingly puts down the opposition, yet, this acknowledgment is a request for improvement from opposition to increase accountability and save the democratic regime.

The 2017 S&T mentions how the ANC should be creative in “handling electoral dynamics, including management of caucuses in legislatures, and the politics of coalitions and opposition” (ANC, 2017: 15). The use of the word ‘creative’ implies that the ANC does not agree with the way in which coalitions and oppositions are approaching topics and thus need to find a way of responding. The ANC suggest the formation of a broad national front that would be mutually

beneficial to the party and citizenry. Political parties will always try to out-strategise and out-manoeuvre each other, sometimes resorting to ‘dirty tricks’ and manipulation of the media. In the South African context, it is even more complicated, partly because the opposition is small in number and impact when compared to the dominant party; partly because of continuing racial polarisation; and partly because the ANC’s own narrative of demonising any party that disagrees with or criticises the ANC’s policies and implementation of those policies.

Despite the lack of mention or support of the concept of ‘political opposition’, the ANC does state in the 2017 S&T document that splinter-parties from the ANC and a broader opposition are “appropriating the language and symbols of change” (ANC, 2012: 17). These groups hold the government accountable for developing negative tendencies since the first democratic elections 1994, and these tendencies are described by the ANC as follows:

deviant conduct has become deeply entrenched; and arrogance, factionalism and corruption have been identified by large sections of society, including ANC supporters, as dominant tendencies within the movement. Gate-keeping, money politics and fraud characterise most ANC electoral processes. Underhand practices increasingly define interactions between various spheres of government and the private sector; and private interests seek to capture and control not only state organs, but also the ANC itself.

(ANC, 2012: 17)

Interestingly the ANC seems to be admitting to these negative tendencies in 2012 despite (normally) in the public discourse seemingly denying that these problems even exist.

The aim of this code group (namely, focusing on the political opposition) was to highlight the ANC’s overall view of political opposition and to prompt discussion around this specific topic in this study. From the various S&T documents, it seems that this code group is associated with conflicting quotations, which makes it difficult to articulate a clear stance by the ANC on the concept of political opposition. In 1997, the ANC initially promoted the concept, although it also immediately provided criteria for what constitutes an ‘acceptable’ opposition. In other words, the opposition must support the revolution in order for it to be accepted by the ANC as a legitimate opposition. In so doing, the ANC misses the point that opposition parties within a democratic regime are entitled to follow differing strategies and hold different beliefs.

4.2.2.2 Political party

Political parties are a crucial feature of democracy. Without them, democracy would not exist. The quotations mentioning party involvement in the ANC S&T documents do reveal some

support of and disagreement with the concept. The ‘political party’ code group holds 16 percent of the total number of quotations, in a joint second place with ‘representation’ and ‘mobilisation’ – two very important concepts. After the regime change in 1994, the ANC was expected to transform from a NLM into a political party that would participate in the electoral process.

Although, the ANC does state that it would like to build strong co-operation with parties and movements, it often only refers to external relationships, for example:

In building party-to-party relations, we are guided by these principles [to build an equitable world order], particularly to forge strong co-operation with parties and movements that share our views in the region, on the continent, in countries of the South and further afield

(ANC, 1997: 18)

The above quotation reveals a willingness to cooperate with parties outside of South Africa. This is due to the fact that these parties do not have direct influence on the ANC’s position as ruling party of South Africa. Additionally, these relations are beneficial to South Africa’s economic growth because an ‘equitable world order’ implies that the Western world can no longer abuse the African continent of resources.

In the 1997 S&T, the ANC clearly states its commitments to its own vision of a democratic and just society under the constitution:

The ANC commits itself to the fundamental provisions of the basic law of the land, which accords with its own vision of a democratic and just society. We have set out to implement both the letter and the spirit of the constitution, including such principles as multi-party democracy, the doctrine and practice of separation of powers in a constitutional state, fundamental human rights to all citizens, respect for the rights of linguistic, religious and cultural communities, and social equity within the context of correcting the historical injustices of apartheid.

(ANC, 1997: 22)

The ANC mentions the constitutional framework with regard to having a multi-party democracy three times within the 2007 S&T document. It says that in the 1990s, “the Interim Constitution prescribed the need for a multi-party government at national and provincial levels” (ANC, 2007: 23). This reveals that the original intention has always been toward a multi-party

system rather than the currently developing dominant party one. The ANC states in both the 2007 and 2012 S&T documents the following:

The National Constitution sets out the framework within which to manage social relations. Some of the basic principles include: multi-party democracy; the doctrine and practice of separation of powers in a constitutional democracy; equal human rights and access to opportunity; freedom of speech and of the media; equality of all before the law; respect for the rights of linguistic, religious and cultural communities; social equity and practical corrective action against racial, gender and other forms of discrimination.

(ANC, 2007: 23; ANC, 2012: 58)

The ANC promotes its use of the constitutional framework and boasts that:

South Africa enjoys a system of vibrant multi-party democracy, with a progressive Bill of Rights which recognises political, socio-economic and environmental rights and obligations, and with separation of powers among the executive, the judiciary and the legislatures. Beyond the formal processes of regular elections and legislatures, various forms of legislated and other forums ensure popular participation.

(ANC, 2007: 9)

In practice, however, when the ANC speaks of political parties, it tends to refer only to *progressive* political parties, for example: “through mass mobilisation and progressive political parties, and through the power of the vote, continuous processes of self-correction do assert themselves” (ANC, 2012: 53). These words state that the ANC tends only to have accept political parties that are progressive and that do not have so-called counter-revolutionary traits. The ANC defines a progressive party as a party that supports the ANC’s political position and is pro ANC transformation policy. Additionally, the ANC does not consider itself a regular political party. It states in both the 2007 and 2012 S&T documents that a democratic society is not “ready-made at the point of transfer” and that it thus needs to build on it and “improve their capacity” (ANC, 2007: 17). It goes onto to say that because of this:

the ANC cannot conduct itself as an ordinary electoral party. It cannot behave like a shapeless jelly-fish with a political form that is fashioned hither and thither by the multiple contradictory forces of sea-waves. There should be clear value systems that attach to being a member and a leader of the ANC, informed by the strategic objectives that we pursue.

(ANC, 2007: 17; ANC, 2012: 46-47)

By stating that they cannot conduct themselves as an ordinary party, the ANC is positioning itself as being superior to the opposition parties and as more legitimate, as they are at the forefront of democratic development, which they had fought for in the struggle. This superiority suggests that the ANC cannot or should not be criticised or held accountable for the seemingly apparent anti-democratic behaviour.

In its 2017 S&T, the ANC speaks of how they have aided in changing the opinions of ANC-deemed counter-revolutionary parties into understanding the rhetoric of the NLM and transition to democracy.

The motive forces of change – the classes and strata which objectively stand to benefit from fundamental transformation – still desire such change and are prepared to work for it. It may well be that many of these forces are starting to lose confidence in the capacity and will on the part of the ANC to lead such a project. But this does not mean that they have abandoned their profound self-interest. In fact, it is testimony to the hegemony of the liberation ideal that even parties historically opposed to fundamental change have sought, at least in their public posture, to embrace both the content and symbols of reconstruction and development. In addition, pretentious radical left rhetoric has found fertile ground within significant sections of the electorate.

(ANC, 2017: 10)

The above quotation states that the working class could possibly be losing confidence in the ANC but remain self-interested. This could suggest that despite the ANC's slow-paced transformation plans, the working class remain loyal as a means to gain equality of outcome. The 'radical left rhetoric' mentioned within the 2017 S&T is described as 'pretentious' by the ANC yet mimics the kind of activism the ANC sported during the liberation. The ANC promotes the lingering hegemony of the liberation struggle as a positive attribution to society that has suggestively led to an increase in far-left action – which is inherently communist.

Further in the same document, the ANC claims that when citizens vote for one of the opposition parties, this is a misplaced vote. They are implying that citizens only vote for the opposition because of impatience, despite there being many other reasons as to why citizens place their vote elsewhere. They use this to defend their strategy and tactics towards their project of democratic development and social transformation:

An examination of the professed positions of the largest parties leads to the conclusion that these sections of the motive forces have not abandoned their support for fundamental change. In some instances, their electoral choices, however misplaced, reflect a sense of impatience and urgency. In other words, some among the motive

forces contend that continuing social transformation does not necessarily require ANC leadership as such.

(ANC, 2017: 14)

The only other mention of party relationships has to do with international affairs. The 1997 S&T states that the ANC (see Section 4.2.2.1) would like to build strong co-operation with parties and movements, they often only refer to external one's relationships that creates economic benefits for South Africa. Moreover, when discussing globalisation in the 2012 S&T document, the party says

Progressive parties, workers' and women's organisations, popular campaigns around local development and environmental issues, associations of professionals and movements of people with disability, indigenous communities, the homeless, the landless and so on - all have resolved to challenge the negative effects of globalisation.

(ANC, 2012: 55)

The negative effects of globalisation, according to the ANC, is exploitation of resources and people for maximum financial gain. Globalisation is a product of widespread capitalism and the ANC states that this is shaped by dominant forces from the West. This has had many shortcomings, according to the ANC (2012: 54), such as: corruption, migration from poor to rich nations, the entrenchment of patriarchy, exploitation, and trafficking.

It is clear from the above quotations that the ANC understands the importance of political parties in a democracy, but interestingly it excludes itself from the generic understanding of political parties. Its argument is that its history as a NLM places the ANC in a different position to the ordinary democratic political party; this is why it regards itself as superior, and why it excludes itself from the 'normal' party behaviour of political parties. The ANC is exempting itself from the democratic structures that allow for consolidation.

4.2.2.3 Elections

The electoral system allows the citizenry to exercise their rights by choosing a representative party that has their best interests in mind. Despite being a vital part of any democratic regime, the 'elections' or the electoral process only made up 9 percent of the total number of coded quotations, without them, the regime would not be democratic. According to the ANC:

South Africa enjoys a system of vibrant multi-party democracy, with a progressive Bill of Rights which recognises political, socio- economic and environmental rights and

obligations, and with separation of powers among the executive, the judiciary and the legislatures. Beyond the formal processes of regular elections and legislatures, various forms of legislated and other forums ensure popular participation.

(ANC, 2012: 31)

The ANC states that “one of the most critical acts of the NDR is the creation of a legitimate state which derives its authority from the people, through regular elections and continuing popular participation in the processes of governance” (ANC, 2007: 5). This quotation is repeated in the 2012 S&T document, along with further mentions of the electoral system. For instance, it refers to the fact that the NDR is founded on: “popular participation of the people in the process of development, and with special focus on the poor and marginalised” (ANC, 2012: 3). This statement does not, however, promote the liberal’s idea of ‘equality of value’ but rather the communist idea of ‘equality of outcome’ for the poor and marginalized members of society. The ANC make it clear that they utilise the functions of democracy to increase the wealth (resource or financial) of the previously oppressed citizenry.

A major advancement the ANC has made, and one that it boasts about in the second decade of freedom, is: “the introduction of strong elements of participatory democracy” (ANC, 2012: 6). These elements refer to the open and fair voting environment for all citizens. The ANC, however, highlights a major issue surrounding the participatory democracy as “insufficient attention to promoting a non-racial, non-sexist, deliberative and participatory democratic culture within the movement and society” (ANC: 2012: 8). Therefore, seemingly admitting to the shortcoming of the regime. Hence, the ANC mentions its approach to the electoral process with an aim of long-term success:

the ANC is faced with two options: either to act as a party of the present, an electoral machine blinded by short-term interest, satisfied with current social reality and merely giving stewardship to its sustenance. Or it can become a party of the future, using political power and harnessing the organisational and intellectual resources of society to attain the vision of a national democratic society.

(ANC, 2007: 17; ANC, 2012: 46)

In the most recent S&T document of 2017, the party discloses a further need to improve the electoral processes:

ANC electoral processes should be more transparent, with rules that include systems of vetting, interaction between candidates and the broad membership, as well as do’s and don’ts that are strictly observed

(ANC, 2017: 18)

These rules are defined as “strategic interventions” that are in place to stop the decline the ANC had been experiencing (ANC, 2017: 18). Without the acceptance of the concept and importance of political opposition none of the suggested improvements above would be achievable. As disapproval of opposition shows the ANC would not be trying to make the electoral processes more transparent or legitimate. The existence of the opposition creates options for the citizenry to vote differently, which makes it an important feature of the South African democracy, despite receiving only the minimal mention by the ANC. Calls for improvement of electoral processes were prominent in the 2012 S&T, while transparency was promoted in the 2017 S&T. Nonetheless, this code group only made up a very low percentage of the quotations made by the ruling party.

4.2.3 Functionality in a Democratic Setting Code Groups

The second key political opposition code category is the functionality group that consists of the key functions of political opposition that ensure its effectiveness. These include ‘accountability’, ‘loyal opposition’, ‘mobilisation of citizenry’, and ‘representation’. These were drawn from this quotation in the literature: “political parties are important in that they can fulfil democracy-supporting functions, including: aggregating and channelling interests; representing interests of citizenry; mobilising the public; utilising sources of government; and maintaining government accountability” (Ball & Peters, 2005; De Jager, 2010; Randall & Svåsand, 2002).

4.2.3.1 Accountability

In an ideal democratic regime, the political opposition would hold the ruling party accountable for their actions. This a vital democracy supporting function that aims to safeguard government stability and democratic consolidation. It also ensures that the people are represented correctly and it discourages any anti-democratic behaviour. The ‘accountability’ code group held a minor 4 percent out of the total number of quotations coded in the category of political opposition. In the introduction to their 1997 S&T, the ANC states its intentions and concerns as follows:

We have only started along a long road towards justice and true equity. The new constitutional order and the government based on the will of the people express both the immediate and long-term interests of the overwhelming majority of South Africans. They accord with the world trend towards democratic, open and accountable

government. But the balance of forces both within South Africa and internationally is such that these interests can be subverted by capitalism's rapacious license. In this sense therefore, the basic framework of our democratic achievement in South Africa is irreversible: but it can be derailed, leaving us with a shell of political rights without real social content.

(ANC, 1997: 1)

This statement above shows that they are sceptical of the strength of a "democratic, open and accountable government" (ANC, 1997: 1). In 2017, twenty years later, the ANC asserts that it understands the importance of accountability and that they aim to build such a state:

The state should play a central role in leading the initiatives aimed at achieving a decent quality of life for all. The programme to build a democratic developmental state that is responsive, legitimate, capable and accountable should therefore be intensified.

(ANC, 2017: 14-15)

Furthermore, in the 2017, the ANC states that they need to be more creative in handling the politics of coalitions and oppositions (mentioned in Section 4.2.2.1). This implies that they intend on being imaginative in their approach rather than being direct and transparent. However, as pointed out above, the role of the opposition is to hold the ANC (or whichever party governs the country) accountable, and so it should be heard in order to safeguard, protect and support democracy. It is the role of the ruling party to listen to the opposition rather than to manage them creatively. The ANC's S&T (2017) further states that the ANC:

Should continually seek to forge a social compact – a broad national front – for mutual benefit. This requires deft management of contradictions in broader society and even among the motive forces themselves. It requires the capacity not only to ensure progressive and transformative governance; but also, creativity in handling electoral dynamics, including management of caucuses in legislatures, and the politics of coalitions and opposition.

(ANC, 2017: 17)

As mentioned previously, a crucial function of any democracy is the oppositions (and civil society) role of holding the ruling party accountable. In fact, it is a mutually beneficial role that improves the reputation of the opposition and ultimately ensures democratic stability. The opposition uplift their image against the wrongdoings of the ruling party that has been highlighted for discussion. However, the ANC ruling party may not see any benefit in being held accountable, or the opposition's role in doing so. Given such a low number of quotations

across all five of the S&T documents from 1997 to 2017, one can deduce that the ANC does not hold this aspect of political opposition in high regard.

4.2.3.2 Loyal Opposition

Having a loyal opposition is ideal in a democratic regime, as it aims to protect the regime with consistency and accountability. In other words, although the opposition still opposes the ruling party to ensure democratic stability, it remains loyal to the government's power and the mutual goal of democratic consolidation. The concept of the 'loyal opposition' is not one that is mentioned regularly within the ANC S&T documents, with only one relevant quotation taken from the 2017 S&T document. The ANC needs to accept the opposition party in order to build loyalty amongst the cabinet. In the section titled 'Enhancing the Integrity and Role of the ANC' (ANC, 2017), during a discussion of the increasing anti-democratic behaviour of the ANC, it states: "this is unfolding against the backdrop of splinter- parties from the ANC and a broader opposition appropriating the language and symbols of change" (ANC, 2017: 17). This statement reveals the ANC's acceptance of suggestions from the opposition and its motives for change in order to resist and overcome the negative tendencies (the common characteristics of NLM governments) that have developed post-1994. The concept of loyal opposition is not present within any of the other S&T documents, although it is recognised worldwide as a crucial concept within a democracy to ensure stability.

4.2.3.3 Mobilisation of Citizenry

One of the main purposes of the opposition party is to mobilise the citizenry to contest the actions of the ruling party, hold them accountable and participate in electoral processes. This benefits both the opposition and the regime as the opposition advertises their party's morality to the public and democracy is protected from anti-democratic behaviour. Mobilisation in this context refers to the encouraging of the citizenry to participate in electoral processes. This key term code group – 'mobilisation of the citizenry' – received a high number of quotations and is in a tied in second place alongside the 'political party' and 'representation' code groups, all holding 16 percent of the total quotations. This is due to the fact that the ANC as a NLM, with a long liberation history, is well versed in mobilisation for change coming from their liberation history. After all, they fought for the implementation of democracy to allow all citizens the right to vote for representation. Their 2007 S&T thus states that: "through mass mobilisation and progressive political parties, and through the power of the vote, continuous processes of

self-correction do assert themselves” (ANC, 2007: 21; ANC, 2012: 53). Here the promotion of political parties is clear, and mobilisation is shown as a key tool for democratic development.

The ANC consistently acknowledges this as a main feature of democracy in the 2007, 2012, and 2017 S&T documents that celebrate their second decade in power with the same quotation: “mobilising the people as a whole, especially the poor, to act as their own liberators through participatory and representative democracy” (ANC, 2007: 8; ANC, 2012: 29; ANC, 2017: 7). They further mention the use of mobilisation in their international agenda as a means to create global equality, which is repeated in the 2007 and 2012 documents:

The ANC forms part of the global forces -including governments, political parties and civil society organisations in developing and developed countries - campaigning for a humane and equitable world order.

(ANC, 2007: 23; ANC, 2012: 56)

The ANC admits to the power of mass mobilisation, stating that they are aware of its strength, possibly for future utilisation. This is shown in the 2007 and 2012 S&T documents in the chapters dealing with the character of the international situation:

The global mass movements around these and other issues attest to the impact of these factors on global human consciousness and conscience. Public opinion is steadily turning. Progressive parties, workers' and women's organisations, popular campaigns around local development and environmental issues, associations of professionals and movements of people with disability, indigenous communities, the homeless, the landless and so on -all have resolved to challenge the negative effects of globalization.

(ANC, 2007: 22; ANC, 2012: 55)

The ANC admires and promotes citizen mobilisation, as expressed in a quotation from the 2017 S&T that has not been taken from previous documents. It states: “formal democratic processes need to be underpinned by citizen activism and the mind-set to accommodate differences, be they ethnic, racial, religious or party political” (ANC, 2017: 21). The party consistently mentions the various ways in which it has mobilised the citizenry. This is a feature of democracy that the ANC enjoys, as it originates from the ANC liberation history.

The various generations of rights enshrined in South Africa's Constitution represent society's contract for an improving quality of life for all. The efforts to inject these rights into the lived experiences of all citizens, should be intensified. Each centre of power, from the state to civil society should be mobilised constantly to enhance the legality and legitimacy of the polity; and each arm of government – the executive, the

judiciary and the legislature – should play its role in the context of the doctrine of separation of powers.

(ANC, 2017: 22)

The ANC states that black workers have been able to progress in their status, outcomes, and treatment due to the environment of change created by the ruling party; this is the party's way of suggesting that they do indeed mobilise certain parts of the citizenry:

[Black workers – employed and unemployed, urban and rural] have, over the years, developed a keen sense of their aspirations and those of broader society; and have organised and mobilised for thoroughgoing change.

(ANC, 2017: 12)

It can be seen from the above coded quotations that the ANC utilises its liberation movement knowledge to mobilise the masses for change, as well as to mobilise the masses to participate in elections with the motive of remaining in government as the ruling party.

4.2.3.4 Representation

Representation of the citizenry should be any political party's main objective, making it an important code group. If the ANC truly supported the regime of democracy, their main priority would be to represent the entirety of the public i.e. all South Africans (not just those who were oppressed). This would make it a prominent topic in all of the S&T documents. And in fact, this is true, as it is second highest code group, receiving 16 percent of all the coded quotations,

However, the ANC tends to focus only on the majority that was negatively affected by apartheid, rather than representing South African citizenry as a whole. In 1997, the party had just transitioned from a NLM to a political party, which made it difficult for them to represent all South Africans. Despite this, they follow the Constitution, and the ANC states:

The new constitution and its various institutions provide the framework within which individuals should exercise their democratic rights. They afford parties with requisite support to attain representation in parliament, there to pursue the interests of their constituents.

(ANC, 1997: 10)

Nonetheless, the ANC shows that it is aware of its responsibility as a political party within a democracy:

We seek to create a social order in which the many positive elements of the market dovetail with the obligations of citizens one to the other. Through its elected representatives and other avenues, society should ensure that those who are indigent are accorded a humane and respectable quality of life.

(ANC, 1997: 10)

Africanist ideological thought and communist promotion of equality of outcome are shown clearly in this coded quotation, which reveals the ANC's agenda of African support and unity:

The ANC is a product of a given historical period, formed to unite the African people in the struggle for equality. Over the years, it developed to embrace non-racialism both as a principle and as a guide to its composition and day-to-day practice. Driving its approach to struggle was the fundamental national contradiction represented by the oppression of black people.

(ANC, 1997: 14)

Contradictorily, the ANC claims to represent all citizens in the quotation below, despite its predominately communist quotations above, which state that the focus will be on those who had been oppressed by apartheid. In the chapter on motive forces of the NDR in the 2007 S&T document, the ANC states:

in its conduct in relation to the state, the ANC should be guided by its own principles, and act within the framework of the National Constitution and relevant legislation. In this regard, it should manage the state as an organ of the people as a whole rather than a party political instrument.

(ANC, 2007: 18)

Despite the above claim, the ANC seem to be increasingly equating the state with political party, which does not abide by the Constitution or the principles of democracy.

In 2017, the ANC states that one of its main goals is “mobilising the people as a whole, especially the poor, to act as their own liberators through participatory and representative democracy” (ANC, 2017: 9). In other words, the ANC understands the important role of a political party to represent the people who voted for it. This is why the ANC have made mentions of this concept throughout their S&T documents; they aim to represent those who had no representation during apartheid, as this was the main goal of the struggle. Despite being in a position where representation of the people as a whole is a requirement. When a party succeeds in the electoral process and becomes the ruling party, it is necessary for a mindset

change. They are now in a position where they represent the entirety of the citizenry, including those who did not vote for them.

4.2.4 Non-pluralist View Political Opposition Code Groups

The final grouping is the non-pluralist view of opposition. This group contains two key terms, one from communism and the other Africanism. They were found to be the most prominent views of opposition from the two non-liberal ideological influences within the ANC. The first code has Africanist roots as Osabu-kle (2001) states that in African culture opposition is seen as ‘the enemy’. The second key term comes from the communist idea of vanguardism. The likelihood of the formation of a ‘vanguard party’ is probable due to the ANC’s historical communist influence, party dominance since 1994, and lean towards centralisation. The very concept of vanguardism rejects the idea that another party could sustain power and transformation, hence the importance of codifying this term. These code group will be analysed according to the data that is presented on them from the coding of the five S&T documents from 1997-2017.

4.2.4.1 Enemy

In the literature around political opposition (Section 2.2.2.3.1), Osabu-kle (2001: 19) states that in African culture “the concept of opposition and enemy came to mean the same thing, as the only known opposing force was the enemy from outside”. This way of thinking can be seen throughout the S&T documents, mostly when the ANC is referring to the struggle and the previous apartheid government. In Western political ideology, however, it is counter-productive to call the opposition party ‘the enemy’. This controversial code group accounted for a minor 6 percent of the total number of coded quotations from the key terms used to refer to the political opposition.

When discussing counter-revolutionary forces in their 1997 S&T document, the ANC raised the various challenges it was facing, and stated that it must “remember the adage of [their] own campaigns attack the enemy on all fronts” (ANC, 1997: 11). This is mentioned again with reference to the liberation struggle in the concluding remarks of the 1997 S&T:

A new epoch has dawned, presenting the ANC with the wherewithal to realise the ideals and aspirations of the generation which set it up when the final destination was but a phantom beyond the horizon; of the militant and brave cadres who sacrificed their lives in the face of an enemy that seemed invincible; and of the mass of the people who put their trust in the organisation in the face of brutal repression.

(ANC, 1997: 27)

From statements like these, it can be seen that the ANC is seeking to legitimise its position in power by highlighting the fact that ANC members fought the liberation struggle against an oppressive force, which is repeatedly referred to as ‘the enemy’. Doing so, however, puts white citizens in a bad light (because they are equated with the apartheid enemy, even though the ANC does/did have white members) and could effectively hinder the nation’s ability to unite. In their 2007 S&T, this was highlighted once more, after discussing how members of the black community were treated as servants of the white community:

The liberation movement defined the enemy, on the other hand, as the system of white minority domination with the white community being the beneficiaries and defenders of this system. These in turn were made up of workers, middle strata and capitalists. Monopoly capital was identified as the chief enemy of the NDR.

(ANC, 2007: 12)

The above quotation is repeated in the 2012 document under the Drivers of Change section (ANC, 2012: 37). The only other mention of the term ‘enemy’ is with reference to the capitalist system that benefitted the white community whilst African’s suffered due to longstanding oppression during apartheid:

The system, by definition, privileged and benefited the white community as a whole. The workers, middle strata and capitalists in this community in large measure united in its defence. Monopoly capital, made up of local and foreign corporations controlling large chunks of the economy, was identified as the primary enemy of the NDR.

(ANC, 2017: 11)

The above quotation suggests that the white community was and still is ‘the enemy’, and ignores the sheer numeric superiority of the black community. The ANC uses the reference to liberation history and reference to the white community as ‘the enemy’ to legitimise its position in power. Although it does not directly describe the opposition parties in South Africa as ‘the enemy’, it does, by highlighting the ANC’s own legitimacy – and by implication the illegitimacy of the power held by the white community and monopoly capital, aims to weaken the opposition’s appeal and strengthen its own. It must be borne in mind though that this type of behaviour (elevating one’s own party and disparaging the opposition) is not unusual in a competitive electoral environment.

4.2.4.2 Vanguard party

ANC members are familiar with communist ideology, particularly the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary concept of vanguardism (see Section 3.3.2). A vanguard party is at the forefront of a political movement and if successful is the only legitimate party to rule. These teachings from the exile period of the liberation struggle have been carried through into the post-liberation strategy and tactics. However, they contradict the basic principles of the NLM's chosen regime of democracy. The code group of 'vanguard party' accounted for the highest number of quotations (27 percent of the total quotations) out of all of the key terms referring to the political opposition. It therefore expresses the ANC's main political influence on their view on political opposition.

In the 1997 document it is stated that the ANC "commits itself to the fundamental provisions of the basic law of the land, which accords with its own vision of a democratic and just society" (ANC, 1997: 22). This is concerning for democratic stability, however, as it seems to imply that the ANC is determining its own vision of a democratic regime, rather than adhering to the normal practices and definitions of democracy. It may therefore be effectively undermining democracy. Interestingly, they do however acknowledge a tendency to engage in vanguardism, in that "it is always tempting for revolutionary organisations in political office to characterise all opposition to their programmes as acts of counter-revolution" (ANC, 1997: 10).

Vanguardism appears when the ANC discusses their liberation history in the 1997 S&T, it referred to this concept indirectly when it states that "the accession of the ANC to government was therefore not merely a change of parties in political office" (ANC, 1997: 4). When discussing counter-revolutionary parties, the ANC tends to raise itself up as a superior political party while simultaneously putting down the opposition. Despite the claims that certain parties are counter-revolutionary, the acts of generalised discrimination towards the opposition's credibility reveals a sense of party-righteousness:

the overwhelming moral and political legitimacy of the new order, and of the ANC in particular, does draw some of these parties and other elements - who have no hope in the near future of assuming political office - towards finding clandestine and sometimes innocuous ways of subverting transformation.

(ANC, 1997: 10)

The above quotation seems to reiterate an underlying belief in the ANC's superiority and dismissal of any opposition party. The ANC's legitimacy and claimed entitlement to rule, stemming from its liberation history, is also highlighted within the S&T documents when the ANC is discussed as a NLM turned political party.

While at this stage we define ourselves as a liberation movement, it is trite to counterpose this to being "a party" in the broad sense or as understood by adherents of formal bourgeois democracy. It is our strategic objectives, the motive forces of the revolution and the character of the terrain in which we operate such as mass work, parliament and government as a whole which are central in defining our organisational character, irrespective of the formal label attached to it.

(ANC, 1997: 15)

The above quotation shows that the ANC is reluctant to take on the basic democratic label of political party, as it has experienced and achieved much more than that. Accordingly, they suggest that their liberation history has placed them in a much more significant position. When it comes to the NDR, the ANC claims to be:

the vanguard of all these motive forces of the NDR, the leader of the broad movement for transformation. Its leadership has not been decreed, but earned in the crucible of struggle and the battles for social transformation. It should continually strengthen itself as a national political organisation and ensure that it is in touch with the people in their day-to-day life...

(ANC, 1997: 16)

The above quotation is another example of how the ANC justifies its position as the only legitimate party to rule South Africa. A similar statement was coded in the 2007 and 2012 S&Ts, when the ANC claimed that it cannot be considered a normal electoral party.

...the ANC cannot conduct itself as an ordinary electoral party. It cannot behave like a shapeless jelly-fish with a political form that is fashioned hither and thither by the multiple contradictory forces of sea-waves. There should be clear value systems that attach to being a member and a leader of the ANC, informed by the strategic objectives that we pursue.

(ANC, 2007: 17; ANC, 2012: 46)

The above quotation undermines the role of an electoral party by labelling it as 'ordinary', as well as using a simile to imply that electoral parties have no true purpose and are easily swayed.

The ANC furthermore suggests that the common democratic practice is insufficient, in the introduction of the 2017 S&T document:

Across the world, progressive civil society and left political movements have sought to challenge this state of affairs. However, many parties that have historically pursued social progress have either been co-opted into the dominant school of thought or are unable to break through discourse that justifies social inequality and security-oriented solutions as the natural order of things.

(ANC, 2017: 1)

In the above statement the ANC highlights the concept of left political movements such as their NLM. It then reveals the difficulties of achieving equality of outcome from historical record seemingly suggesting that they have chosen this difficult path. Additionally, they are suggesting that the dominant school of thought (liberal democracy) is unable to create equality. This statement shows a stray from the ideology of the chosen regime.

Furthermore, the ANC is boastful about its role as the ruling party and liberation movement leader:

Since the advent of democracy, a new polity has emerged, with the liberation movement led by the ANC at its head. This movement has gradually mastered the science and art of electoral politics and grown in experience as the leading force in government.

(ANC, 2007: 10)

Another boastful legitimisation of the NLM government party is seen in the 2012 S&T:

The African National Congress is such a movement. Over the years, it led the struggle of the people of South Africa for the achievement of democracy. In turn, during successive elections since 1994, it has resoundingly been returned to office.

(ANC, 2012: 44)

Here one can see that the ANC closely links the acts of being a NLM and a political party when these are in fact very different roles. The consistent use of the liberation history is a tactic that ensures the party's legitimacy as the only party that can truly rule South Africa.

When discussing the character of the ANC in the 2007 and 2012 S&T, the following quotation was coded:

In order for it to exercise its vanguard role, the ANC puts a high premium on the involvement of its cadres in all centres of power. This includes the presence of ANC members and supporters in state institutions. It includes activism in the mass terrain of which structures of civil society are part. It includes the involvement of cadres in the intellectual and ideological terrain to help shape the value systems of society. This requires a cadre policy that encourages creativity in thought and in practice and eschews rigid dogma. In this regard, the ANC has a responsibility to promote progressive traditions within the intellectual community, including institutions such as universities and the media. Playing a vanguard role also means the presence of members and supporters of the ANC in business, the better to reshape production relations in line with the outlook of a national democratic society.

(ANC, 2007: 17; ANC, 2012: 45)

The ANC is nonchalant when it comes to the use of the term ‘vanguard’, they portray themselves as an important liberation political party combo and are not shy to reveal their tendencies for vanguardism. They also make use of the term *cadre*, which is a communist term commonly used to describe “a group of activists in a communist or revolutionary organisation” (Collins Dictionary, 2019). This hints towards communist ideological thought within the ANC S&T, which is understood by the high percentage of quotations mentioning vanguard party tendencies.

In the S&T of 2012, the trend of not considering the ANC an ordinary electoral party continues:

The breakthrough of 1994 marked a decisive break with the history of colonialism. South Africans, led by the ANC elected with an overwhelming majority as the leading ‘party’ in government, had the opportunity to determine their destiny and together realise the ideal of a democratic, non-racial, non-sexist and prosperous society.

(ANC, 2012: 4)

Interestingly the word ‘party’ is in inverted commas, as it seems to imply that the word is used loosely or ironically, and that the organisation does not in fact regard itself as a ‘party’ in the conventional sense.

They continue to boast confidently about their success as a NLM turned supposed political party, claiming that “the organisation’s electoral performance has largely affirmed the correctness of its approach and thus, in broad terms, its vanguard status” (ANC, 2012: 18). At the same time, they continue to put down the opposition, as seen in this quote from the 2017 S&T:

In voting patterns, virtually all white voters support parties that, in various historical periods, identified with variants of white privilege. Today, contestation around these issues takes place within the framework of the Constitution, and it forms part of legitimate political discourse. Further, in an attempt to fish from a bigger electoral pond, parties popular within these communities are repositioning themselves to embrace, or be seen to embrace, the basic ideas of change.

(ANC, 2017: 13)

The ANC claim in the above quotation that previously privileged (white) people tend to only vote for parties that represent the same type of privilege they once had during apartheid, and that these parties are merely masquerading as transformative. The ANC are implying that these parties are counter-revolutionary and once again uplift themselves to be the only legitimate electoral choice.

The ANC furthermore loosely refers to the communist description of the party being a NLM turned electoral party as being vanguard in its transformation of South Africa and in the creation of a democratic regime. The ANC continues to link its history as the NLM with the current status of being an electoral party within a legitimate government:

it is against this background that the notion of motive forces occupies an important place in the fashioning of strategy and tactics. As during the years of struggle, the ANC sees itself as the organised vanguard with the responsibility of educating, organising and mobilising these drivers of change to act in their profound self-interest. Because of the seamless continuity between the struggle against apartheid colonialism and the process of building a new society, activism among the motive forces – with new tasks under new conditions – is fundamental.

(ANC, 2017: 11)

The above quotation reveals that the ANC is unaware of their own struggles with transitioning to political party calling this process ‘seamless’. Possibly, the ANC meant to label this as an uninterrupted transition rather than seamless.

The early vanguard tendencies as expressed in the earlier S&T documents have continued to grow, so much so that in the 2017 S&T, it is clear that the ANC is not impressed with relations that are outside of the vanguard realm.

At the same time, natural allies among the intelligentsia, in the religious community and other sectors, and even within veterans of the movement, have sought to coalesce outside of the ANC, in opposition to deviant conduct that has become intolerable. The very opposite of vanguard leadership has been playing out, as a factional ANC

leadership becomes narrower and narrower in its appeal, less and less dignified in its bearing and more and more shrill in its tone.

(ANC, 2017: 17)

In above quotation, the ANC states that coalitions are being formed outside of the ANC party. The ANC refers to this as 'intolerable', which is a blatant disapproval of opposing forces. Furthermore, it suggests that vanguardism is a dignified approach whilst stating that an undesirable version of the party has appeared. This all implies that the ANC's desires to be a vanguard party and accepts that this is slipping away, possibly due to the democratic regime restraints.

The ANC further makes this statement, thus confirming their communist goal of being a vanguard party:

An uncompromising fight against these aberrations is a matter of strategic priority. This is the main organisational mission of the ANC in the current conjuncture, for its own survival as a vanguard movement.

(ANC, 2017: 17).

This section is the largest out of all of the political opposition code groups. It is evident that the ANC openly promotes the communist idea of vanguardism. This further reveals their key view on the political opposition which allows the first part of the research question to be answered below.

4.2.5 Summary

The aim of the above data analysis is to answer the first part of the research question, being: What is the ANC's view of political opposition? This was done by analysing the coded quotations from the various S&T documents from 1997 to 2017, by looking at each of the key political opposition term codes in the three categories of fundamental, functionality, and non-pluralist.

The first key term category are the fundamental key terms, as they are crucial concepts to this particular research question. These code groups were chosen to highlight and prompt discussion, and consisted of 'political opposition', 'political parties', and 'elections'. The first key term under the fundamental grouping is that of 'political opposition', which is an important concept to this study. Initially in the earlier S&T documents, the ANC promoted the concept,

but made it very clear that opposition must support the revolution to be accepted. Thus, it was observed that the ANC has conflicting views of political opposition and does not understand the very concept of opposing parties being allowed to have opposing viewpoints.

The second code group, in the fundamental category, is that of ‘political parties’. Political parties can exist outside of democracy, but democracy cannot exist without them. They are an important feature, similar to elections of democracy, that ensure democratic consolidation. One might thus assume that political parties in general would be prominently mentioned in the S&T documents, yet only 7 percent of the coded quotations on ‘political parties’ fall into this. The ANC makes it clear that their support for other parties is dependent on whether those parties are progressive or not, which ironically undermines the concept of having opposing parties with opposing views.

The third code group in the fundamental category is that of ‘elections’; this represents a defining characteristic of democracy. Without an electoral process, democracy would not exist. It is as important to democracy as political parties are. The ANC quotations on elections amounted to 9 percent of the total number of quotations. As the ANC cannot achieve its goals of transformation without being the ruling party, it talks about the electoral process, yet barely mentions the opposition it must compete against in the elections. This can be seen as evidence of their sense of entitlement, superiority and legitimacy to be in control, derived from their history as a liberation movement.

Functionality forms the second political opposition key term category. It contains the code groups that represent the functions of political opposition. This category consisted of ‘accountability’, ‘loyal opposition’, ‘mobilisation of the citizenry’, and ‘representation. The first code group under the functionality category is ‘accountability’, which accounted for the lowest number of quotations, evidently making it a concept of political opposition that the ANC does not promote as a strategy or tactic in any of its S&T documents. The term is only mentioned in the 1997 and 2017 S&T documents. It is a key function of the opposition in a democratic regime, however, and the lack of mention in its S&T documents suggests that the ANC does not want to be held accountable by opposition parties or feels it necessary to concern itself with such an issue, as they have suggested they cannot be restricted by the functions of ordinary democracies.

In a democratic dispensation, it is one thing to have an opposition but highly beneficial to a democracy to have a ‘loyal opposition’; this was the second functionality code group analysed. Political parties that aspire to obtain democratic consolidation would strive to achieve such a status. The concept of loyal opposition ensures that the ruling party is held accountable, thus protecting the regime as a whole. Out of all of the code groups, this one received the lowest quotation count, with only one quotation in the ANC’s latest S&T document. This suggests that this may be a new concept to the political party, and one that could either develop into a goal for the party or be dismissed entirely.

The third functionality code group, ‘mobilisation of the citizenry’, presents itself as a key concept in all five S&T documents. This is most likely because the ANC has practiced the art of activism and mobilisation for over a century now, and it continues to remind the citizens of their democratic achievement and the importance of the citizenry remaining actively involved in political and civil society. The aim of a political party is to motivate the public to vote at the elections, to hold representatives and government accountable, and to stand up for their rights. The ANC prominently promotes this concept in order to remain in power and highlight to the public their achievements as a liberation movement.

Similar to mobilisation, ‘representation’ – the fourth functionality code group – plays an important role throughout all the S&T documents. The ANC’s understanding of the role of a political party as a representative of the country’s citizens is clear and often repeated. At the same time, the ANC takes pride in its history as a liberation movement of the struggle and its ability to represent the oppressed majority, despite the fact that, as the largest and dominant party in the country, it is now in a position where it is expected to represent the interests of *all* citizens, not just the previously oppressed majority.

The last category for the political opposition analysis is that of the non-pluralist view of opposition. This consisted of the Africanist code group of the ‘enemy’ and the communist code group of the ‘vanguard party’. The concept of ‘enemy’, is an interesting one, as it is often likened to the concept of opposition in African culture. The ANC utilises the term ‘enemy’ whenever it discusses the oppressive apartheid government, but also when it refers to any party or individual, they feel is hindering their transformation plans. Although this code group amounts to only 6 percent of the total number of quotations, it is a powerful concept with negative connotations that could effectively disrupt the process of democratic consolidation, if it continues to refer to an entire racial group (whites) as ‘the enemy’ in future S&T documents.

The second non-pluralist code group of ‘vanguard party’ – a communist concept – has proven itself to be the most influential concept of all the key political opposition terms analysed. The ANC often uses the term vanguard to describe the NDR and the party as a whole. This stems from their history as a NLM, alongside the regular use of the communist and militaristic term ‘cadre’. This code group makes up 27 percent of the quotations and therefore has the highest influence on the ANC’s view of the political opposition. Its promotion of vanguardism strongly suggests that it views itself as the only legitimate party to rule South Africa because of its history.

The ANC’s S&T documents are all about self-promotion. It is clear from a critical reading that the ANC is reluctant to support any concept that in any way implies that the citizenry should not place their vote with the ANC. They continually emphasise and promote their liberation history, creating a sense of legitimacy. The large impact of vanguardism throughout their history has influenced their view of political opposition negatively, thus leading the country towards a dominant party system that ultimately undermines the democratic regime and hinders consolidation.

4.3 Data Analysis of Political Ideologies

This section will draw together all the data collected from the five S&T documents (the 50th until the 54th, i.e. from 1997 to 2017), in order to determine the common ideological trends. Each document was coded using certain key ideological terms (see Table 2 **Error! Reference source not found.**) to see which ideology was the most prominent throughout, where certain ideologies were applied, and how/if the ideologies have changed over the years for the ANC. An analysis of each ideology’s codes will be done in order to draw an overall conclusion and reveal whether the choice of language and terminology within the S&T documents supports political democracy in relation to the dominant ideological assumptions, as well as to answer the second part of the research question, i.e., why the ANC views political opposition in a particular way and how these ideologies have informed such a view.

4.3.1 General Trends in the Data

This section will examine the general trends throughout all five of the ANC S&T documents from 1997 to 2017, now that each document has been individually assessed and divided up into the three ideological groups. This will allow for a consensus on which ideology holds the

greatest influence in the ANC political party's strategies and tactics, as well as to determine trends and ideological transitions.




Figure 2: Quotation Percentage of each Ideology Throughout the S&T Documents (1997 – 2017)

Figure 2 Error! Reference source not found. was created in order to get an overall view of which ideology was most prominent in each document and an average, from the 1997 to 2017 S&T documents, was calculated and represented in the figure.

4.3.1.1 Liberalism




Figure 3: Total Number of Quotations in the Liberalism Code Group

It can be seen from **Figure 3**, that liberal ideology is the most prominent throughout the 1997 to 2017 period, except for 2002, which built upon the foundations of 1997 document. It can be seen that liberalism holds an overall average of 58 percent from 1997 to 2017, in comparison to 18,98 percent for communism and 22,99 percent for Africanism. Liberty and equality of

value were important goals of the ANC NLM, and a democratic society was the means to achieve this. Those who were previously oppressed wanted to be liberated and given equality, and this was achieved by granting all the citizens political and human rights protected under the National Constitution, which is the highest level of law.

Across all of the documents, the code group of ‘democracy’, which is the ANC’s chosen political regime, was found to be the main feature of the liberal group. This is due to the fact that a democratic regime in South Africa has been the ANC’s main goal from the beginning; the S&T document of 1997 contains this statement in its introduction: “the [ANC] was founded in 1912 with the purpose of uniting the African majority against the colonial Union in pursuit of non-racial democracy” (ANC, 1997: 2). The ANC further states that “a fundamental condition for liberation is democracy and an abiding culture of human rights” (ANC, 1997: 6). Quotations similar to these are made throughout the ANC’s S&T documents and particularly in the sections that explain the struggle and the party’s history as a NLM. According to the 1997 document, “the nature of democracy that the ANC pursues leans towards the poor” (ANC, 1997: 14). The achievement of democracy thus entails more than providing the previously oppressed with equality rights and opportunities; it also calls for their upliftment.

This code group was closely followed by ‘equality of value’, a key concept of liberalism, which is of great importance to the ANC and of the liberal ideology as a main concept to be highlighted in the Constitution, with “equality of all before the law” (ANC, 2007: 23). The liberal concept of equality of value suggests that all individuals are born equal and should be treated that way. The ANC repeatedly emphasises that their strategy during the liberation struggle was “the creation of a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society” (ANC, 1997: 26). Since being in power, the ANC created the NDR, which:

seeks to abolish this combination of sources of social conflict. It has national and democratic tasks, and it should strive to realise: a united state based on the will of all the people, without regard to race, sex, belief, language, ethnicity or geographic location; a dignified and improving quality of life among all the people by providing equal rights and opportunities to all citizens; and the restoration of the birthright of all South Africans regarding access to land and other resources.

(ANC, 2007: 5)

‘Political and human rights’ came third as a code group under the liberal ideology; they are an important feature that was not attainable by the masses during apartheid. As stated above,

human rights are a fundamental condition for democracy. Throughout the S&T documents, the ANC shows that this is of great importance to them. According to the ANC:

South Africa enjoys a system of vibrant multi-party democracy, with a progressive Bill of Rights which recognises political, socio-economic and environmental rights and obligations, and with separation of powers among the executive, the judiciary and the legislatures. Beyond the formal processes of regular elections and legislatures, various forms of legislated and other forums ensure popular participation.

(ANC, 2012: 31)

They continue to emphasise the importance of rights in each document and state in their latest S&T that “consistent attention should be paid to the exercise of human rights by all sections of society, especially the most vulnerable” (ANC, 2017: 22).

‘Constitutionalism’ – the fourth code group - plays an important role in the ANC’s S&Ts, hence the large number of quotations in this category. It is stated that “the ANC should be guided by its own principles, and act within the framework of the National Constitution and relevant legislation” (ANC, 2007: 19). The Constitutional framework is explained here:

The National Constitution sets out the framework within which to manage social relations. Some of the basic principles include: multi-party democracy; the doctrine and practice of separation of powers in a constitutional democracy; equal human rights and access to opportunity; freedom of speech and of the media; equality of all before the law; respect for the rights of linguistic, religious and cultural communities; social equity and practical corrective action against racial, gender and other forms of discrimination.

(ANC, 2007: 23)

All four of these main code groups – ‘democracy’, ‘equality of value’, ‘political and human rights’, and ‘constitutionalism’ – point towards the general principles of liberalism as well as the overall goals the ANC set itself initially as a liberation movement and now as the ruling political party. The other coded groups – ‘consent’, ‘general freedom’, ‘human development’, ‘individualism’, ‘liberty’, ‘morality’, ‘rationality’ and ‘self-determination’ – were represented substantially less often in the text, despite being important features of liberal thought. Of particular concern is the absence of ‘individualism’ and ‘self-determination’ in the documents. ‘Individualism’ was only mentioned a few times in the 1997 and 2007 documents and the premise of these quotations was that; “the new constitution and its various institutions provide the framework within which individuals should exercise their democratic rights” (ANC, 1997: 10). As for ‘self-determination’, the quotations can be summarised with the fact that a goal of

the ANC is to mobilise the citizens to be their “own liberators through participatory and representative democracy” (ANC, 2017: 6). Despite minimal mention in the S&T documents, these are very important concepts within a democracy, as they encompass what democracy is about, given that the power is (ostensibly) in the hands of the citizenry. The liberal ideal of ‘general freedom’ refers mostly to the freedom of expression, which was mentioned briefly in all the documents bar the S&T of 2002 and was a continuation of the 1997 document.

Liberalism held the highest influence in the 1997 document, as this was the first S&T document since the change to democracy had been achieved. Morale was high at the time, and the document focused on democratic development. The 2012 S&T document had the second highest liberal influence as this was the ANC’s 100th year since its formation in 1912. The ANC’s level of pride was high, and democracy was regarded as the NLM prize that the party had achieved; this document was thus all about action and the improvement of quality of life. Third on the list was the 2017 document, whose theme was the intensification of action to achieve a National Democratic society, although anti-democratic behaviour was mentioned too. The influence of liberalism on the 2007 document was low, however, the focus was on progress in improving democracy. The 2002 document showed little liberal influence that could be coded, although it did re-emphasise the foundations contained in the 1997 S&T, which expressed the highest liberal influence, and focussed on other major issues. Therefore, although a low percentage of liberal quotations were coded, liberalism was not undermined within this document in the 2002 S&T document.

4.3.1.2 Communism

Figure 2 reveals that the communist ideology has the lowest overall influence in the ANC S&T documents from 1997 to 2017, being referred to in only 18 percent of the total number of coded quotations. However, in the 2002 S&T document, which focused on issues other than democratic formation, communist ideology was highly influential.

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


Figure 4: Total Number of Quotations in the Communism Code Group

Throughout all the S&T documents, ‘class struggle’ and ‘social justice’ are the main code groups mentioned, closely followed by ‘equality’ and ‘revolutionary’. This is due to the emphasis placed on the working class and rectifying the injustices done to them during the years of oppression. The ‘social justice’ code group made up 22 out of a total 50 communism quotations. The ANC claims that “industrialisation also meant the emergence of a working class from traditional communities, as well as their proletarian organisations in the form of the Communist Party of South Africa and the trade union movement” (ANC, 1997: 2). In order to deal with this injustice, the ANC states that:

These organisations are committed to a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic South Africa, and a system which pays particular attention to the improvement of the conditions of especially the poor. They themselves took part in defining this strategic objective, and, to the extent that the struggle to reach this goal remains in place, they will always have a close partnership with the ANC.

(ANC, 1997: 15)

The Tripartite Alliance of the ANC with COSATU and the SACP forms part of these organisations that aim to help the working class. This alliance monitors and supervises policies and processes to ensure that justice is served to the working class. The SACP, which makes up a third of the alliance, plays a large role in influencing decisions around this topic, and is one of the main sources of the communist ideological thought that influences the ANC. According to the 1997 S&T document, “this Tripartite Alliance is therefore not a matter of sentiment, but an organisational expression of the common purpose and unity in action that these forces share, and continue jointly to define and redefine in the course of undertaking the tasks of the NDR”

(ANC, 1997: 15). In later documents, however, the Tripartite Alliance is not mentioned; instead the focus is placed solely on the ANC in executing the NDR.

The ANC (2002: 2) states that:

the [S&T] document defines in clear terms the character of the NDR in relation to apartheid socio-political relations that democracy is meant to eliminate. This character plays itself out in both class and national terms, in the intersection between national oppression and capitalist exploitation.

Considerable focus is placed on the motives of the NDR under the code groups of ‘equal distribution’ and ‘social justice’, as a programme that is specifically designed to improve the quality of lives, particularly the poor. The main elements are set out here:

A critical element of the programme for national emancipation should be the elimination of apartheid property relations. This requires: the de-racialisation of ownership and control of wealth, including land; equity and affirmative action in the provision of skills and access to positions of management; consolidation and pooling of the power of state capital and institutional and social capital in the hands of the motive forces; encouragement of the co-operative sector; as well as systematic and intelligent ways of working in partnership with private capital in a relationship that will be defined by both unity and struggle, co-operative engagement and contestation on fundamental issues. It requires the elimination of the legacy of apartheid super-exploitation and inequality, and the redistribution of wealth and income to benefit society as a whole, especially the poor.

(ANC, 2002: 2)

This statement would not be considered wholly communist as it does not aim to create common ownership but rather overall equal distribution and to ensure those who had previously been oppressed receive what was taken away from them during apartheid such as land, skills, and opportunities. This essentially entails giving them the upper hand in society to rectify the past, doing so by implementing policies that are additional to the liberal regime of democracy. The clear communist link to the NDR is the support and involvement of the SACP.

A more recent issue within the ‘social justice’ code group is that of land redistribution, the ANC states that “land redistribution and restitution will be speeded up; and land use management will be approached in a more systematic manner” (ANC, 2017: 25). This is a clear example of the aim for equality of outcome.

Closely linked to the above, the second code group of ‘class struggle’ similarly aims to rectify the problems in the class system and to aid those who have been oppressed by this. It is made clear that “the primary task of the ANC remains the mobilisation of all the classes and strata that objectively stand to benefit from the cause of social change” (ANC, 2012: 44). The ANC states that it must intervene in matters of class inequality as democracy has not been able to deal with such class-related issues. The ANC thus makes this statement, which is highly influenced by communist thought, in its most recent S&T document:

A national democratic society is, by definition, made up of various classes and strata. The NDR seeks to eradicate the specific relations of production that underpinned the national and gender oppression and super-exploitation of the majority of South Africans. It does not eradicate capitalist relations of production in general. It should therefore be expected that in a national democratic society class contradictions and class struggle, particularly between the working class and the bourgeoisie, will play themselves out. As such, a national democratic state will be called upon to regulate the environment in which such contradictions manifest themselves, in the interest of national development including fundamental socio-economic transformation.

(ANC, 2017: 6)

The above quotation was coded as both ‘class struggle’ and ‘social justice’ and reveals the party’s communist strategy. The ANC appears to contradict their chosen regime of democracy here by undermining its ability to create sufficient equality without intervention and placing emphasis on the NDR, which is a fundamentally communist programme solely focused on the equality of outcome rather than the liberal understanding of equality of value.

As a supposedly and self-proclaimed liberal party, the ANC’s close work with SACP raises concern for the consolidation of democracy. Although the influence of blatantly communist ideology is lessening with each S&T document, its influence is still present. This undermines the democratic institution of the political opposition as a liberal institution. The SACP was participating in democracy in alliance with the ANC and COSATU, in the hope of gaining power and then changing the regime to a communist one.

The concept of equality in communist ideological thought differs from the liberal understanding of the concept. Communism aims for the equality of outcomes, whether such as resource or financial. It states that people are only equal when they have equal means to show for it. ‘Equality of Outcome’ thus stood out as a prominent code group with 10 quotations, although minimal influence in comparison to some of the other code groups, such as ‘social

justice', which has 22 quotations. The ANC uses policies to uplift those who have been oppressed during apartheid, whilst simultaneously removing opportunities from citizen who were not oppressed in order to rid the country of financial disparity. This is stated here:

Critical to nation-building is the de-racialisation of South African society and the elimination of patriarchal relations. It means creating a society in which the station that individuals occupy in political, social and other areas of endeavour is not defined on the basis of race, ethnicity, language, gender, religious, cultural or other such considerations. It means integrating communities in residential areas, at the work-place and within the trade union movement, in sports and other areas. It also means a consistent programme of affirmative action to eradicate the disparities created by apartheid.

(ANC, 1997: 6)

Promotion of one racial group by the ruling party does not endorse unity or encourage inclusivity; the ANC is quite evidently aiming to aid the black community in all aspects of society. This is transparently shown in the 1997 S&T:

The strategic objective of the NDR is the creation of a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society. This, in essence, means the liberation of Africans in particular and black people in general from political and economic bondage. It means uplifting the quality of life of all South Africans, especially the poor, the majority of whom are African and female.

(ANC, 1997: 6)

Despite suggesting aims to uplift the quality of life for 'all South Africans', the ANC specifically mentions those who are 'African and female'. The ANC continues to act as it did during the liberation struggle, by making statements such as: "the liberation movement must lead each of the classes and strata within the black community in narrowing the racial chasm" (ANC, 2012: 41). Whenever they refer to their party as a liberation movement, the goal of ensuring equality seem to appear as upliftment of the black community only. This is also evident when they discuss gender relations, as they often make prioritise African women. This can also be seen here: "recognising the reality of unequal gender relations, and the fact that the majority of the poor are African women, the ANC pursues gender equality in all practical respects" (ANC, 2012: 44; ANC, 2007: 16).

At the same time, the ANC is undermining opposition parties by claiming that opposition do not agree with transformation but instead continue to promote the apartheid regime's

inequalities: “the defining character of the public platform of most opposition parties is to entrench the social relations of black poverty and white opulence – however modified – that were engendered by the system of apartheid” (ANC, 1997: 10). This statement again underscores that the ANC regards itself as the only legitimate party. Their claims to promote equality is undermined by the above quotations, leading one to assume that black upliftment is the actual goal rather than the creation of equality throughout society.

The code group of ‘revolution’ links up with social justice and class struggle as a code group that seeks to ease the injustices of the apartheid regime on the working classes and communities of colour. With only 7 quotations coded, this code group is not highly influential, but it is supportive of the larger communist themes. A quotation that stands out from the revolutionary code group is:

The ANC recognises the need to weave together the revolutionary-democratic, socialist and trade union strands of the broad liberation front into a tight alliance of formations that share a common approach towards the NDR and its objectives. Besides the strong bonds forged during the years of struggle against apartheid colonialism, the ANC appreciates that the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the progressive trade union movement (now represented by the Congress of South African Trade Unions, COSATU) are committed to thorough-going transformation. They are a critical political and sectoral voice of the working class, which the ANC recognises as a leader of the motive forces. The Tripartite Alliance forms the core of the broad national liberation front.

(ANC, 2017: 16)

Interestingly, the ANC failed to mention their 2010 alliance with the developing nations organisation called BRICS (comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in their 2012 S&T document. These nations support developing nations and aim to uplift the developing world against the first world powers. However, Russia and China are both communist nations of great power, which could influence the ANC’s future tactics to stray even further away from liberal thought. This could change in future documentation due to their new allies and recent increase in anti-democratic behaviour, which has already been mentioned in the 2017 S&T document discussing corruption. This is coupled the ANC’s 2017 description of their aim to utilise the best parts of social democracy (a modern form of communism) in the creation of their ideal state. Additionally, it should, once again, be noted that the Tripartite Alliance is no longer active even though it is although mentioned multiple times throughout all S&T documentation.

One can see that communist thought is strongly linked to financial upliftment of the black working class, and land redistribution. This need to create financial equality (or equality of outcome) has influenced many of the ANC policies, such as Affirmative Action (AA), Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE), gender programmes and economic redistribution. With the majority of the population forming part of the previously racially oppressed black community, these policies make the ANC a favourable choice for voters from that particular demographic. The ANC may utilise this to gain further legitimacy with the citizenry, thus retaining its dominance. In conclusion, although only a small number of quotations from the ANC's S&T documents refer to communist ideology, it is present throughout the transformation processes, which are a vital part of democracy building in South Africa.

4.3.1.3 Africanism

Africanism represents the second most important influence within the ANC S&T documents from 1997 to 2017 with 22,99 percent of the total number of quotations. Mostly, this influence pertains to the international agenda and the creation of a national identity. The first two S&T documents that were analysed (1997 and 2002) focused on transformation and African unity, whilst nationalism became relevant from 2007 onwards. The ANC emphasises throughout all the documents that African nations on the continent need to unite in order to become a serious player in the global arena. The majority of the African nations can, after all, relate to this aim due to their own colonialist and oppressive pasts that have left them underdeveloped and vulnerable to the exploitation. In 2002 the AU, NEPAD, and WSSD were created in order to combat precisely these threats, and South Africa has made it their priority to aid the continent and participate in its development. From 2007, the notion of a national identity came to the attention of the ANC, as democratic formation slowed down and the need to unite a diverse people became important to internal stability. From [Figure 5](#), it can be seen that the most coded groups overall in descending order are 'transformation', 'African unity', 'nationalism', and 'independence'.

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


Figure 5: Total Number of Quotations in the Africanism Code Group

The ‘transformation’ code group holds 23 of the total number of Africanist quotations, as it is an important feature of Africanism, which aims to elevate the African continent to equal status in the international arena. The goals of transformation are summarised here:

the mobilisation of the people of Africa to take their destiny into their own hands: in the definition and consolidation of democratic systems of government in which the people play an active role, in attaining rapid economic growth that is based on meeting the basic needs of the people, in widening and deepening the scope of economic, political and social integration on the continent, and in joint efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts within and among African nations.

(ANC, 1997: 19)

The ANC’s interest in continental affairs directly implicates their perspective and aspirations with regard to international relations. After all, if the African continent gains power, then South Africa as the driving nation will do so too. The ANC states that:

South Africa's interests in a complex and unpredictable global environment necessitate the building of capacity for strategic as well as rapid responses to changes in our region, Africa and the world. Within this context, our global strategy for the coming years will remain firmly anchored on the African continent and the developing countries.

(ANC, 2007: 22)

In order to achieve such transformation, there needs to be unity amongst African nations, which explains why the second most frequently used term in the Africanism group is ‘African unity’. The 1997 S&T explains the call for African unity:

This approach is underpinned by our commitment to, and active promotion of, the African renaissance: the rebirth of a continent that has for far too long been the object of exploitation and plunder. It recognises in the first instance the difficulties wrought on the continent by years of colonialism and unjust international relations, including the debt crisis, underdevelopment, social dislocation, and in some instances untenable political relations underpinned by forms of government that imperialism encouraged for its own selfish interests. However, the essence of our approach is not to mourn this treacherous past; but to find solutions to a complex reality. Therefore, for us, this African renaissance is both a strategic objective and a call to action.

(ANC, 1997: 19)

The call for unity on the African continent did not change over the five S&T documents, with a similar coded quotation stating in the 2017 S&T document:

The fate of South Africa is inextricably linked to the continent's future. Indeed, the progress that the continent has made in the past twenty years has rebounded to South Africa's advantage. This is reflected in investment, trade, the innovation system, peace operations and so on. However, South Africa needs to develop and implement a clear Africa strategy which includes well-thought-out approaches to the division of labour and targeted partnerships. Critically, Africa Rising will succeed only if there are reliable law-governed processes to manage investment relations.

(ANC, 2017: 21)

Africanist thought also informed the 18 quotations relating to nationalism. This is fitting, given the importance of nation-building after having overcome and replaced an oppressive regime, as over time segregation is likely to dwindle and unity creation must be implemented. The ANC's goal of creating a national identity is summed up in this quotation:

The ANC seeks to mobilise all South Africans to contribute to the ongoing transformation of our country. In doing this, we strive to appeal to and foster a common sense of South Africanness and a shared responsibility for our common destiny among all citizens of South Africa, black and white.

(ANC, 2007: 12)

The ANC aims to pursue this by working with "all sectors of society to promote an overarching South African identity", recognising the diversity of the country's people (ANC, 2012: 63). By "[promoting] pride in our heritage including geographic and place names, our African identity and our common humanity as global citizens" (ANC, 2007: 26). Recently the ANC has updated its strategy of fostering a national identity with the following:

Multiple identities based on language, geography, customs, gender, sexual orientation, religion, sport and cultural preferences – and much more – are a normal part of social existence. They should be acknowledged, without subtracting from the overarching national identity. Indeed, against the backdrop of the stoking of religious and other conflicts in many parts of the world, South Africans should treasure and safeguard the unity in diversity which we enjoy. This should include a conscious and deliberate campaign against any manifestations of racism, ‘tribalism’, xenophobia, sexism, homophobia and other intolerances.

(ANC, 2017: 26)

The above quotation is important given the impact of xenophobia, racism and tribalism that continues to characterise South African society even today. Interestingly, the ANC are inclusive, in the above quotation, of all aspects of society in South Africa and shows an openness and acceptance from the ANC rather than the exclusive promotion of a single racial group.

‘Independence’ is a major theme for the entire African continent, after many years of colonialism and oppression. After all, the ANC fought the liberation struggle in order to achieve an independent democratic state. The global order, however, continues to abuse and exploit African nations. The African continent is still aiming to free itself from the powers of the West, yet it is doing so by turning to and surrendering to the powers of the East, which is also having a negative impact. The ANC calls this: “an international epoch in which Africa enjoys the unique opportunity to extricate herself from the vicious cycle of these scourges, and to strike forth in a continental renaissance” (ANC, 1997: 1). Moreover, it is stated:

Africa has the best possibility in this milieu to emerge from an era of political and social decline into a renaissance of hope and social progress. It can on a massive scale turn adversity into opportunity. A new spirit is abroad on the continent, and the people of Africa are determined to use their newly-harnessed energy, pride and self-assertiveness to chart their own course of development and extricate themselves from the lowest rungs of human development.

(ANC, 2012: 56)

The ANC has for many years acted as the driving force for African unity, transformation and independence. It claims that, “in its own unique way, South Africa should emerge as a united African nation, adding to the diversity and identity of the continent and humanity at large” (ANC, 2012: 24). The promotion of the continent is envisaged to create global equality and subsequently enrich South Africa.

The other code groups – cultural heritage, ethnicity, fraternity, and patriotism – received six or less quotations, although all link to the major themes of the Africanist influence within the S&T documents. To conclude one can see that all the quotations relate to the promotion of the African continent, excluding the code group of ‘nationalism’, which aims to create a united yet diverse South Africa.

4.3.2 Summary

The aim of this study is to ascertain whether the ANC supports the institution of political opposition, in order to determine whether South Africa’s democracy is indeed consolidated. The qualitative research coded each of the five ANC S&T documents since the implementation of the democratic regime in order to determine, by looking at the terminology used, which of the three main ideological influences was the most prominent. It was envisaged that the result would reveal whether the ANC supports the concept of the political opposition.

Liberalist ideological thought was proven throughout to have the highest ideological influence by far. This is counterbalanced by the other two ideologies, which have a high influence in specific areas. Communism is particularly influential in references to the working class and in the formulation of policies around the promise of financial equality for the black community, which had previously been oppressed. Additionally, the NDR is continually mentioned in all of the S&T documents; it is controversially communist with its blatant promotion of the black community, particularly black women, above all other groups of citizens. The Africanist ideology primarily focuses on international affairs, with a rejection of the Western world – the previous colonial powers – and an openness to trading partners from non-western countries. The goal is to promote and advance the African continent to gain enough power to compete properly in the global arena. It is envisaged that this will be achieved by promoting African unity and independence. Internally, the ANC aims to build a national identity to unite the country despite creating barriers to this with its policies of racial profiling based on policies such as AA and BBBEE.

From the above analysis, one can see that the ANC is influenced by all three ideologies in different aspects of their S&T documents, with an overarching liberalist theme. A detailed analysis of the terminology used in these documents confirms that the ANC promotes the democratic regime and its main principles of democracy, equality of value, political and human rights, individualism, and constitutionalism. In summary, throughout their S&T documents,

the ANC promotes liberal ideals when it comes to the democratic regime, communism in relation to transformative policy, and Africanism with regard to international affairs

4.4 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to analyse the qualitative data collected in the coding process done using the ATLAS.ti programme. To answer the first part of the research question, i.e., how the ANC as a liberation movement in a democratic regime views the political opposition, the coded quotations under the code groups from the key political opposition terms table (Table 1) were analysed. These code groups are divided into three categories, the fundamental, functionality and non-pluralist. Overall this analysis, revealed that the ‘vanguard party’ code group held the highest number of quotations and therefore had the most influence. This concept is a communist concept that also reveals that the ANC sees itself as the only legitimate party to rule South Africa. Other highly influential code groups include ‘representation’, ‘political party’, and ‘mobilisation of citizenry’. All of these support the ANC’s vanguard agenda, consequently leading to the undemocratic characteristics of a NLM turned government, namely, dominant party formation and centralisation.

The second part of the research question sought to address why the ANC held this view of the political opposition and which ideology informed such a view. Each ideology was explained in Chapter 3 and key terms were drawn from their descriptions. These key terms were loaded into the ATLAS.ti programme in order to code each of the five ANC S&T documents since the implementation of the democratic regime. The results were analysed according to each ideology, in order to determine the most influential ideology within each S&T document and across all of them together.

It emerged from this analysis that liberalism was the most prominent ideology in each document, except for the 2002 S&T document, which was dominated by communist ideology. Despite the high number of communist quotations in 2002, the document actually followed on from the 1997 document, and only highlighted major issues that were not presented in the previous document. Communism maintained a low influence throughout the other documents, only pertaining to issues of the working class and policy formation. Much emphasis was placed on creating equality of wealth across all racial groups, but with particular focus on the black majority, which the ANC had fought for during the liberation struggle; this is also why most of the ANC’s goals support the black majority. Africanism was the second most influential

ideology throughout the 1997 to 2017 period, although the focus remained on the international situation; it later shifted to the South African national identity. Liberalism's main principle of equality of value influenced each ideology and maintained its position as one of the most prominent themes throughout the documentation assessed. Although communism and Africanism did hold some influence, their goals seemingly aligned with the liberalist goal of equality of value and democratic development. From this, one can conclude that the ANC paints itself as a liberal party that supports the liberal democratic infrastructures, despite the influence of both communist and Africanist ideologies. Ultimately, though, these additional influences are undermining the regime and preventing democratic consolidation from occurring. The ANC holds conflicting views towards opposition parties; due to the high levels of communist vanguardism that are evident throughout the S&T documents, it appears that the ANC does not fully support the concept of the political opposition, claiming that it is the only legitimate NLM turned political party that can govern South Africa.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

5.1 Introduction

The concept of political opposition is considered one of the main institutional foundations towards ensuring democratic consolidation. This thesis intended to discover how the ANC viewed political opposition in a democratic regime, and why. This was achieved by coding and analysing the party's language within their S&T documents from 1997 to 2017. Key terms were drawn out of the understanding of political opposition as an important institutional foundation for democratic consolidation, as well as terms from the three main ideological strands found within the party, which influence the ANC's view. This chapter provides an overview of the findings of this thesis as well as suggestions for possible future research. Firstly, a summary of the findings from each chapter will be presented. Secondly, the central conclusions that were reached will be reviewed. Thirdly, the study's significance will be discussed, as well as its contributions to the greater body of literature on this topic. Finally, recommendations will be made to assist future research in respect of the democratic consolidation of the ANC liberation movement.

5.2 Summary of Findings

This section provides a summary of the findings of this thesis, by referring to the purpose and findings of each chapter.

Chapter 1 served as an introduction and research plan for the entire study. The study aimed to answer the broad question: How does the ANC, as a liberation movement in government, view the political opposition in South Africa's democracy? And, why? And, what informs their views? The research design for this thesis was presented. A qualitative desktop study using the qualitative data programme ATLAS.ti was chosen because it created a platform in which a comparative coding process could occur with the ability to easily group and analyse the data produced. Heywood (2013: 29) notes that ideology, is the intellectual foundation of political parties, and thus provides the 'intellectual framework' through which political parties and their leaders make sense of the world. Hence, the use of ideologies as the conceptual tool of analysis.

Chapter 2 provided a review of two bodies of literature, first literature on democratic consolidation and, secondly the ANC as a liberation movement. Democratic consolidation was

defined as referring to a democracy that is unlikely to break down due to the following: widespread support from the country's citizenry for a democratic regime; the support of core democratic values by representatives and the rejection of authoritarian alternatives; and sufficient institutional restraint on executive power (Foa & Mounk; 2017 Kapstein & Converse, 2008; Schedler, 2001). Schedler's (2001) foundations of democratic consolidation were investigated, revealing that political opposition is a vital institution in any democratic regime as a democracy is only a democracy if there is an opposition. It was found that political opposition offered a peaceful alternative to government and healthy political opposition ensures that the core principles of freedom of speech and choice are maintained. The very idea of opposition should motivate the ruling party to increase service delivery in order to maintain their votes. Most importantly, political opposition hold the ruling party accountable, usually through debate, to counter the progression of party dominance or anti-democratic behaviour. In conclusion, political parties provide political choice and ensure the system remains effective, and thus creates the foundations for democratic consolidation. Hence why, key terms are drawn from this conceptualisation and were operationalised in this chapter. The key terms of political opposition were divided into three categories, namely, fundamental, functionality in a democratic setting, and the non-pluralist view. The aim of this was to answer what the ANC's view of political opposition is through the coded language used in the S&T documents analysed.

A NLM was defined as part of a liberation struggle (as defined by Clapham, 2012) that aims to free both people and territories from oppressive regimes, regardless of whether these regimes are colonialist, domestic dictatorships or oligarchies, by using various violent or non-violent strategies in order to gain liberation. Subsequently, a NLM movement becomes a NLM turned political party in a democratic regime that came to power during an electoral process and that has taken up the role of ruling party in government. With particular focus placed on Southern African NLMs, it was discussed that NLMs tended to develop common characteristics that are born out of the liberation struggle. These characteristics included: lack of familiarity with government; entitled legitimacy; party dominance; and poor governance. When these characteristics were applied to South Africa's NLM government, it was found throughout the literature that the ANC did in fact develop these common characteristics, and that these are ultimately hindering consolidation. Of particular interest was the ideological underpinnings of many NLMs and how they view opposition. The literature has noted the challenge of the transition of NLMs from liberation movement in an authoritarian setting to a political party in

a democratic setting. As Salih (2007) noted, NLM governments tend to see themselves as the only legitimate party to rule a post-liberation society, and view their opponents as representatives of the past regime trying to undo the movements successes. This leads to the formation of dominant parties, which ultimately undermine the fundamental functions of democracy. The NLMs are thus given an abundance of power with little accountability checks. These tendencies towards opposition and common characteristics of NLMs in government obstruct the chances of democratic consolidation.

Chapter 3 presented the conceptual framework in terms of ideologies. The three main ideologies within the ANC were taken from the work of Dubow (2000) and De Jager (2009); these ideologies are: liberalism, communism, and Africanism emanating from the history of the ANC. The chapter provided insight into each ideological strand allowing for the key terms to be operationalised and coded. The development of each ideology's influence on the ANC was discussed before definitions were provided. The key terms from each ideology were drawn from their definitions in order to create code groups, and were operationalised in this chapter. The intention of these code groups was to categorize statements made by the ANC within the five S&T documents into ideological strands, in order to determine the ANC's views of political opposition and which ideology informed such views.

Chapter 4 presented the findings of the data collection process and the analysis that occurred through the use of the qualitative data processing programme, ATLAS.ti. The chapter consisted of two main sections that answered the two parts of the research question. The first section aimed to identify the ANC's view of political opposition by coding each S&T document from 1997 to 2017 according to the key political opposition terms as identified in Chapter 2. The second section aimed to answer why these ideologies were dominant in certain aspects and what informs this view of political opposition. This was done by coding all five of the documents according to the three ideological strands and the key terms under each as identified in Chapter 3.

Both sections looked for general trends. When coding for the views of political parties, it was found that the ANC views itself as 'the vanguard party', this code group held 27 percent of the total political opposition code groups making it of the highest influence. The ANC states that it is no ordinary political party, as their history as a NLM provides them with large amounts of legitimacy, by implication making them the only party that is supposedly able to govern South Africa. The ANC's self-perception as a special-kind of political party – the vanguard party –

is imbued with communist language. The idea of a vanguard party contradicts many of the coded quotations that reveals the ANC's recognition of the importance of political opposition in a democratic regime. The code groups to follow held only 16 percent each and these groups were 'political parties', 'representation', and 'mobilisation of the citizenry'. All of which held clashing views of political opposition. A concerning observation made was that the code groups with the lowest percentage of quotations were the concepts of 'loyal opposition' (with only 1 percent), and 'accountability' with 4 percent – both are crucial functions of political opposition in a democracy. The historical ideological influence of the SACP and communism in general is clearly evident. But it is certainly not the only influence. When coding for the three ideologies, it was a surprising finding to see that, in the documents analysed, the liberal ideology comes through strongly. Liberalism held 58,03 percent influence across all five of the S&T documents, whilst Africanism held 22,99 percent and communism held 18,98 percent. The ANC predominately promotes liberalism throughout the documents however contradicts this with communist and Africanist ideological thought that also runs throughout.

It is subsequently argued that the communist ideological influence inhibits and constrains a pluralist view of political parties in a democratic regime and thus inhibits democratic consolidation in South Africa. Additionally, this ideological influence promotes the common characteristics of NLMs turned government set out in the literature. They tend to see themselves as the only political party instead of one amongst many in a democratic setting. The prospects for democratic consolidation were based solely on the institutional condition of the presence of opposition (while recognising that there are other conditions for consolidation, such as democratic behaviour). Thus, the ANC could potentially inhibit their chances of consolidation due to an antagonistic understanding of opposition.

5.3 Conclusions

This thesis intended to discover how (and inadvertently itself) the ANC viewed political opposition and why, thereby investigating which ideology informed such a view. This was done by codifying key terms, drawn from the literature and conceptual framework, in the ATLAS.ti programme. By the end of this thesis, the following conclusions have been made:

The ANC has a mixture of ideological influences that continue to inform their view of political opposition and themselves as a political party in a democratic setting. The ANC's view of political opposition cannot be considered a liberal one due to their consistent promotion of vanguardism. This vanguard label is informed by the struggle and legitimises their status as

ruling party *forever*. The ANC fought for the liberal regime of democracy, although this regime is being challenged by communist and Africanist influences. It is these various ideologies that informed the intellectual framework for the ANC's view of opposition, but have also served to constrain South Africa's move towards democratic consolidation. Contestation, political choice and pluralism manifested in political parties competing in a democratic setting are essential for democratic consolidation. A ruling party, which considers itself a vanguard party, is contra to this as it supports the idea that due to its role in the liberation struggle, it is the only legitimate party that can rule the post-liberation society. However, this view is constrained by the also evident and strong liberal influence within the ANC and the S&T documents.

Finally, this thesis concludes that the ANC's view of political opposition is that political parties are a necessary feature of a democratic regime, yet they view the opposition as not capable of steering and implementing the transformation that the ANC had fought for. Similarly, as evident in the S&T documents they argue that the democratic system needs interventionist policies to create equality of outcome for the previously oppressed population and they are the only party qualified to achieve this. This view was found to be influenced by the three ideological strands in various ways, creating a confusing ideological stance for the NLM turned political party and a confusing view of political parties in a democratic setting.

5.4 Summary of Contributions

Since the transition to a democratic regime in 1994, democratic development and consolidation have been popular research topics. South Africa's transition falls into a group of nations in Southern Africa that have experienced NLMs turned governments hence the extensive research that is being conducted into their common characteristics.

The main conclusion presented in this thesis is that the ANC as a NLM turned government promotes the basic principles of liberalism under the broad ideas of liberty and equality, even though it also holds the view that its liberation history inhibits the party from becoming an ordinary political party. It provides them with a sense of legitimacy with regard to uplifting the people who had been oppressed and continuing the fight for economic freedom against the Western nations. The historical and contemporary communist and Africanist influences as evident in the S&T documents serve to hinder the democratic regime from consolidating through a negating the value of pluralism.

The legitimacy created by the liberation struggle shows that the ANC has the common characteristics of NLMs turned government, such as lack of familiarity with governing, reliance on party dominance, and poor governance. The ideological influences of the ANC's view of political opposition are also informed by the liberation struggle.

This thesis thus contributes to the understanding of South Africa's prospects for democratic consolidation and possible reasons for why it has not yet attained consolidation. Ideologies which inform the view of political opposition is possibly one of the keys as to why democratic consolidation is proving difficult for South Africa.

5.5 Suggestions for Further Research

The delimitations on this thesis were intentionally drawn to create an in-depth but manageable research project. This research was restricted to the case study of the South African NLM turned government, the ANC. As noted in Chapter 1, the research was focused on content analysis of the party's S&T documents rather than a behavioural analysis of the party. The ANC is a member of a larger group of liberation movements that have successfully fought for democracy and are in the process of transforming a nation from oppression to the liberal regime of democracy. It was found in the literature that common characteristics develop when NLMs become governments. This provides a space for this research question to be expanded into a larger comparative study, possibly looking at how political opposition is viewed by NLMs turned governments in other Southern African countries.

It was found in this research that vanguardism is present throughout the ANC's S&T documents. This vanguard approach to a democratic regime implies that only the liberation movement or activist party can truly rule the state after the end of oppression. Further research on how vanguardism in the ANC has negatively affected democratic consolidation would be insightful. Additional research on how the influence of vanguardism leads to party dominance amongst NLM turned government is also necessary.

Finally, it is important for further research to be conducted on this topic of democratic consolidation in South Africa, as the topic of liberation movements in power is a relatively new field of study. The author thus recommends that further research be done on the two understandings of equality identified herein, as the ANC holds this in such high regard. It was found in this research that the liberal understanding of equality of value is coupled with the communist understanding of equality of outcome. But it is important to bear in mind that they

are not the same concept. An in-depth study of the distinction between these two understandings of equality and the implications of governments pursuing either of these types of equality could provide insight into how these understandings are used for political ends.

As a last word, if South Africa is to move towards democratic consolidation, the ANC will need to reconsider its conceptualisation of itself as a vanguard party and accept the inherently pluralist nature of liberal democracy as a regime.

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